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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
  
Colleges between Public and Private:  
An Ethnographic Case Study of Independent Colleges in China 
  
by 
 
Xiaopeng Shen 
Doctor of Philosophy in Education 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 
Professor Val D. Rust, Chair 
  
Independent colleges in China are a group of peculiar higher education institutions 
emerging in the late 1990s and expanding at a speed, hardly seen in any other higher education 
systems but maybe conceivable in the context of China’s large college-aspiring population and 
miraculous economic development. One of the most peculiar things about independent 
colleges is their institutional nature – whether they are public or private. Building upon the 
literature context of privatization in education and China’s higher education experience, this 
study investigates this young group of higher education institutions growing up in China’s 
market reform era. The central research question focuses on the nature of these independent 
colleges from an insiders’ perspective. Are they truly private higher education institutions born 
out of China’s market reform efforts in the higher education sector? Or are they rather some 
market adapted extension of some public higher education institutions? To answer these 
questions, a macro-perspective analysis is given to both present the important social policy 
context for China’s privatization experience and describe the Chinese characteristics in the 
higher education privatization process. More importantly, a micro-perspective is further 
provided in the form of an ethnographical case study to reveal the nature of independent 
colleges from an insiders’ point of view. The ethnographical case study is based upon Schein’s 
theoretical framework for studying organizational/institutional culture. Physical “artifacts”, 
espoused official value and differentiated assumptions are investigated to provide a wholesome 
iii 
picture of the institution. Zhejiang University City College, the first independent college in 
Zhejiang, is selected as the site for this ethnographical case study. 
 Through this micro and macro-perspective study, it is found that 1) founding public 
higher education institutions exert great influence over the operation of independent colleges. 
Their crucial role in the emergence and development of independent colleges is a pragmatic 
policy decision to quickly expand and diversify the higher education provision. Therefore, the 
influence of the public force shall not be overlooked in China’s higher education privatization 
experience. 2) Students in independent colleges hold an ambiguous view on the nature of 
independent colleges. On the one hand, because of the participation of public higher education 
institutions they see independent colleges as more trust-worthy and quality-ensured. On the 
other hand, they are troubled by the marginalized/stigmatized status of independent colleges as 
minban (private or people run in literal meaning) higher education institutions in China’s 
public dominant higher education system. 3) Faculty and staff in independent colleges are able 
to see both the advantages and disadvantages of this hybrid model of higher education. 
Academic resources and social recognition are important advantages. Lack of character and 
autonomy are mentioned as disadvantages. However, many argue independent colleges shall 
not go on a path with more independence. More support from the public higher education 
institution and the local government is essential to its future survival and success in China’s 
public dominated higher educationsystem.  
  
Keywords: Independent Colleges, Minban, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), Privatization, 
Massification, Chinese Characteristics, Organization Culture 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Entering the gate of Zhejiang University City College (ZUCC), it is hard to miss 
a huge grey boulder, inscribed with golden characters – truth seeking and innovation, 
noticeably standing in the front of a lawn. These are the school motto of this college 
as well as Zhejiang University (ZJU), which enjoys a high prestige in China and has 
been the sponsoring institution for ZUCC. The sharing of the same motto is an 
embodiment of the same DNA. And inscribing them on an immense boulder, 
impossible to move, seems to symbolize the unbreakable blood connection between 
the two institutions, maybe even a connection like one between a mother and a son.  
Research Problem 
Independent Colleges are a group of peculiar higher education institutions  
emerging in the late 1990s and expanding in a speed, hardly seen in any other higher 
education systems but maybe conceivable in the context of China’s large 
college-aspiring population and miraculous economic development during the first 
decade of the 21st century. One of the most peculiar things about Independent 
Colleges is their institutional nature – whether they are public or private. An 
interesting irony about these Independent colleges, that may shed insight into the 
nature of these colleges, is that although they are given the name of “Independent” 
Colleges they are hardly independent in any sense, because they are often closely 
dependent on a mother-like sponsoring public higher education institution. 
Nonetheless, the name was officially given in 2003 with the hope to regulate the 
spin-off secondary colleges of those key public universities and rectify the convoluted 
connections between the public higher education institutions and the affiliated 
colleges (Ministry of Education, 2003). In a word, the new name of Independent 
Colleges is more about addressing the existing controversies and presenting the 
supervising goal for this group of newly-emerged and unregulated higher education 
institutions than reflecting their status or nature. This ironic reality may tell much 
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about the reforming era of China and its changing higher education structure, in which 
many things are pragmatic experiments embodying the spirit of “passing the stream 
by groping stones”—a famous line from Deng Xiaoping, the chief engineer for 
China’s opening-up and reform. Under the backdrop of socialist market reforms, HE 
also becomes the important policy experimental field displaying the Chinese 
characteristics baffling the western audience.  
In addition to making sense of the name and nature of independent colleges, these 
recently-emerged higher education institutions were not fully studied when discussing 
the massification process in China. According to Trow’s theory on the transition of 
HE from elite to mass and to universal access, China’s HE entered the stage of 
massification around 2002 with the gross participation rate reaching the point of 15% 
(Yang, 2004). In 2017, this number has come to 45.7%, according to the Ministry of 
Education data. Though attention has been given to this significant increase in HE 
participation rate, the story behind this massification is less well-narrated. The rise of 
independent colleges has actually coincided with the massification process. Therefore, 
as an important contributing factor to massification, independent colleges deserve 
better understanding.  
Last but not least, as part of China’s private higher education, independent 
colleges present the paradox of China’s privatization or marketization experience. 
With the market reform in higher education starting in the late 1990s, some scholars 
have embraced the idea that China is also influenced by the neoliberal reform 
movement, which was started in the U.S. and U.K. with the withdrawal of public 
forces and the increasing role of private participation (Rizvi, 2006; Mok, 2007). How 
shall we understand China’s privatization in higher education? What are the reasons 
for its privatization? What are the salient features for China’s higher education 
privatization? These are interesting questions to reveal the Chinese experience with 
higher education privatization.  
Therefore, this study of Independent Colleges in China assigns itself the mission 
to explain the Chinese characteristics in the recent changes of China’s higher 
education system, namely the rise of a new type of private higher education 
3 
institutions having strong connections with some public higher education institutions 
in the context of China’s HE massification and privatization. Through digging into the 
inner culture and living experiences of such institutions, I hope to present not only a 
clear picture of the recent change in China’s private higher education but also a 
tentative window to explore the implications of Chinese characteristics in the age of 
market reform in a socialist China.  
 In the following, I will explain the research question, methods as well as some 
key concepts within this research so as to provide a grand tour for what this project is 
intended to achieve.  
Research Questions and Purpose  
 China’s market oriented reform in education started as early as 1985. Only in the 
beginning it is given an ambiguous term, called decentralization1. After all, the term 
“market” or “marketization” gives too much implication for a capitalistic turn. And 
China’s market reform will take on its own logic, one with Chinese characteristics. 
With the “decentralization” policy guide, the state and all levels of government are 
relegating some power down to the social forces. However, to what extent should the 
non-government social forces be allowed to carry out the market oriented educational 
experiments? How shall the power relation between the government force and the 
social force be balanced? Last but not least, what are the social forces made up of in 
China’s public dominated education system? Who are they?  
 The China experience is unique and often considered an elusive system difficult 
to understand. It is the purpose of this study to use the rise of independent colleges in 
China as a mirror to show what this “marketization” of higher education with Chinese 
                                                             
1 As early as 1985, the CCP issued the Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party of China on the reform of the Educational System which marked the beginning 
of a process of educational reform and gradually aligned the educational system with the newly 
emerging market economy. Outline for Reform and Development of Education in China issued in 
1993 restated the reduction of centralization and government control in general as the long-term 
goals of reform (CCPCC, 1993).  
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characteristics means. These colleges are an important product of China’s market 
oriented education reform and its massification experience. Looking into their stories 
can help us figure out the logic of China’s marketization in its own context.  
 This research project is going to be situated in the context of China’s 
marketization and massification experience. The background story of this experience 
will be given before the project explores one specific ethnographical case.  
 With a key focus on the recently emerged higher education 
institutions--independent colleges, the central research question is what independent 
colleges are or how we shall understand this peculiar group of higher education 
institutions in terms of its privateness and publicness. The nature of independent 
colleges is important because understanding them from an insider’s perspective can 
help to reveal the implications for the marketization with Chinese characteristics in 
the field of education.  
Research Method 
 With the most current research on minban higher education mainly focusing on 
macro-policy and structural perspective, the understanding of these universities as 
organizations from a micro-perspective is lacking. How these colleges are functioning 
on the hybrid public-private model and how this model was understood by the inside 
members are worth exploring questions in order to discover the nature of the hybrid 
model. The study of independent colleges from the theoretical lens of organizational 
culture is particularly valuable in revealing the lived experiences of those involved in 
daily operations and providing knowledge for beliefs and assumptions surrounding 
this new HE model. 
 Burton Clark is one of the pioneers in studying organizations as culture. His 
concept of “organizational saga” emphasizes on the role of key institutional 
stories/events and that of certain charismatic leaders in forming the legend and 
building up distinctive colleges (Clark, 1970; 1972). In studying the subcultures 
within HEIs, Clark takes a cultural look at the different academic disciplines and 
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reveals the specialization and differentiation of disciplinary worlds (Clark, 1987).    
Tierney, in defining the essentials for studying higher education organizational 
culture, lists six elements for studying the culture: organizational environment 
(controlling or amenable to changes), mission, socialization (role learning), 
information (information production, communication), strategy (decision making) and 
leadership (1988). Researchers seeking to understand better the culture of one 
particular college or university can examine these six concepts to reveal the shared 
value and the construction of that value. The approach recommended by Tierney 
reflects a more integration perspective and is weak in disclosing the internal struggles 
or conflicts in value.  
Schein (1992), a professor in management from MIT, borrowing concepts from 
anthropology, proposes another organizational culture framework: artifacts, such as 
physical environment, social environment, technology, overt behavior and symbols; 
espoused values, such as those institutionalized beliefs; and assumptions, such as 
assumptions about nature of reality, human relationships, and human activities. Here 
the first dimension is more physical and can be found in the college logos, curriculum, 
programs, administrative structure and etc. The second dimension reflects the purpose 
of integration for a common culture. It is often the official narrative of that institution 
or the legend. The third dimension embodies the differentiation within the 
organization, and the conflicted assumptions may appear due to disciplinary or status 
differences. In that sense, the faculty from different disciplines and students from 
different backgrounds may hold different views on the publicized mission or value.   
 In the field of Chinese higher education studies, some literatures take an 
interpretive lens to narrate the story of HEIs (Pan, 2009; Hayhoe, 2011; Rhoads, 
2014). Pan’s study takes Qinghua University, one of the most prestigious universities 
in China, as a case and focuses on relationship between the state and the university in 
the changing social context to reflect upon the issue of university autonomy (2009). 
Hayhoe uses the institutional portraits as a way to give an overview of the status of 
higher education in China. Twelve universities in different regions and representing 
different types of HEIs are selected to reflect upon the changing nature of China’s HE 
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in a mass HE era (2011). Rhoads, interested in understanding the rising research 
universities with a global ambition, takes four case studies of prominent universities 
(Tsinghua, Peking, Renmin, and Minzu) to highlight the current push for building 
China’s world class universities (2014).  
 These studies give us some detailed understanding about the institutional changes 
in China. The different institutional experiences reveal not only the cultural character 
of the universities but also the interaction between the institution and the changing HE 
environment.  
In my research, I will particularly borrow the research model from Schein to 
conduct an ethnographical case study from the perspective of institutional culture. In 
the following, I will discuss the importance of insiders’ ethnography, which is a key 
research method conducted for this study.  
 Ethnography, as a meaning-making endeavor, has gone through some 
transformation in the past few decades. The goal of creating value-neutral and 
objective research has been challenged by the rise of native anthropology, or “insiders” 
ethnography, which takes a critical view at the established authority and turns to a 
kind of value affirmation research (Erickson, 2011). In this way, a variety of insiders’ 
anthropological researches have turned up since the 1970s, focusing on revealing the 
black and native American communities from insiders’ viewpoint, rather than from 
one of an “objective” white American perspective (Aquilar, 1981).  
 In Aquilar’s critical discussion on insider research, he raises some advantages 
claimed by ethnic insider researchers, which inspire the research approach for this 
dissertation. One advantage is that insiders can interact with local members in a more 
natural way and it is easy for them to attain a thorough rapport with informants, 
because they are able to better blend in and meet the social/cultural behavioral 
requirements. This is something I can be fully aware of when I have casual 
conversations or formal interviews with students and faculty at the site. As a fellow 
insider, I can tell whether they are engaging in a sincere dialogue or not and it is easy 
for me to interact appropriately or ask the right question at the right moment. This 
insiders’ advantage offers me great convenience in understanding the context and 
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conducting the research interviews.  
 The other advantage, mentioned by Aquilar, is the ability to understand “a 
language of great subtlety which is beyond the reach of those who are not native 
speakers” and the politics behind it (1981, p. 19). In this study, some concepts with 
social/cultural implications are revealed and discussed. BianZhi, the public personnel 
system in English, is one such example. The story behind this meaning-packed social 
concept tells a lot about the subtle public influences at ZUCC. SanBen, the third tier 
college, is another one disclosing the rigidly hierarchical nature of China’s higher 
education system and the stereotypical baggage people in this kind of institutions have 
to carry with them. The implications of these concepts are beyond the studied 
institution and require the thorough knowledge as good as an insider to make sense 
and tell the story. It is important to note that an insider’s research enriches the current 
educational studies on China’s universities and colleges.  
 On the other hand, as an insider, I am also aware of the challenges. It is easy to 
take some ideas for granted and unable to see the “strange” things an outsider can 
usually discover. As Anderson-Levitt mentions, “ethnography requires a dual 
perspective: understanding the insiders' points of view to grasp the logic of their 
actions, but stepping back to take the outsiders' distanced perspective that makes 
visible what insiders would otherwise take for granted” (2006, p. 284). In order to 
avoid an insider’s negligence and bias, I took measures to keep myself reminded 
about the necessity to take a step back when needed. I find that listening, asking 
questions and taking reflective notes are particularly helpful. Let the interviewee 
finish the whole answer and ask even when I think I might have the answer. After 
interviews, I often took notes about the key issues turned up in the interviews and 
tried to write the explanation for audiences with no background knowledge. Also my 
anthropological learning has done me a great favor in keeping my mind alert about the 
fieldwork process and opening my anthropological eye for possible discoveries. When 
I went in the field as an insider researcher, I felt I was one of them but different in the 
way I think, speak and behave. It was like assuming a double identity, both as a 
participant and as a researcher. This awareness is not only interesting but also helpful 
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in revealing the otherwise obvious and taken-for-granted knowledge.  
 Last but not least, Schein’s work on the study of organizational culture provides 
the research roadmap for this dissertation (2010). His insights on looking into the 
physical artifact, the espoused values and the cultural assumptions held by sub-groups 
have led this study to focus on the campus appearance, programs, admission ads, 
official websites and tuition structure for the publicly circulated institutional image 
and on the faculty and student experiences/assumptions for the underlying 
knowledges about this institution. It is in this way, I hope, that this research has done 
a thorough job in telling the institutional nature of independent colleges—what are 
they and what they mean in the context of Chinese higher education system.  
 
Figure 1.1 Ethnographic Case Study of ZUCC 
 
 Based upon the above methodological awareness, this research draws upon the 
qualitative methods, including interviews, focus groups and participant observation, to 
dig into the insiders’ perspective on the nature of independent colleges (Merriam, 
2015). During this process, I conducted 15 formal interviews with fourth year students, 
16 formal interviews with faculty/administrators who have worked there for at least 
six years and 4 interviews with faculty/administrators from three other independent 
colleges in Zhejiang. Interviews were conducted based on Seidman’s guidance on 
how to conduct interviews for qualitative researches (2012). These interviews were 
recorded, coded and analyzed with the purpose to find the concerns and perceptions 
shared by the interviewees.  
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 In terms of careful selection of interviewees, the interviews with students were 
relatively easy to arrange. Students tend to be more open-minded and willing to share 
their true ideas. 15 interviewees came from eight different secondary colleges within 
ZUCC. The criteria for selecting interviewees include the number of years at ZUCC 
and the representation of different programs. Also, willingness to share is also a soft 
requirement, since uncooperative interviews yields not only little useful information 
but also false one. Beyond formal interviews, I have also conducted 5 focus group 
discussions with each one having four to six students participating. These are usually 
students from the same program or school. It happens that when I invite one student 
for interview, he or she wants to bring his or her friends to contribute as well. In this 
case, I always turn the interview into some small focus group discussions, which 
provide opportunities for participants to not only verify each other’s information and 
perceptions but also stimulate voluntary responses. I find these small focus groups 
especially informative and inspiring in terms of understanding the students’ 
perspective.  
 The interviews with faculty/administrators are less easy to arrange, especially for 
some administrators who currently hold leadership positions. Some tended to avoid 
sharing their personal thoughts, or politely decline to accept interviews. Faculty 
tended to be more cooperative in accepting interviews and sharing ideas, partially 
because they mostly saw me as fellow teachers working in the same college. 
Therefore, 11 out of the 16 interviews conducted at ZUCC were conducted with 
faculty from different programs. Just as what I did with students, I tried to give 
representation to the eight secondary colleges at ZUCC. For the selection of 
administrator interviewees, participation in the ZUCC staff organization activities 
turns to be very helpful. Through these activities, I was able to meet the co-workers in 
the administration building, who I usually have less chance to interact with. The 4 
interviews with faculty/administrators from other independent colleges in Zhejiang 
serve to find out similarities and differences among independent colleges in the region 
so as to provide supplementary support for the ethnographic case study.  
 In addition to interviews and focus groups, participant observation is also a key 
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research method in collecting data (Spradley, 1980). Carrying a researcher’s lens, I 
wrote fieldwork notes for some of the activities I participated in. These activities 
include opening ceremony for freshmen, commencement ceremony, campus job fairs, 
student club activities, staff soccer and badminton clubs, student recruiting/admission 
meetings, anniversary celebration events and so on. These are great events for me to 
learn the official narrative or the espoused value, as well as the nuances between the 
official narrative and the understanding of different participants on campus.  
 
Concepts 
Private HEI in China and the Concept of Minban 
 Private schools have a long history in China, rooted in Chinese culture’s great 
respect for learning. In pre-modern China, private schools, in contrast to government 
schools, were established, financed, and run by Confucian scholars or societies. Since 
the formation in the Spring-Autumn period, private schools have existed in China for 
over two thousand and five hundred years. Confucius (551-479 B.C.) was often 
considered one of the very early private tutors who established private schools in 
Chinese history (Deng, 1997). The influence of the private education fluctuated with 
the rise and fall of dynasties. During the Song Dynasty, Shuyuan (academies) were 
quite influential and became the nurturing place for new social and cultural ideas, 
such as Neo-Confucianism (Walton, 1999; Lee, 1999).  
During the Republican era of China (1912-1949), China’s modern private 
universities started to emerge with the increasing aspiration to learn from the West 
and modernize China. Some of today’s well-known universities, such as Nankai, 
Fudan and Xiamen, can find their origins in either patriotic Chinese entrepreneurs or 
western missionaries. In the 1910s and 1920s, due to the constant wars and weak 
central government their number actually surpassed that of public universities (Song, 
2003).  
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That tide was interrupted when many private schools became nationalized after 
1949. The socialist system wiped out the private sector and set up the national HE 
system after the model of the Soviet Union. Specialization in curriculum and class 
conflict in school politics began to take the central stage. It was not until the opening 
up and reform in 1978 that the nation shifted from its ultra-leftist position to a more 
moderate one tolerating trials in market-oriented reforms. In the name of market 
reform and modernization, private enterprises, including private schools, began to 
reemerge and develop, though still within the regulative framework of the socialist 
state.  
Therefore, private education can be traced back to the Confucian tradition in 
ancient times. The early missionaries, in the late 19th century and the early 20th 
century, brought the modern concept of university and discipline into China and 
established some of the earliest modern universities, such as Yenching University 
(Predecessor of Peking University, John Leighton Stuart serving as the first principal) 
and St. John’s University.2 However, since the founding of the communist China, 
many of these missionary universities were broken up and their programs were 
incorporated into different specialized colleges in order to reorganize higher education 
under the Soviet model of educational specialization. Until the opening-up and reform 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the contributions these missionary schools made in 
                                                             
 2 St. John’s University was an Anglican university in Shanghai, founded in 1879 by 
American missionaries. It was one of the oldest and most prestigious universities in China. In 
1952, the communist regime adopted a policy of specialist curriculum reform in higher 
education with the influence of the Soviet model. St John’s was broken up. The humanities 
part went to the East China Normal University (ECNU) and the medical school became part 
of today’s Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Yenching University was founded in 1915 and the 
famous missionary-educator John Leighton Stuart was the first principal of the university. In 
1952, it was also broken up and the different departments were incorporated into several 
specialized universities. Peking University inherited its arts and science faculty. More 
information can be found on these two books:  Chen, Kaiyi. Seeds from the West: St John's 
Medical School, Shanghai, 1880-1952. Imprint Publications, Chicago, 2001. West, 
Phillip. Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations, 1916-1952. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1976. 
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modernizing China were acknowledged in retrospect (Hayhoe, 1996). However, they 
have permanently disappeared from the Chinese soil with only history and memories 
left in books. 
 The current condition of private HE in China has a lot to do with the large 
context of the over 30 years’ state-led market reforms. The private education, often 
referred to as minban education (民办教育) in public media and government 
documents, is considered of great strategic importance in supplementing the 
overloaded public universities and mobilizing various social resources in education 
provision. Thus, from the viewpoint of the state, private participation is desired and 
encouraged as long as it is properly regulated and supervised. Social forces or even 
individual investments are encouraged to bring diversity both in educational forms 
and financial input to the homogeneous and overburdened public higher education 
(Hayhoe, 1996). 
 Minban or people-run (民办) in its literal meaning, is an important concept 
reflecting the current condition of private HE in China.3 After the communist 
take-over of many private properties in 1949, most private owners and their private 
businesses were deemed politically incorrect and gradually nationalized. In political 
ideology, a sense of communal living was greatly exalted and actions with private 
consideration were deemed undesirable (Tsang, 2000). Therefore, the term – private, 
though widely used in the Republican China, began to be an anachronism. It even 
caught up the negative implications of being capitalistic in such an era of 
nationalization and communism. However, still a small group of non-governmental 
institutions remained and conducted businesses in a realm permitted by the state. 
Minban, deemed neutral and insensitive, became a term used to describe a wide range 
of schools and businesses run by social organizations or individuals. Of course, before 
1978—the beginning of the reform and opening up, most minban schools were run by 
industrial enterprises, urban communities and rural cooperatives either owned or 
backed by the government. Thus, minban can mean a kind of low level participation 
                                                             
3In this paper, the term private is used to stand for minban, since in most English language scholarship the term 
private is used to make sense to the English audience. However, it is important to know the hidden implications of 
the term minban.  
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of the government and withdrawal of the government funding, but the government 
stays in the backseat and is ready to take over the wheel if necessary.  
 Since the reform and opening up, various forms of minban organizations began to 
emerge and develop. The term is used with some other terms sharing similar 
connotations, such as people-managing (min ying民营), socialization ( she hui hua社
会化), denationalization ( fei guo you hua非国有化 ), and marketization ( shi chang 
hua市场化), to describe the privatization in the post-Mao reform era. To this day, the 
term minban still bears some negative connotations, implying the possibility of losing 
collectively-owned or state-owned capital, profit-driven and uncertainty (Francis, 
2001). Despite over three decades’ market reform, the state forces seem still the most 
reliable, especially in education, and the volatility of the market proves minban 
somehow a tricky concept. Therefore, the term minban shows the Chinese 
characteristics. It reflects the nature and implication of the market/private-oriented 
reform under a socialist state, which is cautious about the vague political boundary 
between what is socialism and what is capitalism.    
Types of Minban 
 In the current context of China’s private HE, the picture of minban is becoming 
increasingly complex with both the rapid rise of young Independent Colleges and the 
foreign HEIs entering China’s market in various ways.  
 In Wang’s work on privatization of HE in China, he offers a more nuanced 
taxonomy, considering the nature and history of the ownership. Basically, he divides 
the private sector into two groups (2013). One is the traditional minban (private) HEIs 
originating either from a former public institution transforming its ownership or a 
newly established non-public ownership. This group can be traced back to the early 
1980s with the establishment of Zhonghua Societal University in 1982 in Beijing. The 
second group is the Independent Colleges, which are affiliated with public HEIs. 
Depending on whether the public institution has a private partner, this group is also 
further divided into the public-ownership model and the public-private partnership 
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model. Wang’s categorization fits better with the statistical data collection custom of 
the Ministry of Education, which lists the independent colleges as a sub-category of 
minban (private) HEIs.  
 Spring Su briefly offers three categories of private HEIs in China: degree and 
diploma-granting private colleges, independent colleges and Sino-foreign cooperative 
colleges (2011). The private HE in China before 2000 was in a very marginalized 
condition. Most offered exam-preparation courses and did not have the authority to 
offer degrees. The appearance of independent colleges around 2000 boosted the 
number of private colleges eligible to offer bachelor degrees. Su’s first category 
distinguishes the more well-established formal private HEIs from the ones offering 
non-degree courses, whose number greatly outnumbers the former type. The other 
feature different from Wang’s taxonomy is the inclusion of Sino-foreign joint HEIs, 
which are also a recent development. In 2016 there are 69 Sino-foreign joint HEIs 
(Ministry of Education, 2016). The Ministry of Education treats these institutions 
differently from the other two and does not include them in the national HE data. 
However, there is a separate official website about Sino-foreign joint HEIs established 
for the application, quality supervision and information sharing. Therefore, the status 
of these institutions is well-documented and easily accessible through that online 
source.4 Another thing worth mentioning here is there are much more Sino-foreign 
joint degree programs than joint institutions, over 300 spread out in different 
provinces of China. The possible reason is that the application process for joint 
institutions is often more tedious and rigorous. The joint programs are, on the other 
hand, less difficult to meet the requirements. And it costs far less financial and 
academic resources to open one or two programs to realize the goal of 
internationalization.  
 Therefore, Wang’s taxonomy offers more insights into the complex ownership 
structure of private HEIs with good detailed analysis into the political and social 
implications of these ownership differences; however, Su sets up a more inclusive one 
                                                             
4 This is the website leading to the recent developments in Sino-Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools. It is 
basically an information platform for supervision and resource sharing. http://www.crs.jsj.edu.cn/  
15 
and touches on the often neglected joint institutions, which have caught more and 
more attention in the current internationalization of HE. The joint institutions arose 
after China’s joining of WTO and developed quickly just like the independent 
colleges in the intensified massification process of China. If the joint programs are 
considered, they also represent a significant body of private HE in China. But their 
contribution stays more in diversification and internationalization of HE than in the 
quantitative expansion, since the joint programs’ tuition, usually ten times higher than 
the public tuition, bars the majority of the Chinese students from even considering 
applying. Therefore, in the case of Chinese private HE, the traditional minban HEIs 
and the newly-emerged independent colleges consist of the major part of China’s 
private HE sector, playing a key role in expanding the HE opportunities. For this 
study, I am going to focus on independent colleges, which take up the big 
responsibility of HE expansion and contribute greatly to meeting the HE demands.  
 
Privatization in China and Role of the State  
 The market reform since 1978, led by the late CCP leader – Deng Xiaoping, has 
been described by many as a process of China shifting away from its socialist cause 
and embracing the Western neoliberal tide (Harvey, 2007). Private businesses are no 
longer stigmatized and individuals are now allowed to enter many sectors to bring in 
competition and dynamics so as to improve efficiency and generate wealth. In 
education, the number of private schools at different levels is unprecedented since 
1949. Also, the state is shifting part of the funding responsibilities to individual 
families by charging tuition at public universities since 1997. In a word, the state 
seems to be withdrawing and the private sector is expanding to provide the services 
which were previously state-provided (Mok, 2007; Zha, 2012, 2013).  
 Under this circumstance, it is easy to include China as part of the world under the 
impact of neoliberalism (Rhoads & Torres, 2006; Rizvi, 2006). However, we should 
be cautious about the nature of this movement in China and also be aware of the 
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Chinese socio-political context. Is the Chinese state truly adopting the market to allow 
the autonomy of universities in financing and administration, which implies not only 
the shift in economic structure but in political culture? Or is the use of privatization 
only a pragmatic consideration with certain short term goals? Is the State truly ready 
to let go its dominant role in HE and allow the minban ones to take up the central 
historical stage? Mok, from a macro policy perspective, argues that the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) is now trying to bring back the role of the state to suggest a 
shift in policy towards a more left-leaning approach to reforms in social welfare in 
face of the increasing inequalities and the public complaints over education. He states, 
“the government seeks to retain the positive aspects of market forces, for example, by 
mobilizing resources and increasing access to education, while identifying and 
eradicating certain negative aspects; namely, the rising financial burden and growing 
inequalities of education, as controlling these negative aspects is critical to 
maintaining social harmony” (Mok, 2012, p. 238). Therefore, it seems the state is in a 
precarious situation, where it has to walk the wire by balancing the forces of the 
market with the public interest. Without refuting the impact of neoliberalism in China, 
Mok, nevertheless, reminds us that the state force is always there and ready to play 
the role of regulation and guidance when it sees necessary.  
 Wang (2014) takes a relatively more embedded micro perspective to look into the 
privatization in China. For him the authoritarian nature of the Chinese government 
explains the Chinese characteristics during this privatization experience. Wang points 
out that different from the systematic privatization in some western countries, the 
Chinese experience can be called the “pragmatic privatization.” Using his own words, 
“pragmatic privatization is often an ad hoc solution for a government which does not 
necessarily suggest the shrinkage of the public sector” (Wang, 2014, p. 21). With the 
state holding its dominant control over the core aspects of higher education, including 
admission policies, degree award and funding opportunities, the privatization in the 
Chinese context is not the typical neoliberalization in the western countries, such as 
Australia, America and U.K., which often happen in a deeper structural level and is 
legitimized by the change in political culture. Also, due to the concerns about the 
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capitalistic implications in the shift to privatization in a socialistic state, the term 
privatization is often avoided. Instead, phrases such as people run (min ban 民办 or 
min ying民营), socialization (she hui hua社会化), denationalization (fei guo you hua 
非国有化) and marketization (shi chang hua 市场化) are employed to describe the 
increase of the privateness in different sectors. Wang concludes by arguing that 
privatization is likely to be “a contingent strategy adopted in China’s HE sector, rather 
than a fundamental reform suggesting a paradigm shift in university governance” and 
“ultimately, privatization in HE in China was concerned more with reallocation of 
responsibility than power” (p. 111). Indeed, the significance of the state has never 
been undermined in the context of China. 
 
Independent Colleges 
 The rise of independent colleges, a peculiar group of private colleges owned or 
co-owned by public universities, is an important case to show the explicit and implicit 
roles of the public forces. A study of these colleges shows the complicated faces of the 
public HE influence in a country with strong state and market reform, two seemingly 
competing forces at the same time.   
In the late 1990s the independent colleges were first established mostly as 
secondary colleges of some public HEIs to both conveniently meet the education 
demands in the time of HE massification and bring financial benefits for public 
universities, which were left to become less financially dependent while enjoying 
more administrative autonomy (Pan, 2004; Wen, 2005). After no more than ten years, 
their number has reached over 300, which was more than the number of traditional 
degree offering private colleges with no public affiliation. In other words, in merely 
seven years this group of special colleges realized the level of expansion the 
traditional private college could not achieve in twenty years. Independent colleges are 
the ones that appear at the right time and enjoy the special association with the public 
force. The implicit public background not only brings the favoring of the government 
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but also gives them stronger credibility among students and parents who are inclined 
to trust organizations with some government sponsoring, sometimes even nominally 
only.   
It is widely accepted that China has a public-dominant higher education system. 
The private sector played mainly a peripheral role before the massification. The 
emergence of independent colleges is believed to have contributed to absorbing the 
demands and expanding the private HE (Jiang, 2012). Interestingly, in my research, I 
find the people from the traditional private HEIs do not consider independent colleges 
as fully private and independent as they are and they believe independent colleges are 
some kind of spin-offs of public HEIs, which has given them some unfair advantages 
in educational resources and public reputation. Also the people from the independent 
colleges think they are different in many ways and benefit somehow from the implicit 
public connection in comparison to other private competitors. This division shows the 
complexity of China’s minban HE and the controversial status of the newly-emerged 
independent colleges. Their hybrid model is not only baffling to the outsiders but also 
dispute-causing for the insiders5 (Wang 2012; Lu, 2009).  
 Therefore, in the case of China’s privatization, the state did not fully withdraw 
itself; rather it relegated some power to local governments or public HEIs to allow 
them bigger responsibility and autonomy. This process is strategic and practical in the 
big context of China’s entry into WTO and its long term aim of mobilizing social 
resources to reduce the financial burden and increase the competition to push the 
reform of the HE system. A careful study into the independent colleges reveals the 
in-between character of these institutions. The most prominent part of their 
privateness is fee-charging. However, the tuition in most independent colleges has not 
changed much since 1999 due to the state regulation device and the concern over 
educational equality. Besides, there are many other innate characteristics, such as 
personnel system, administration and program set-up, which reflect the strong 
                                                             
5 Certain scholars in China called independent colleges hybrid freak due to their ambivalent nature. Whether they 
should be considered public or minban is extremely controversial. Their background and founding structure gives a 
strong indication to its public force backing. However, its tuition charging and running style can be cost-effective 
and even profit-considering. Therefore, the social debate is about whether it should be given the minban status or 
return to its public nature.  
19 
influences from the state. In one word, the force of the state exerts implicit and 
explicit influences in the privatization process. The minban HEIs that have enjoyed 
quick growth and received favorable attention in the market are still those with subtle 
public connections.  
It is argued in this dissertation that independent colleges are the very products 
from the privatization with Chinese characteristics, which means a pragmatic 
privatization with the guidance or participation from public forces.  
  
Limitation and Significance of Research 
 Independent colleges are the major study subject for this research. They are not 
widely known in the western scholarship on China’s HE. One reason is they are 
relatively new and not as prominent as the well-known 985/211 project universities in 
China. The other is that the scholarship in the West tends to focus on the big picture of 
China or the rising research universities in China as they seem to represent the rising 
status of China in today’s international arena (Rhoads, 2014; Hayhoe, 2011). However, 
it needs to be recognized that China’s story of massification of HE was unfolded with 
the emergence of these new HEIs since 1999. Today almost one third of Chinese high 
school graduates go to these colleges with a history of less than 20 years for their 
undergraduate education. These colleges show us the other less known side of China’s 
HE development, enriching our understanding about the true nature of China’s HE. It 
is just like someone who wants to study U.S. will usually be given the advice to visit 
the Midwest of the country, where the majority of the ordinary folks live. Studying 
independent colleges helps us understand the mid-tier colleges in China. That is 
where most of the ordinary kids go for college and their desires and aspirations give 
us good insights into the lived experience of those average young students.   
 Furthermore, the scholarship on China’s HE is largely focused on the top 
universities or the general trend and development in the big context of globalization 
and massification, such as Hayhoe’s portrait of China’s universities in the age of 
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massification, Hawkins’ overview on the cultural dynamics in Asia’s HE system and 
Mok’s long term observation of China’s privatization policy in HE (Hayhoe, 2013; 
Hawkins, 2014; Mok, 2009). There are not enough in-depth studies on China’s HE 
transformations. Rhoads’ work on China’s rising research universities offers a good 
overview of the increasing competitiveness in research and ranking among some top 
elite universities in Beijing (2014). However, China’s HE transformation is more 
complicated and fascinating than a few elite universities. The recent global shift in 
neoliberalism has shifted the scholarly attention to China’s privatization and 
marketization in HE. Some good quality researches have given us good knowledge on 
the privatization of HE with Chinese characteristics (Su, 2011; Yan & Lin, 2010; 
Wang, 2013). Wang’s work on the recent privatization in China’s HE presents a highly 
analytical and insightful image of private or minban HE in China (2013). For him the 
state’s role in this process should never be underestimated and he even compares this 
privatization movement to the Cultural Revolution with the state playing a pivotal role 
in guiding, supporting and regulating the direction of this movement. However, 
independent colleges as a recent episode in the privatization movement are not 
well-documented and there is no ethnographical case study to offer an insider’s 
perspective on what these schools actually are, how they are connected to the market 
force and to what extent they are controlled by the state power. It is believed that an 
insider’s perspective can offer more delicate and nuanced analysis on this new page of 
China’s HE change. It is the goal of this research to give a vivid ethnographic case 
study on the organizational nature of this newly-emerged minban HEIs – Independent 
Colleges.  
The main reason to choose Zhejiang province as the research site and Zhejiang 
University City College as the case study focus is their significance for the emergence 
of independent colleges. Zhejiang University City College (ZUCC) is widely known 
as the first independent college in China. It started to admit students in 1999, when 
this concept of independent college did not even exist. And Zhejiang province is 
famous of experimenting on new market ideas in China. Some market reforms, such 
as private business owners in the 1980s, all first appeared in Zhejiang. Therefore, it is 
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not a total surprise to see a new type of HEIs first appeared in Zhejiang. Also, the 
Zhejiang Model of independent colleges, popular among Chinese HE scholars, have 
received more favorable comments and is believed to be an exemplary model for 
independent colleges in other provinces to learn from (Xu, 2011). In addition, 
accessibility is also a practical consideration for conducting this research. With the 
author’s work experience in Zhejiang’s HE system, it is relatively easy to access the 
independent colleges in Zhejiang.  
After almost ten years’ high-speed development, in 2008 many independent 
colleges started to reconsider their strategies and directions. The expansion in size is 
not sustainable for the long run with the slowing down of entering students’ number. 
The 2008 No. 26 Decree on Establishment and Management Methods for Independent 
Colleges placed strict regulations on opening and running an independent college. The 
shift from quantity to quality and standards has pressed all the independent colleges to 
find new ways to develop or even to survive. These recent developments may help us 
see how these independent colleges deal with new challenges in a post-massification 
era and how they seek their place in China’s HE. An ethnographical case study in 
Zhejiang can offer an insider’s view on this fascinating shift in an age of late or 
post-massification.  
 In terms of limitation, this study is limited in scope. If more research resources 
are available, it can cover the stories of independent colleges in different provinces of 
China. Though all the independent colleges in China are supported by certain public 
HEIs, there might be some regional differences. This study tries to portray the story of 
independent colleges in Zhejiang, which are famous for public ownership and private 
operation. In other provinces, the ownership structure is more complicated. For 
example, in Hubei province, there are more independent colleges which are co-owned 
by one public HEI and one private company/individual. That ownership structure can 
complicate the daily operation, since the two owners may have different opinions in 
how to run the school.  
 In addition, the story of China’s private/minban HEIs is very complex. 
Independent colleges are the recently emerged supplement to this big group. As 
22 
mentioned earlier, the traditional minban HEIs and the Sino-foreign joint HEIs are 
integral part of the story as well. Their interactions with the state and the peculiar 
institutional culture they display are also important for better understanding China’s 
privatization experience. However, this study, due to the limitation in scope, only 
focuses on independent colleges. The aim is to contribute to the understanding of 
China’s privatization experience through the in-depth study of independent colleges. 
A more extensive study on traditional minban HEIs and Sino-foreign joint HEIs can 
of course yield more valuable knowledge on the full picture of China’s privatization 
experience.  
 Lastly, if time allows, more interviews and fieldwork can be conducted beyond 
the major research site of ZUCC. I made three fieldwork visits to three other 
independent colleges in Zhejiang and four interviews with staff working in these 
colleges. It would be better if I could spend more time immersing myself in these 
three other independent colleges in Zhejiang. More comparison can be done to see the 
differences and similarities among these independent colleges.  
 
 In the following chapters, I will discuss the marketization background of China’s 
HE and the policy evolution on independent colleges. Then, I will present the details 
for the ethnographic case study about one independent college in Zhejiang—Zhejiang 
University City College (ZUCC). Chapter 2 gives the background story about China’s 
private education experience and the recent private or minban HE structure in the 
reform era. With that background knowledge, I will draw the next knowledge circle 
by presenting the social and policy background of the independent colleges in Chapter 
3. Bearing in mind the macro-picture understanding of China’s private education and 
the history of recent independent colleges experience, further anthropological 
investigation is conducted to reveal the microscopic picture of one independent 
college in Zhejiang in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. Building upon the Schein’s research model, 
I conducted research to collect the “artifacts”, including university prospectus, 
program introduction, school anniversary celebration PPT, official website documents, 
student recruiting data release, personnel information data and etc. The collected 
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information builds the foundation for Chapter 4 in exploring the physical and official 
face of the institution. Chapter 5 is focused on the perception of students studying in 
the institution. Priority is given to senior students who have been in the environment 
long enough to form their understanding. Chapter 6 is built upon the perception of 
faculty/staff who have worked there for more than 6 years. Their stories and 
experiences in the physical environment show the true nature of the institution with 
powerful testimonies. It is important to note some “assumptions” found in the 
research process coincide with the message the “artifacts” try to convey. However, 
there are also other surprising results disclosing a different facet of the independent 
college experience. Therefore, the study into the “assumptions” of people inside the 
organization offers a vivid insiders’ perspective on the nature of the institution and the 
culture it displays. How they feel and understand is an important piece of the jigsaw.  
The ethnographic case study is also supported by further fieldworks and 
interviews at other independent colleges in Zhejiang to deduce the shared experience 
among all the independent colleges in Zhejiang so that the case study is not just an 
exceptional one but one with representativeness. It is interesting to note that the 
schools do try to learn from each other, especially from the successful ones. Good 
models or experiences quickly spread to other institutions so they may catch up in the 
competition. In this sense, ZUCC, as one of the most successful independent colleges 
in China and the earliest one in Zhejiang, is a good place to conduct an ethnographical 
research in understanding independent colleges.  
 
Figure 1.2  ZUCC and Its Eco-Environment 
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Overall the study is conducted just like operating on a human body, if we 
compare the subject of the ethnographical study to a human body. The general 
condition check of that human body is similar to the social and policy background of 
all independent colleges in China. The eco-environment that human body lives in is 
equal to China’s private education experience. And the ethnographical study is a 
surgery operation into the specifics of that human body. The functions and adaptations 
of these specific organs shall be understood by learning their interactions or relations 
with the whole body and the environment. Therefore, it is a more holistic view on 
how to conduct an ethnographic case study.  
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Chapter 2  Minban HEIs in China 
   
Theory of Privatization and Its Problematic Application in the Context of China 
 Privatization, if broadly viewed, often means attempts to increase participation of 
the private sector and to promote the role of market in a national socio-economic 
system. According to Bennett (1997), there can be three forms of privatization: 
divestment, delegation and displacement. The first represents the transfer of public 
assets to the private sectors; delegation refers to the change of managerial 
responsibilities into the private hands while retaining public ownership; and 
displacement indicates the private sector displaces the public forces through 
competition and deregulation.  
 The following continuum shows the movement away from the public provision 
and the increasing participation of the private sector (Wang, 2013). In the West, there 
is much scholarship discussing this change. The increasing emphasis on efficiency 
and effectiveness, the introduction of new evaluation/measuring standards to improve 
accountability, the advocating for public-private partnership as well as the rise of 
human capital theory to justify the increasing individual cost for education are all the 
main intellectual currents surrounding the global movement in favor of a 
market-oriented and choice-accentuated user-pay system (Schulz, 1961). Both Bok 
(2003) and Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) document the above described systematic 
change in the field of higher education from different perspectives. This 
encroachment on the concept of education as a public good is also found elsewhere in 
the world. Rhoads and Torres (2006) depicts how, in South America, the weakening of 
the state’s role and the strengthening of the market impact both the autonomy of the 
university and its function of serving the public good. Therefore, it is fair to say that 
from a linear perspective privatization is a course of action for governance change 
from more public influences to more private involvement.  
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Figure  2.1 Public and Private Continuum  
 
One important theory explaining this systemic shift is the new public 
management concept. Osborne and Gasebler (1992) put forward the idea of 
entrepreneurial spirit in the field of public management, when such countries as 
Britain and the U.S. experienced fiscal difficulties in the late 1980s. Facing the 
budgetary deficits, public sectors adopted a series of strategies to solve the problem of 
decreasing efficiency in an increasingly cumbersome public service system. Reducing 
public expenditure and improving efficiency proved to be more feasible than 
increasing taxation and cutting services. Managerialism began to be introduced into 
the public sector to develop entrepreneurial spirit in public management so as to gain 
better efficiency and successfully reduce public expenditure. Performance evaluation 
to achieve effective and efficiency became the core logic in the new public 
management (Dale, 1997; Codd and Harker, 1997).  
 This influential concept has impacted many aspects of education since the late 
1980s and greatly changed the relationship between the state, the market and 
education. Terms, such as devolution or decentralization, have been used to describe 
the process and point out the restructuring of the state and education relationship 
(Dale, 1997; Hawkins, 2000; Mok, 2001, 2007).  
In China’s context, scholarship also covers the increasing popularity of the new 
public management concept in higher education. Lai and Lo (2007) ’s ethnographic 
work on the lived academic experience in a regional university in China reveals the 
introduction of evaluation standards, the stress on efficiency and its subsequent 
impacts on the faculty life. With China’s economic growth, the ambition to build 
world-class universities has driven the state to stimulate the potential of research 
universities and compete at the global level through national initiatives, such as 
Project 211 and Project 985 (Rhoads, 2014). The increasing emphasis on first-class 
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(Yi Liu in Chinese) has largely pushed the faculty life to be more quantitatively 
evaluated and efficiency-oriented.  
 
Problematic Application in the China Context 
 Despite the popular rise of the new public management concept and its impact on 
education in China, China’s own unique condition should not be ignored. China’s 
Mao era (1949-1976), characterized by nationalization and de-privatization, and its 
socialist ideology does not disappear so easily and still exerts influences on the 
privatization experience in the reform era (Lin, 1999). 
Kornei (2000) proposes a mixed system to capture the dynamic interplay between 
the socialist and capitalist elements in the post-socialist nations, which might be 
useful in understanding the China context. The term, “mixed system”, is used to 
describe the adoption of capitalist mechanisms in a socialist regime, and under this 
system the socialist and capitalist features coexist to serve the political and economic 
structure. China’s “socialist market economy” fits well in this “mixed system” model, 
in which capitalist market mechanisms are adopted to serve the economy in a socialist 
political framework. A similar and influential study on China’s mixed system can be 
found in Huang (2008)’s work on state capitalism. From a political economy 
perspective, Huang explores the development of the Chinese private sector and 
reveals China’s unique model of state-led capitalistic reform in urban areas. The most 
inspiring message from the book is to never underestimate the role the state plays in 
China’s market reform and the timing the state chooses to intervene.  
In this sense, the market reform and privatization, in terms of improving 
competition and efficiency, can be considered as a means to serve the purpose of 
economic and social development under the socialist political ideology and not be 
mistaken as a fundamental political restructuring. To further this argument, 
Feigenbaum et al. (1998) proposes a typology on the different purposes of 
privatization, which helps to reveal the nature of privatization under a socialist state. 
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There are three different types of privatization: tactical, systemic and pragmatic 
privatization. Tactical privatization, with political needs, intends to achieve short term 
political goals of those backing the policy, which may have a long term impact. It is 
often used by the party to gain political allies or win political supports from certain 
interest groups. Systemic privatization, however, focuses on the long term goals and 
pushes for the shift of power from the public sector to the private. It is the most 
comprehensive kind of privatization with an intention to change the political culture 
and shrink the role of the government. Lastly, pragmatic privatization, which I argue 
is most relevant to the China context, is an ad hoc solution for a state that does not 
necessarily suggest the shrinkage of the public role. It does not mean any political or 
ideological shift and is mostly a short term solution to settle an immediate problem or 
challenge.  
 In China’s mixed system, the communist influence is still there and plays an 
ineligible role in shaping and regulating policies on privatization. The deliberate 
avoidance of terms, such as privatization (si you hua私有化) and capitalism (zi ben 
zhuyi资本主义), is more and less out of a fear for their undermining of the 
communist regime. A list of alternative terms, such as people run (min ban民办), 
socialization (she huihua社会化) and marketization (shichanghua市场化) are 
employed to describe the process of privatization.  
 In Wang’s recent study on China’s privatization experience in higher education, 
he reminds us that “although privatization leads to increased private participation and 
strengthened markets, it does not necessarily shrink the overall size of the public 
sector. In other words, this is not a zero sum game in which the increase of the private 
results in immediate retreat of the public” (Wang, 2013, p.30). Therefore, one should 
be careful not to assume that the adoption of some privatization strategies in China’s 
higher education experience, such as the rise of more private or minban HEIs, implies 
the political shift from public to private with some deep systemic impacts. Only when 
we take a close-up look at the Chinese experience can it be found that the increase of 
the private HEIs does not necessarily foresee the shrinkage of the public sector. On 
the contrary, it is one of the key tasks for this study to show a substantial part of the 
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rising private HEIs have a clear public backing. The affiliation with some public force 
provides some great advantages during their emergence and development for the past 
one and a half decade or so.  
In one word, the communist infrastructure determines the direction and width of 
this privatization path. In the mixed system with a strong communist state, the 
privatization is mainly used as a useful mechanism to achieve the efficiency and 
resource mobilization goals for a state that is making every effort to achieve Chinese 
dream of wealth and power in the 21st century (Schell and Delury, 2013). It is a dream 
with over one hundred years of incubation, which is often characterized by struggles 
and chaos. With the beginning of the reform era, a series of deregulation policies have 
been introduced to increase competition so as to enhance the microeconomic 
efficiency. Also the market culture has been developed to mobilize resources from 
individuals to participate in different sectors of the social and economic activities. All 
this is for the goal of achieving modernization and improving wealth and power. 
Therefore, it should be noted that it is the state and the communist regime that 
initiates such a privatization process focusing on the goal of reform. And the state 
keeps a watchful eye to see when and how to intervene so as to balance the interests 
of different groups and keep the development on a steady-going track. This is where 
the Chinese case is most interesting and vastly different from the western neoliberal 
change, which often suggests a political purpose of structural adjustment and power 
shift through the denationalization of public services and the adoption of the user-pay 
principle.  
Hence, it is suggested that the neoliberal privatization experience shall also 
consider the distinctive national contexts. As this study tries to unfold, China’s 
minban higher education experience is not the simple increase of the private sector or 
the shift away from the public, just like the continuum showed above. In this story, the 
rising minban HEIs become a useful means to mobilize resources to meet the goal of 
increasing participation rate during the massification era. They serve the much-needed 
national social and economic development by providing the necessary skill-oriented 
human resources in China’s miraculous economic boom. However, they cannot and 
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will not replace the dominant public sector; the competition they bring in has a very 
limited impact on the public HEIs, which often enjoy favorable policies in recruiting 
and degree program establishment. As a matter of fact, the independent colleges, 
which are the focus of this study, create more pressure and competition for the 
traditional minban HEIs, which have been existing in a peripheral level for almost two 
decades since the 1980s.  
 In the following, I will discuss the brief history of private HE in China so as to 
offer a background knowledge on the private experience with Chinese characteristics.  
  
Brief History of Private Higher Education 
Private schools have a long history in China. In pre-modern China, private 
schools, in contrast to government schools, were established, financed and run by 
individuals or learned societies. Since the formation in the Spring-Autumn period, 
private schools have existed in China for over two thousand and five hundred years. 
Confucius (551-479 B.C.) was often considered one of the very early private tutors 
who established private schools in Chinese history (Deng, 1997). The influence of the 
private education fluctuated with the rise and fall of dynasties. During the Song 
Dynasty, Shuyuan (academies) were quite influential and became the nurturing place 
for new social and cultural ideas, such as Neo-Confucianism (Walton, 1999; Lee, 
1999). During the Republican era of China (1912-1949), China’s modern private 
universities started to emerge with the increasing aspiration to learn from the West 
and modernize China (Song, 2003). That tide was interrupted when many private 
schools became nationalized after 1949. The socialist system wiped out the private 
sector until the opening up and reform in 1978. In the name of market reform and 
modernization, private enterprises, including schools, began to reemerge and develop, 
though still within the regulative framework of the socialist state. Therefore, the 
private education can be traced back to the Confucian tradition in history and should 
be viewed from a historical perspective 
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The Republican Era (1912-1949) 
Since the Opium War in the 1840s, western style learning began to take hold in 
China. Around the turn of the 20th century, China’s first batch of modern universities, 
which often combine both the Chinese and western features of learning, started to 
emerge (Hayhoe, 1996). China actually experienced a golden age for the development 
of private universities in this period.  
The passion of new Chinese intellectuals to modernize China and the relatively 
loosely-controlled private sector in a time featuring wars and chaos provide the 
historical context for the emergency and development of various private universities, 
including missionary ones and non-governmental ones established by patriotic 
capitalists and overseas Chinese. As a matter of fact, many prestigious public 
universities in today’s China originated in the tumultuous early 20th century of China, 
finding their roots in these early private universities. In 1938 there were 50 public 
HEIs and 47 private HEIs. The private HEIs included prestigious ones, such as Fu 
Dan University (1905), Xiamen University(1921) and Nankai University(1919). The 
development of private HE was supported by national capitalists, western-educated 
Chinese, overseas Chinese, missionaries, foreign foundations (Yale-China) as well as 
local government officials (Song, 2003). These pioneering efforts to build universities, 
combining the western and Chinese intellectual frameworks, symbolized an eager 
attempt to catch up and pull China out of the backward position in the world order. 
The weak central government, occupied with the wars, was unable to build a 
satisfying public HE system and left great room for the development of private HEIs.  
According to Yeh (2000), roughly there were four major types of HEIs during the 
Republican era: state-sponsored universities created under the Qing, western (mainly 
American) missionary colleges, private Chinese colleges, and government-sponsored 
institutions supported by the Nationalist Party (Yeh, P 3-4). Chinese scholar, Song, 
categorizes the HEIs during this era into three categories: public, private and 
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missionary colleges. Though they might have minor differences in how to categorize 
the HEIs in this era, they both argue private HEIs had a prominent position in the HE 
system of that time (Song, 2003).   
Private HEIs at the turn of the century were products of political protests and 
intellectual discontents on the part of overseas students, gentry-elites, patriotic 
scholars. The earliest two were China College (Zhongguo Gongxue) and Fudan 
College (Fudan Gongxue), which were both founded in Shanghai in 1905-1906. They 
were both results of massive student discontent. China College originated with the 
large number of Chinese students, who studied in Japan on the eve of the Japanese 
victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. They were political active and many 
went to Japan in order to seek ways to revive the ailing Chinese nation. In the winter 
of 1905, over 1000 students left Japan for Shanghai, protesting the new regulations on 
Chinese students from the Japanese Ministry of Education. With the support of some 
gentry elites, these students rented a few buildings in the spring of 1906 and 
announced the birth of China College (Yeh, 2000).  
Private HE during this era held a very important role in terms of HE provision 
and pursuit of academic autonomy and national rejuvenation. For a time, the number 
of private HEIs exceeded that of public ones (Song, 262). Though entering the 1930s 
the “partification”（党化） policy, advanced by the nationalist party to put the HEIs 
under their strict control, restrained the self-directed development of private HEIs and 
led to the rise of the nationalist party controlled public HEIs, the private HEIs had its 
heights during this era and produced many important intellectuals and activists 
connecting their self-cultivation with the radical public engagement.  
 
The Socialist Era (1949-1978) 
In 1949, the Communist regime overthrew the Nationalist government and 
founded the People’s Republic of China. Then China experienced a period of 
de-privatization, which nationalizes many industries. The private schools were all 
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reorganized to follow the Soviet education model. From 1949 to 1978, the private 
education, deemed capitalistic and bourgeois, had been forbidden and the historical 
connection with its past was also disrupted.  
In 1950, the First National Conference on Higher Education was held to establish 
government control over the administrative and financial activities of all private 
universities and colleges. All foreign-subsidized church-run universities were also 
converted into public ones. Following the Soviet model, many comprehensive 
universities were broken up into specialized colleges, such as medical colleges, 
agricultural colleges and engineering colleges. Many of these small colleges had no 
more than 1,500 students. By 1956, almost all the private HEIs had been nationalized 
(Lin, 1999).  
With the anti-rightist campaign and the “Great Leap Forward” in the late 1950s, 
higher education was forced to experience a drastic expansion. In 1965, the 434 HEIs 
in China provided services to a student population of 670,000 (Deng, 1997). Also, 
many college graduates from the top universities were sent to the rural or remote 
regions to learn from peasants and workers. College admission requirements turned to 
be more political than academic. Those from “red” families were given preference 
over those with academic potentials. Colleges shifted the curriculum focus from 
theoretical instruction to instructions related to practical labor and social activities. 
From 1966 to 1976, the Cultural Revolution put the whole national higher education 
system into some chaos. The national college entrance examination was discontinued 
and majority of the academic instructions were replaced by class struggles and 
political confrontations. It was not until the end of the “Ten Year of Turmoil” in 1977 
that the national education system began to gradually recover and some early “minban” 
colleges emerged to provide college entrance exam preparation with simple facilities 
and some teaching staff.  
One thing to note in this era is that in the early 1950s the communist government 
once encouraged the different social forces, such industrial enterprises, government 
agencies, social organizations, rural cooperatives and urban communities, to establish 
and run a kind of “minban” school. In the early days of the socialist China, the nation 
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experienced great shortage in talents and material resources. Therefore, it was a way 
to mobilize social resources to help with the building of the already shattered 
education system. Interestingly, this logic can also be found in the Reform era, when 
the nation was trying to achieve the goal of development with limited resources. It is 
equally important to note that In the early days, despite the participation of social 
forces, the government required the inclusion of socialist training in all the curriculum 
to assert the political power over the education system.  
 
The Reform Era (1978-Today) 
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping shifted the national attention from political struggles 
onto economic reforms aimed at modernizing the country. In the name of “reform and 
opening up”, a more decentralized market approach was taken to transform the 
economy. Education was also given great attention and believed to be the key force in 
reinvigorating the nation (Deng, 1997).  
After Deng Xiaoping’s attempt to modernize the country through reform and 
opening up, policy-makers began to consider the possibility to diversify the economic 
sector as well as the educational providers. Minban education, as a new term 
embodying the compromise or the combination between the socialist ideal and the 
market-oriented reform, came to be accepted or even promoted as a useful supplement 
to the public education. In 1982 the first minban (people-run) college, China Social 
University (ZhongHua She Hui Da Xue), opened and in the same year more than 100 
minban institutions were established (Wang, 2013; Deng, 1997). Though most of 
these minban HEIs were adult-level education focusing on self-examination and had 
no authority to award degrees, it symbolized the return of private HE in the form of 
Minban HE.  
In 1987, the State Education Commission (the predecessor of the Ministry of 
Education) issued a series of documents, including the Provisional Regulations 
Concerning Educational Institutions Run by Social Forces and the Provisional 
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Regulations on the Financing of Educational Institutions Run by Social Forces. These 
documents provided the legal support for the establishment of private education 
institutions by enterprises, democratic parties, organizations, economic collectives or 
individual citizens.  
To affirm the reformist “open policy”, the government continued to provide 
policy support for private education in the 1990s. In 1993, the Provisional Stipulation 
on the Establishment of Private Higher Education Institutions was passed to provide 
the guideline for promoting the opening of HEIs run by “social forces”. In 1997, the 
principle of “active encouragement, unstinting support, proper guidance and 
administration” was clarified in the Provisions on Running Schools with Private 
Resources. Under the auspices of government policy, private institutions enjoyed a 
quantitative increase, though many still only provide non-degree course programs. 
Some grasped the opportunity to rise as medium-sized degree-awarding colleges with 
some specialization during this period. For example, Xian Translation and 
Interpretation College, established in 1987, developed into a language-translation 
specialized college awarding both bachelor degrees and vocational training 
certificates with a student population of over 10,000.  
In spite of the opening up for different channels of running schools, the minban 
institutions were still at the margin of the education system and served mainly as 
“useful supplement” to the public sector. Around the turn of the 21st century, the 
central government set up certain supporting policies to build China’s top universities 
into world-class ones. The Action Plan for Revitalization of Education in the 21st 
Century was passed in 1999. Also, the “211” project and “985” project were 
established respectively in 1995 and 1999 to provide significant financial support for 
the selected universities for improving the global academic competitiveness (Wang, 
2013). There were about 100 key public universities/colleges included in the “211” 
project to upgrade these top tier universities so as to meet the 21st century 
requirements for HE. The “985” project further selected 39 universities to build them 
into “world-class” universities. These projects mostly benefited the top universities 
and were important measures to achieve the goal of “national rejuvenation through 
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science and education”. Therefore, while the public HEIs, especially the top ones, 
competed to improve academic quality with the funding support from the central and 
provincial governments, the minban HEIs played the important role of serving the 
quantitative development of higher education through mobilizing resources from the 
society. It can be argued that the minban HEIs, many of which emerged in the late 
1990s, significantly contributed to the massification of higher education in China. In 
1999 only 37 private institutions, with an enrolment of 46,000 students, were fully 
recognized by the Ministry of Education to confer their own graduation diplomas. By 
2008 the number of private institutions that were eligible to confer degrees and 
diplomas had grown to 638, including 322 independent colleges. They constituted 28 
percent of all higher education institutions in China, with an enrolment of four million 
students, representing about one fifth of the entire enrolment in the regular higher 
education sector (Zha, 2011).  
 However, most of these institutions rely on tuition and fees to operate and they 
are often considered inferior in academic quality. Therefore, despite their important 
contribution in massification, they have never posed serious challenge to the status of 
public institutions. In the stratified structure of China’s higher education, they often 
occupy the lower or middle echelon due to the policy structure and the social 
stereotyping. This systemic differentiation assigns different roles to public HEIs, 
especially the top 100, and minban HEIs, with the former focusing on research and 
academic competitiveness in a global scale and the latter serving the education of an 
expanded population of youth with application oriented knowledge. Entering the 
former institutions often means a subsidized tuition and better learning resources; on 
the contrary, enrolling into the latter often stands for tripled or quadrupled tuition and 
comparatively poor teaching quality.  
 The foregoing discussion gives the basic information about the transformation of 
private higher education in China. The development of private institutions only 
became possible after the reformist agenda came to the front. The government seemed 
to have adopted a decentralized policy to encourage greater market competition, 
improve the diversity of education provision as well as relieve itself the financial 
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burden. Generally, the Chinese government holds a positive attitude towards different 
forms of private higher education. The fore-mentioned legal support has established 
the private education as an important part of the education system.  
In 2010, the National Medium- and Long-term Planning Framework for 
Education Reform and Development (2010 – 2020) states the importance of providing 
“greater support” for minban education through ensuring the equal legal status of 
these minban schools and the students/teachers in them as well as developing 
preferential policies. Therefore, it actually confirms the currently disadvantaged 
position of minban institutions in comparison to the well-funded and 
socially-recognized public institutions. The sound regulation and assessment of 
minban institutions are also mentioned to ensure the healthy development so as to 
avoid problems, such as inappropriate allocation of funds and profiteering. In the 
section on reforming school-running system, the Development (2010-2020) clearly 
states that while encouraging participation of different social forces and enriching 
school-running forms, it is equally important to maintain the dominant role of 
government-run schools with the whole-society participation in developing minban 
and public education together (Ministry of Education, 2010).  
 Therefore, it is important to note that the government does provide various 
supports, especially in legal terms, to minban higher education in the Reform Era. The 
market approach does greatly increase the existence and development of minban HEIs. 
However, there seems to be a vague boundary and the government keeps itself ready 
to use regulation measures when it seems necessary. And fundamentally, the public 
HE still and will continue to play the dominant role in the education system. Minban 
HE largely serves to increase diversity and market choices through more innovative 
school-running mechanisms.  
 In the following, I will discuss the types of minban HEIs existing in China.  
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The Three Types of Private Higher Education in the Reform Era 
The current categorization mainly builds itself upon the foundation process and 
ownership. For example, Spring Su (2011) comes up with three categories: traditional 
minban HEIs capable of offering degrees and diplomas; independent colleges 
affiliated with some public HEIs; and the Sino-Foreign cooperative colleges. Li Wang 
(2014), focusing mostly on the traditional minban HEIs and independent colleges, 
goes further to break them into different models on the basis of the ownership 
structure when they were founded. Considering the impacts of globalization and 
Chinese universities’ great interest in developing global connections, the group of 
Sino-foreign joint institutions should not be ignored while discussing the recent 
development trends of private higher education in China. Therefore, I will adopt 
Spring Su’s typology and explain each category. 
 
1) Traditional Minban HEIs: the “Stepchild” 
 The traditional minban HEIs represent the first group of minban education 
emerging in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1985, the CPC issued a legal document, 
titled “Decision on Reform of the Education System,” to encourage all social forces, 
including democratic parties, different organizations, and individuals to participate 
actively in developing minban education in various ways (Jiang, 2011; Mok, 1999). 
Local entities, no matter it was government affiliated or privately established, were all 
encouraged to engage in the provision of educational services. This is what often 
termed as the decentralization process. During it, private entrepreneurs, democratic 
parties (social political parties), educational groups, and even local government all 
participated in the wave of establishing Minban HEIs. For example, Zhejiang Shuren 
College was established by Zhejiang Political Consultative Committee members 
under the auspice of Zhejiang provincial government in 1984. However, Beijing 
Geely University was founded by the Geely Auto Group in 2000 with the support 
from Beijing municipal government. One interesting point from these minban HEIs is 
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that although the founding parties can vary much, they all receive some kind of 
support or consent from the local government, either favorable policy support or land 
granting support. Therefore, the minban HEIs have never been purely private or 
totally independent from government influences. Down to earth, they all have to 
adhere to the national and provincial policies for student admission and 
school-running standards. 
  Though enjoying some autonomy in fee charging and curriculum innovation, they 
have to follow the policies to recruit students after most of the public HEIs and fully 
reply on fees and tuitions to cover the operational cost. Most minban HEIs discover 
their operational autonomy to be greatly constrained when they have to follow the 
central ministry’s guidelines closely in developing and launching academic programs, 
designing curricula, conferment of degrees or qualifications. A close look at the list 
can reveal that most of these colleges offer associate degree programs and the names 
indicate their vocational orientations (Pan, 2010). With a supplemental position to the 
public HEIs, their reputation is usually associated with poor educational quality, 
low-scoring students, fee-charging (or profit-making) and skill preparation. Due to the 
negative publicity, the lack of mobility channels and social stereotyping, both students 
and faculty in such institutions have a sense of inferiority, even though they consist of 
an important part of the HE system. Having a lower “social status”, some traditional 
minban HEIs’ principals call themselves “stepchildren” to express grievances about 
the unequal treatment between minban HEIs and those with public affiliations. In 
2008, there were about 318 such colleges, which was almost equal to the number of 
independent colleges in that year. However, one interesting phenomenon is that 
although the two types of minban colleges shared an equal institutional number, the 
number of students enrolling in independent colleges exceeded that in traditional 
minban HEIs by almost 7 times (Ministry of Education, 2008). Considering the first 
appearance of independent colleges in 1999 and traditional miniban HEIs in 1982, the 
independent colleges have grown to surpass the traditional ones in only a few years. 
Some argue it is another form of unfair competition, because independent colleges are 
affiliated with reputed public HEIs. In the following, I will further on to discuss the 
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independent colleges.  
 
2) Independent Colleges: the “Innovation” of Guo You Min Ban (Publicly 
Owned and Run by Social Forces)  
 The emergence of this type of minban HEIs embodies the reform spirit of China: 
groping stones while wading through the water. They first appeared in 1998 and 1999 
in Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the two economically most developed provinces with a 
reputation of support for min ying (private) enterprises. As a matter of fact, they were 
the result of some institutional ingenuity developed with the cooperation between 
some successful enterprises with an interest in education and some reform-minded 
local governments seeking ways to satisfy the huge social demands for HE and make 
full use of the reputed educational resources of those public HEIs.  
 When independent colleges were first established, they were identified as the 
secondary colleges affiliated with public HEIs. Most of them shared the same 
campuses with the mother institutions and drew upon the faculty resources to teach 
part-time at the secondary colleges. Therefore, they had an intimate dependent 
relationship with the public HEIs in terms of administration, finance, curriculum 
design, and faculty recruitment. In Chinese, they were first called Er Ji Xue Yuan, 
meaning second tier colleges, which indicates their strong affiliation with the mother 
institutions. Later, with the deepening reforms to separate them from the more reputed 
public HEIs and the critiques on these colleges’ unfair and relentless pursuit of 
benefits from their affiliation with the mother institutions, they went on the effort to 
establish themselves as “independent colleges.” In 2003, beware of the rapid rise of 
“independent colleges” and the wide-spread social critiques about the social and 
educational status of these schools, the Ministry of Education issued Proposals on 
Standardizing and Tightening up Administration over Independent Colleges Run on 
Trial Basis under New Mechanisms and Patterns by Higher Education Institutions 
(Su, 2011, p. 29, Ministry of Education, 2003). There are two main purposes: 1) 
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continue the development of independent colleges to meet the social demands on 
higher education; 2) legally categorize them as independent colleges and give them a 
reform schedule to operate increasingly independently from the mother school, 
including conferring diplomas bearing their own names and establishing a separate 
campus from the mother institution (Su, 2011, p. 29). Although the regulative verdict 
tends to prompt these institutions to plan their long-term independent development, 
most independent colleges were worried about their attraction to students when they 
couldn’t confer the diploma bearing the seal of the reputed public HEI and had to 
remove themselves from the physical location of the public HEI’s campus, which, 
with its usually century long history, improves the social credibility of the 
independent colleges.  
 In the intellectual world, there are mainly two voices about this type of 
institutions. On the one hand, some scholars and leaders of the traditional minban 
HEIs hold a negative view about them, pointing to the educational chaos or even 
cheating under the name of independent colleges. They argue these institutions are 
basically the cash cows for public HEIs or some profit-oriented social enterprises with 
them charging high fees and receiving favorable land and loan policies from local 
governments. Some even go further to call them a freakish invention because of their 
status of being Gong You Min Ban (publicly owned and run by social forces), which 
puts them in a grey area blurring the boundary between the public and private 
education (Mok, 2008; Liu, 2012). On the other hand, those engaging in the 
establishment and development of independent colleges point to the contributions 
they have made to the expansion of HE from the elite stage to the mass stage in China. 
The organization of independent colleges is a public-private partnership model, which 
is suitable for the current public dominant HE system. Their rapid rise has proved 
themselves to be the new type of minban HE model fit for the Chinese national 
conditions. With the current short history, it still takes time to perfect these institutions 
and find a HE development path suitable for their long term development (Yan, 
2010b).  
 Independent colleges are the result of a historical period characterized by the 
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market oriented reforms under the government regulation. With the public dominant 
HE system in China, the public HEIs enjoy many favorable state educational policies 
and the social status coming with their soft influences. Given the long time 
marginalized position of minban HE, it seems logical for some public HEIs to take the 
initiative in building a type of HEIs with a blurred public and private line. In order to 
make sense of this type of minban HEIs one must first understand the China’s current 
national conditions and the history of minban education in the PRC era. Gong You 
Min Ban (publicly owned and privately run) is a term vividly depicting the 
educational reality with Chinese characteristics. Public ownership or public 
dominated ownership means not only more market credibility among parents and 
students, but also strong ties with the government and the reputed public HEI, which 
can bring some favorable attention from the ministry. Therefore, a further study of 
independent colleges may give us a more in-depth understanding about the 
educational realities in today’s China. With the current number of about three hundred 
independent colleges, they have become a major part of the degree-awarding minban 
HEIs in China.   
  
3) Sino-Foreign Joint Institutions: Cross-National Marriage  
 Sino-foreign joint institutions is another type of minban HEIs also emerging at 
the turn of the century with China’ embrace of globalization. China’s reform and 
opening up has stirred up the great curiosity about the outside world and the 
increasing interest in learning from the more advanced modernization achievements in 
the West. Higher education is surly one of the important areas for connection with the 
international standards. In September 2003, the State Council started implementing 
the ‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperation 
in Running Schools’. The 2003 legal document promotes transnational higher 
education, particularly encouraging local universities to cooperate with renowned 
overseas higher education institutions in launching new academic programs designed 
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to improve the quality of teaching and learning and to introduce excellent overseas 
educational resources to local institutions (State Council, 2003, Chapter 1, Article 3). 
Although the transnational academic cooperation and exchanges are increasing and 
becoming too numerous to keep a record of, the formal kind of joint programs leading 
to degree awarding or even joint institutions with a physical independent campus are 
carefully regulated by the Ministry of Education. Both sides of the joint partnership 
usually have to go through a long-term negotiation to reach an agreement.  
 The first Sino-foreign joint institution in China is the University of Nottingham, 
Ningbo, established in 2004. It is the result of a concerted effort of the local 
government of Ningbo City, Zhejiang Wanli Educational Group (a social enterprise 
with a public ownership starting as a vocational college) and the University of 
Nottingham from Britain. It is by far the most expansive and successful joint 
institution with over 6000 students, over 80 percent of which are Chinese, and around 
600 faculty and staff (University of Nottingham, Ningbo, 2016). Since then, there are 
49 Sino-foreign joint institutions nationwide with Shanghai hosting 9 such institutions. 
And there are about 760 Sino-foreign joint programs in China, most of which are 
co-sponsored by a Chinese HEI and a foreign HEI (Ministry of Education, 2017b).  
 This type of institutions is, to some extent, similar to the missionary universities, 
established in the early 20th century of China. Because they are founded and managed 
by foreign HEIs, they maintain a foreign identity, although they have to compromise 
themselves to the Chinese context, such as student recruitment through the college 
entrance exam and the ownership style (the president of the institution must be a 
Chinese person with legal abilities).6 Therefore, it is a school largely run by a foreign 
HEI, following the rules and regulations designed by the Chinese government. It 
offers an alternative model of private HE. It can be argued that their establishment has 
breathed new air into China’s public dominated higher education system, but they are 
mostly considered necessary supplement to the diversification of China’s HE. Some 
                                                             
6 According to Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running 
Schools, adopted at the 68th Executive Meeting of the State Council on February 19, 2003, Chinese members on 
the board of trustees, the board of directors or of the joint managerial committee shall not be less than half of the 
total number. 
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argue it is the abundant education market that has attracted these foreign universities 
to establish campuses in China. The extremely high tuitions, which can amount to 
80,000RMB and is about 4 times as much as that of the independent colleges, show 
that helping with China’s educational access and equality problem is definitely not on 
the list of goals for these schools. Global influence and international market 
consideration are the probable major motivations behind these institutions.  
 
 Summary 
China is in a peculiar period of history at this moment with a strong communist 
state governing the key educational matters, a lively education market attracting 
investors to knock on its door and a widely criticized problematic public education 
system. Borrowing the typology on higher education environment of Umakoshi 
(2004), Jiang (2011) argues that China has shifted from a private-peripheral to a 
private-complementary environment. In China’s experience of higher education 
massification, these minban institutions have played the role of meeting the growing 
higher education demands and providing human capital for economic development. 
Different from the elite private HEIs in U.S. and Japan, the Chinese counterparts are 
categorized as non-elite/demand-absorbing institutions (Jiang, 2011). While meeting 
the increasing education needs with their limited resources and marginalized social 
status, private HEIs struggle with many problems, including social complaints on high 
tuitions, poor quality, serving low-scoring rich students and ambiguous public/private 
status. However, these schools reflect a lot about the current higher education 
conditions and the conflicts or struggles going on inside the system. To some extent, a 
close look at these institutions offer a microscopic perspective in understanding 
China’s higher education ecology as well as the everyday conditions of the majority 
studying or working in these so-called minban HEIs. 
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Chapter 3 History and Development of Independent Colleges in 
China 
 
Vignette 
 Keyi College of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University was founded by the public 
university, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, and first started to admit four-year 
undergraduates in 2000, being one of the earliest 17 independent colleges emerging in 
Zhejiang around that year. In its early days, it was known as a secondary college of 
Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, sharing the same campus and awarding the degrees of 
its sponsoring public institution--Zhejiang Sci-Tech University. In many ways, Keyi 
College has benefited from the tie with the sponsoring institution and established 
programs with the academic and administrative support from Zhejiang Sci-Tech 
University. In less than five years, its student size has grown to about 5000. Today, it 
has 6800 full time Bachelor degree pursuing students and a faculty size of 650 
offering academic support for 26 Bachelor level programs.  
 However, Keyi College, just like many other independent colleges, has not only 
experienced fast growth in the massification of China’s higher education, but also 
institutional relocation and adjustment in the short history of independent colleges. Its 
institutional fate largely pivots around two key national documents.    
 In 2003 the Ministry of Education passed Opinions on Regulation and Promotion 
of Running Independent Colleges by Regular HEIs in New System and Model, which 
required all secondary colleges run by public HEIs under the cost-recovery model to 
become “independent” with separate campuses and administrative systems. Therefore, 
Keyi College adjusted and moved to a new temporary campus at the outskirt of the 
Hangzhou city, which was rented from a local real estate company. This can be called 
its first step towards becoming “independent.” In 2008 the Ministry issued another 
document Measures for Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges to 
further regulate the newly-emerged independent colleges and shift from quantitative 
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increase to quality improvement. According to this document, all independent 
colleges must achieve independence in campus location, teaching organization, degree 
awarding, student recruiting, legal responsibility and etc. To take the further step in 
becoming independent, Keyi College started to award its own degrees in 2012 and 
established a cooperative partnership with the Shangyu District Government of 
Shaoxing City, which offered a land grant and campus construction support, to build a 
new permanent campus in the Binghai New Town Development Zone in 2015. 
Starting in fall of 2017, first year students started their college experience on the new 
campus.  
________________ 
 
 Fast and under-regulated growth in early years, institutional normalization with 
the passing of two regulation documents and settling on a new “independent” path in 
recent years, this institutional experience might summarize the emergence and 
development of this new group of four year HEIs in China. Keyi College’s experience 
may not represent the whole group, but surly reflect the transformation many have 
had to go through to become “independent.” Instead of turning “private”, it has taken 
a path to become more public-like by integrating itself into the local sub-regional 
development and establishing ties with a supportive local government. Though they 
are still named minban HEIs in the formal categorization, the path many independent 
colleges in Zhejiang have chosen is leaning actually towards public.  
In this section, I will discuss the status of independent colleges in China and offer 
a summary view of independent colleges in Zhejiang Province, which is the main 
research focus of the dissertation.  
  
What Are Independent Colleges?  
 Independent colleges are largely a product of China’s higher education expansion 
and did not officially exist until 2003, though it first appeared around 1998, when 
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Soochow University and Kaida Real Estate Development Company cofounded the 
Wenzheng College of Soochow University as a secondary college affiliated with 
Soochow University and running under the minban cost-recovery mechanism7 (Liu, 
2009). In one sentence definition, independent colleges are the four year Bachelor 
degree-offering HEIs founded and run by regular public HEIs with a cooperative 
partnership from some social organization and they operate mainly on the minban 
self-funded mechanism without the educational funding support from the state.  
 They emerged at a time, when the country embarked on a plan to substantially 
expand higher education and the families aspired for opportunities in colleges. With 
the support of the sponsoring public HEIs, their number increased from zero to over 
200 within five years and formed a remarkable force of HE in terms of meeting the 
demands for higher education, mobilizing social resources and exploring new 
school-running models. In 2015, they enrolled 2.6 million students and constitute a 
group of 275 institutions, which is twice as many as the number of traditional minban 
degree offering HEIs (Ministry of Education). About one fifth of China’s degree 
offering HEIs are independent colleges. They provide learning opportunities for one 
tenth of China’s 27 million regular HEI enrolled students.  
And most importantly, its running model bordering between the public and the 
minban (private) has attracted a lot of controversies in China and created some 
problems. It is not even certain today how to describe its new HEI model under the 
current public or minban HEI structure. But what might be telling about the new 
hybrid model is that the founding institutions are public key HEIs and independent 
colleges are largely built under the public ownership structure. In the following, I will 
discuss the emergence, regulation and transformation periods of independent colleges 
so as to offer a relatively complete background for these institutions.  
                                                             
7Wenzheng College of Soochow University was ratified by the Jiangsu Education Committee to be the first 
publicly owned and privately run secondary college in China with Kaida Company being a founding partner. In 
2007 Kaida divested from the board and Soochow University Education Development Foundation took its place to 
be the social partner. This partnership change returned the administrative rights to the main founding institution, 
Soochow University, and ensured its full public ownership. The founding mother institution using its fully-owned 
alumni or education investment company to be a running partner is a common practice among quite many 
independent colleges to both fulfill the requirement of having a non-state social partner in the 2008 document and 
maintain the control under the sponsoring public HEI.  
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Emergence: 1998-2003 
 The turn of the 21st century was destined to be a historically critical time in the 
history of China’s reform and development. China’s social and economic 
development was experiencing some difficulty due to the aftermath of the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997. The call for transformation into a market oriented economy 
was prevalent with a policy of decentralization taking the central role and the 
domestic market increasingly opening up for private and foreign owned enterprises. 
The country was eager to embrace the world and seek opportunities for development 
in the global economy. In November, 2011, after 15 years of negotiation with 
numerous countries, China finally was accepted into the World Trade Organization, 
which meant both great opportunities for the export-oriented economy and challenges 
for local industries who were previously protected under the state-regulated collective 
ownership running model.  
 In the field of education, there were two major problems which were closely 
related to the China’s economic and social development. One is the urgency to 
develop higher education to both build up the quality and quantity of human resources 
to meet the needs of economic development as well as to satisfy the aspiration of 
ordinary families for college. In 1998 there were only about 7.8 million enrolled 
college students and the higher education participation rate was at 9.8% with the 
OECD’s average rate at 48% (Liu, 2012; Zha, 2012). With the concept of human 
capital becoming popular in the world, the Chinese government also realized the 
importance of developing higher education if the economic development was 
expected to continue the momentum. Also, the Confucian tradition of placing the 
whole family’s fate/wealth upon the education of a son or a daughter under the one 
child policy played a key role in unleashing the great potential of the higher education 
market. In 1998 entering a college was still very difficult and deemed fate-changing 
by many families. Among all the students taking the national college entrance exam, 
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only a little more than one third would be eventually admitted into one.  
 The second problem is the lack of fiscal resources for developing higher 
education. In 1998, the total fiscal support for education was about 17 billion US 
dollars, which was about two percent of GDP (Mok, 2002). This funding provided 
education for 230 million full time school students, which was about one fifth of the 
school educated population in the world in that year. It shall be noted the compulsory 
nine year school education has long been considered one with priority; therefore, 
about 60 percent of the fiscal resources were put into improving and maintaining the 
primary and middle school education level. And in higher education, due to the 
continuous lack of funding and years of disconnection with the global academic world, 
many Chinese universities desperately needed upgrades in infrastructure, faculty 
quality and quantity as well as administrative approaches. One measure was to focus 
resources on building China’s world class universities so as to meet the needs for 
further modernization of the country. In May, 1998, the “985” project was announced 
to select a small group of top universities and build them into “first-class” ones. In 
1999, the Action Plan for Revitalization of Education in the 21st Century was passed 
to put the project into the enforcement stage with 34 institutions selected in the first 
batch. Besides the increasing funding support, institutional merging to pull together 
resources from several specialized regional colleges to build one “comprehensive” 
university was greatly encouraged. This helped not only to quickly build up the 
academic competitive universities but also reduced the total number of HEIs in China. 
In 1998 there were 1022 regular HEIs. In 2000 there were still 1041 regular HEIs with 
only a slight increase despite the sudden emergence of independent colleges since 
1999 (Mok, 2002, 2005; Zha, 2012).  
 Therefore, the national policy was mainly focused on the top institutions and it 
was about putting limited resources on the most hopeful ones in the process of 
modernizing and upgrading China’s universities.  
 In this context, mobilizing resources from the society and encouraging the 
development of the minban sector became a reasonable result. Due to the long-term 
underdevelopment of the traditional minban HEIs and the dominant role of the public 
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HEIs, it seemed plausible to have the public HEIs seek social partners to develop the 
kind of private-public partnership so as to solve the funding difficulty. Also, many 
public HEIs had experience in running adult continuing education colleges, which 
provided fee-charging degree exam preparation courses. Running a secondary college, 
which charged a full tuition and offered similar undergraduate courses, would not be 
too much different from the adult education colleges (Yan, 2010b, Wang, 2012).  
 Seeing the huge market potential, many public HEIs embraced the idea of 
opening such secondary colleges. With the big enticement of receiving the same 
well-known public HEIs’ degree, many students flocked to these secondary colleges 
as their ideal second choice and parents were happy to pay the cost. To some extent, it 
was also deemed an indirect way to increase the admission capacity for these public 
HEIs with the burden of cost on the side of students. However, the suddenly improved 
access to degrees from these well-recognized institutions also led to some chaotic 
situations. Some secondary colleges admitted less qualified students on the same 
campus in return for higher tuition—income for the public HEIs. The learning 
environment for these secondary college enrolled students, sometimes, was 
inadequate and the line between the secondary college students and the home public 
university students was blurry. Despite the huge differences in entering scores, they 
eventually received the same degree papers. Therefore, the social critics accused the 
home public universities of their commercial impulses and negligence for educational 
equality and fairness.  
 In 1998, Soochow University partnered with Kaida Company to found Wenzheng 
College of Soochow University, which was the first to utilize the educational 
resources of the public HEI to attract social funding and establish a secondary college 
running under the minban mechanism within the sponsoring public HEI. Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu and Hubei were the provinces particularly enthusiastic about this new model 
of school building, because these provinces have traditionally been the ones with huge 
student base and great desire for colleges. Zhejiang and Jiangsu were particularly 
developed in terms of minban or people-run/non-state economy. In 1999, Zhejiang’s 
first group of 13 secondary colleges began to enroll new students, among which only 
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Zhejiang University City College had an independent still-under-construction campus 
and the rest used the campuses of the sponsoring public institutions, which resulted in 
controversial discussions about the nature and purpose of such secondary colleges.  
 From 1998 to 2003, these predecessors of independent colleges enjoyed a 
honey-moon like development period with little regulation and great policy toleration. 
In 2003 there were about 644 bachelor degree offering HEIs, among which only 9 
were the traditional minban HEIs (Ministry of Education, 2003).8 Therefore, the rise 
of this new type of HEIs, inheriting the reputation of the sponsoring public HEIs, 
greatly contributed to the booming expansion of minban HEIs and was somehow 
believed to be a significant new force in the development of the minban education.  
 All in all, in a time when the state and public HEIs did not have enough resources 
to quickly improve the capacity of HE and there was this urgency to develop HE in 
order to both lay the human capital foundation for economic growth and to meet the 
educational demands of the society, these secondary colleges or rather the sponsoring 
public HEIs grasped the historical opportunity and took full advantage of the available 
resources to build schools running under the cost-recovery minban mechanism. 
Despite all the problems and controversies, especially in terms of equality and unfair 
competition, the biggest contribution of these institutions was to achieve the goal of 
HE expansion without much input from the government. Plus, it is also important to 
note their role in the potential stimulation for the economy through mobilizing the 
family funds and the alleviation of the social employment pressure in the post 1997 
Asia financial crisis era through absorbing large numbers of 18 or 19 year old young 
men.  
   
Regulation: 2003-2008 
 In 2003, five years after the birth of the first group of secondary colleges, there 
                                                             
8 In 2003 there were 182 minban HEIs in China. Among them there were only 9 qualified to award Bachelor 
degrees and the rest 173 were largely vocational colleges awarding 2-3 year associate degrees. Therefore, it is 
evident that before the rise of independent colleges the traditional minban HEIs were quite peripheral and did not 
hold any power to compete with majority of the public HEIs, though it is debatable whether these independent 
colleges are truly minban with their hybrid running model.   
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were already about 250 such HEIs in China, enrolling over half a million students. 
This is when the Ministry of Education saw it necessary to regulate the operation and 
establishment of them. And this is the beginning of the so-called independent colleges. 
Opinions on regulation and promotion of running independent colleges by regular 
HEIs in new system and model, passed in April of 2003, was the first document to 
point the direction for these emerging colleges. The primary purpose was to confirm 
the positive role these colleges played in expanding higher education and to bring 
them into the formal system of China’s higher education. According to the 2003 
document, independent colleges were defined as “the secondary colleges offering 
bachelor degrees and founded by the regular four year public HEIs under the new 
mechanism and new model” (Ministry of Education, 2003). The two “new” here 
indicated that the Ministry recognized the method of combining public HEIs’ 
educational resources with social funding under no fiscal support from the state. The 
emphasis on their bachelor degree offering showed the high starting point of these 
institutions in comparison to the traditional minban HEIs, most of which were mainly 
two or three year vocational colleges.  
 Announcing the basic attitude of “active support,” the 2003 document gave two 
guiding suggestions about running independent colleges: one was to take full 
advantage of the available high quality higher education resources; the other was to 
benefit the expansion of higher education opportunities. The former confirmed the 
role of high quality public universities in founding and running such institutions, 
because they were deemed more experienced in running HEIs and, therefore, less 
likely to cause social problems with wide impacts. The later praised the significant 
role these colleges had played and would continue to play in massification of HE.  
 In terms of regulation, the 2003 document explained the meaning of “independent” 
with eight aspects of independence and made clear about the minimum requirements 
for establishing such institutions.  
 The eight aspects of independence included 1) campus and basic infrastructure, 2) 
relatively independent teaching organization and management, 3) student admission, 
4) degree and certificate awarding, 5) financial statement, 6) independent institutional 
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legal person, 7) full ability in taking civil legal responsibility and 8) independent 
reporting in higher education statistical information gathering. Among these eight 
aspects, independent campus and degree awarding became the most impactful policies 
forcing many colleges to undergo significant transformations, because it meant they 
had to move out of the current “loaned” campus and stopped relying on the academic 
prestige of the mother public HEIs.  
 In terms of ensuring school operation quality and qualifications, the document 
indicated any independent college planning to establish must have a running campus 
size of at least 150 mu (approximately 25 acres) and a planning campus size of at least 
300 mu (approximately 50 acres). And there were some other requirements on the 
occupying space of teaching buildings, library books, and full time faculty number. 
However, the one deemed most difficult to meet and easiest to supervise was the 
campus size. It was mainly targeted at the controversial phenomenon of 
“school-within-school,” which meant the existence of two schools running under two 
different models on the same campus. Interestingly, it was quite similar to China’s 
“one country, two systems” policy on Hong Kong. The innovation lies in using an 
innovative, also controversial, policy to achieve a pending goal. 
 The 2003 document in reality served more like a guiding policy document 
clarifying some key definitions and issues with no information on how to penalize the 
ones not meeting the requirements. And the founders and their partners chose to pay 
more attention to the “active support” side than the “regulation” part in the high days 
of China’s massification. Therefore, the “school-within-school” problem still existed 
in many already operating institutions; or the sponsoring public universities found a 
way to get around, such as carving a piece out of the current campus to report in the 
document as the independent campus. And awarding independent degrees did not 
happen until 2008, when another document was issued to shift the focus from “active 
support” mainly to “regulation and quality control” in order to achieve “healthy 
development.” 
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Transformation: 2008-Today 
 The year of 2008 became the turning point for independent colleges, largely 
because of this second document giving more detailed guidance on setting, running 
and ending independent colleges and outlining the punishing standards for those not 
meeting the annual check. This is also probably one of the main reasons for the 
slowdown of the independent college establishment movement. The quantitative 
expansion was no longer the priority and the fast increase in enrollment began to slow 
down. In 2008 the number of independent colleges reached 322 and in 2010 it came to 
the historical zenith at 323. And the number of enrolled students in these colleges 
grew from 690 thousand in 2004 to 2.15 million in 2008, an increase of three folds in 
four years. The enrollment stabilized around 2.5 million after 2009 (Ministry of 
Education, 2016). Therefore, the year of 2008 was probably the peak point for China’s 
rapid massification since 1999. And the strategic focus started to shift from quantity to 
quality around 2008, when the social complaints about the side effects of 
massification, such as diploma inflation, college graduates employment pressure and 
mismatch of education and skill, were also increasing.  
 In the 2008 Measures for Establishment and Management of Independent 
Colleges, independent colleges were defined as “higher education institutions offering 
bachelor level degree education, running with no state fiscal support and founded 
through a partnership between regular HEIs capable to offer bachelor level or above 
education and non-state social organizations or individuals.” (Ministry of Education, 
2008) If the 2003 document’s definition implies some kind of encouragement for the 
exploration of the “new model,” the 2008 definition clarifies the minban part, which, 
according to the document, means no state fiscal support and partnership with 
non-state entities. However, in reality my research in Zhejiang finds that most of the 
non-state social partners are either investment enterprises with government 
backgrounds or education investment enterprises controlled by the founding public 
HEIs. In another word, many independent colleges find their ways to get around the 
policy and maintain the public connection/control.  
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 In terms of founding new independent colleges, the 2008 document set the bar at 
a higher level. It specified for the first time that the sponsoring HEI should “normally 
have the right to award doctoral degrees” and the social partner should “have at least 
0.3 billion RMB worth of asset.” And it indicated that the qualified HEIs shall 
“normally establish only one independent college.” In addition, the campus size shall 
be “at least 500 mu (82 acres).” These very specific requirements made it harder for 
the new independent colleges to be set up. In 2008 there were two new independent 
colleges established by Tongji University and Shanghai University of Finance and 
Economics in the Zhejiang Province. Since then there has not been any new 
independent colleges established, probably because of the more strict policy and the 
slowdown of higher education expansion.  
 In terms of school operation, the 2008 document again stated the graduated 
students shall be awarded with the certificates bearing the stamps of independent 
colleges. This item finally triggered the key separation between the independent 
college and the sponsoring public university, though many independent colleges were 
initially worried about the possible negative impact on student recruitment. The 
drawing power of a key national university degree certificate for lower-scoring 
students was usually irresistible. Therefore, from 2008 on, independent colleges 
started to openly inform the prospective students that they would be awarded the 
degrees bearing the stamps of independent colleges. That transition went better than 
expected with no big setbacks for recruiting students.  
 The 2008 document, in addition, added chapters on how to supervise the 
regulation and what consequences may be incurred if schools cannot abide by. The 
provincial level education administrative department was given the power and 
obligation to supervise and guide the independent colleges to establish and operate 
according to the regulations. Also the annual check would also be conducted by the 
local education department to achieve quality control. Most importantly, a five year 
limit was set to require all independent colleges to meet all the requirements and pass 
the acceptance check at both the provincial education department level and the state 
level. If the institution failed in the check, it might receive the relevant penalization 
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with ceasing admission being the most serious punishment.  
 Besides the choice of complying with all the requirements and continuing with 
the path of becoming an independent college, there were two other options given out 
in the 2008 document. One was transformation; the other termination or merging. 
Under the first option, independent colleges could apply for transformation into a 
traditional minban HEI, which meant the withdrawal of the sponsoring public HEI 
and the full ownership by the non-state social organization. In this case, the non-state 
social organization was usually a private company with no government backgrounds. 
This has become the choice of quite a few independent colleges, mainly those with a 
private investing company as a founding partner. The differences in how to run the 
school between the public HEI and the partnering private company might cause some 
incoherent policy making and eventually parting of partnership. With the more strict 
regulations, it has become harder to rely on the public HEIs’ resources to attract 
students. Therefore, some chose to transform into a pure minban HEI and stop living 
in the grey area between minban and public. According to the Ministry of Education, 
the number of independent colleges decreased from 323 in 2010 to 266 in 2016, 
which meant there were about 57 colleges breaking away from the sponsoring public 
HEIs and turning into a pure minban HEI. This is about one fifth of the total number 
(China Youth Daily, 2016).9 Therefore, the transformation is going on at a significant 
extent. So far, there are no independent colleges choosing the other option of 
termination or merging.  
 One important point relating to the ambiguous identity of independent colleges is 
that the 2008 document, on the one hand, states independent colleges belong to the 
“public welfare establishments,” which probably meant profit-making should not be 
the goal. On the other hand, it states that independent colleges are an important part of 
                                                             
9Hubei, Jiangsu and Zhejiang are the top three provinces with the most amount of independent colleges. Since 
2008, 14 independent colleges in Hubei have transformed into traditional minban HEIs. In Jiangsu, only one was 
transformed in 2011. In Zhejiang, Wenzhou University City College was transformed into Wenzhou Business 
College in 2016. The reason for the high number of transforming in provinces like Hubei is that quite a number of 
these independent colleges have private partners, who are more willing to choose transforming so as to gain the 
full ownership of the institution and fundamentally solve the management disputes with the public university 
partner. In the case of provinces, such as Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the majority of the independent colleges are, in 
fact, fully owned by the public HEIs, who are more likely to maintain the tie and treat the independent college as 
an affiliated education entity.  
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the minban higher education sector and the investor should be allowed to receive 
“reasonable return” after deducting the operation cost, the development funds and the 
other necessary costs. This contradiction can also be found in the Law of Promoting 
Minban (non-state/privately run) Education. To this day, the ambiguous phrase of 
“reasonable return” is still an unsolved debatable issue among scholars in China. 
Should the minban education sector be allowed to treat education as a kind of 
investment and receive returns at a rate reasonable for investors? Or should the 
minban education development be fundamentally seen as an education endeavor with 
great implications for public good? Probably the precondition for “reasonable return” 
is to carry on the normal operation and development of education within the 
institution. But how to make the call about the extent of normal operation and 
development can lead to some differences in understanding.  
 
Aftermath of the 2008 Document 
In the case of independent colleges, the state taking the lead in regulation and 
guidance and the public HEIs keeping their roles in managing and operating the 
school seem to direct the reform towards the public side with a goal to serve the needs 
of the general public and assist the regional economic development. Therefore, like 
the “one country, two systems” policy, as long as the independent colleges contribute 
to the strategic goal of higher education expansion under the guidance of the state 
regulations, the nature of being public or minban might not matter much or can be at 
least put behind the paramount strategic goal. The policy logic is pragmatic and serves 
the overall strategy of the nation.  
Based on the 2008 document, many independent colleges have been seeking a 
feasible path for their survival and development with the policy document pushing 
them to comply with the rules. From Table 3.1, it can be found from 2010 on the 
number of independent colleges has been decreasing and the traditional minban 
bachelor degree HEIs has increased from 48 to 148. Actually, 57 of the 100 
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newly-established minban HEIs are the ones transformed from former independent 
colleges. They chose to go on a full private ownership path by breaking all the ties 
with the public HEIs. However, many have chosen to continue the path of being an 
independent college. Jiang Su (24 ICs in 2018) and Zhejiang (21 ICs in 2018) are the 
two major provinces maintaining the development path of independent colleges. 
Many of them keep implicit, if not explicit, ties with the sponsoring public HEIs and 
they find ways to partner up with local governments to meet the requirements for 
campus size and upgrade their institutional competitiveness. And despite the decrease 
in the number of independent colleges since 2010, the number of enrolled students in 
independent colleges climbed a little bit and has stabilized about 2.6 million, which is 
about 40 percent of all minban HEI enrolled students and 10 percent of all college 
enrolled students in 2016. Therefore, while the transformation period has raised the 
bar for founding and running independent colleges, they are still a significant part of 
China’s higher education and their continued development tells a lot about the 
privatization experience with Chinese characteristics, featuring pragmatism, 
hybridization, and state guidance.  
 The data in the following offers a broad chronologically comparative view of the 
changing HE structure in China. What is obvious here is the increasing HE 
participation rate (closing to 50%) and the expanding college enrolled students (the 
world’s largest body of college enrolled students). Overall speaking, the expansion of 
HE is still continuing. The enrolled degree awarding college students number has 
reached 27.53 million, which is more than two times as many as the number of 
college enrolled students in U.S. However, a careful study at the minban HEIs and 
their students’ number shows their marginal position in the whole HE system. Only 
161 traditional minban HEIs can award Bachelor degrees, if independent colleges are 
counted separately.  
 When we take a look at the independent colleges, its total number has almost 
peaked in the year of 2008, which is the year the 2008 regulation document was 
issued. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the regulation document has had a 
significant impact on the growth of independent colleges. The total number has been 
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decreasing since 2010 and some independent colleges in the past 8 or 9 years have 
decided to transform into traditional minban HEIs through decoupling with the 
founding public HEIs. Therefore, a big part of the increase in the number of 
traditional minban HEIs can be attributed to this transformation phenomenon (the 
number increases from 47 in 2008 to 161 in 2017). It is fair to say the past decade for 
independent colleges has been an uneasy one characterized by regulation, seeking 
development paths fitting the regulations and diligently maintaining the status quo 
achieved in the first 10 years. For many, when facing the dilemma of going total 
minban or keeping the public ownership, it is somehow instinctive to maintain the 
public gene, given the origin of most independent colleges and the public dominant 
nature of China’s HE system.  
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Table 3.1  Minban HEIs Data in China 
 
  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
No. of IC enrolled students 
(unit: million) 
 
0.69 1.07 1.47 1.87 2.15 2.45 2.6 2.67 
No. of minban HEIs 
enrolled students 
(unit: million) 
 
  2.8 3.49 4.01 4.46 4.77 5.05 
No. of IC 249 295 318 318 322 322 323 309 
 
No. of Minban Bachelor 
Degree HEIs(excluding IC) 
9 27 29 30 47 48 48 79 
Total No. of Bachelor Degree 
HEIs 
684 701 720 740 1079 1090 1112 1129 
Total No. of college enrolled 
 students (unit: million) 
 
13.33 15.61 17.39 18.84 20.21 21.44 22.31 23.08 
Higher Education 
Participation Rate 
19% 21% 22% 23% 23.3% 24.20% 26.5% 26.9% 
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Note: Independent Colleges began to be officially included as a Bachelor Degree awarding HEI in 
statistics since 2008 because this is the beginning year when many ICs started to award degrees 
bearing their own college names, instead of those of the sponsoring public HEIs. Here the number 
of Bachelor Degree HEIs from 2004 to 2007 does not include ICs; it includes ICs from 2008 to 
2017. The sudden increase of the number of bachelor degree HEIs is due to the inclusion of ICs in 
the statistical information by the Ministry of Education. Also the number for the minban HEIs 
enrolled students includes both 4 year bachelor degree and 2-3 year associate degree college 
students. The number of college enrolled students includes those enrolled in both 4 year HEIs and 
2-3 year associate degree college students and does not include those enrolled in exam preparation 
adult education institutions. Data was collected from Ministry of Education Statistics. 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 
No. of IC enrolled students 
(unit: million) 
 
2.78 2.76 2.69 2.59 N/A N/A 
No. of minban HEIs 
enrolled students 
(unit: million) 
 
5.33 5.57 5.87 6.1 6.12 6.28 
No. of IC 303 292 283 275 266 265 
 
No. of Minban Bachelor 
Degree HEIs(excluding IC) 
87 100 137 148 158 161 
Total No. of Bachelor Degree  
HEIs 
1145 1170 1202 1219 1237 1243 
Total No. of college enrolled 
 students (unit: million) 
 
23.9 24.7 25.47 26.25 26.96 27.53 
Higher Education 
Participation Rate 
30% 34.5% 37.5% 40% 42.7% 45.7% 
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Data Retrieved from Ministry of Education Online  
http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A03/moe_560/jytjsj_2016/ 
 
 
Figure 3.1   Map of Independent Colleges in China 
 
Note: Distribution of Independent Colleges in China (total number: 275 in 2015)  
Data Retrieved from China Independent Colleges Online  
http://www.cicol.cn/shownews.asp?id=4029 on January 17, 2016. 
 
After narrating the historical development path of independent colleges, in the 
following, I will explain the two major running models among independent colleges, 
which shall be important for understanding the true nature of these institutions.  
 
Two Types of Running Models: Public Type and Minban (Private) Type 
 The 2003 and 2008 documents seem to have pointed the minban direction for 
independent colleges and the Ministry also include them as a form of minban HEIs in 
the statistical reports. However, due to the important role played by the founding 
public universities, most of them are quite different from traditional minban HEIs and 
they form a unique group with their distinctive history and development.  
 In explaining the running models of these independent colleges, Li Wang gives 
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two models: public-owned model and public-private collaboration model (Wang, 
2014). The former has a full public ownership and no participation from private 
partners. The latter has private partners being one of the founders and the ownership 
structure is more complicated with possibility to incur disputes in management. I call 
the former one public-type independent colleges and the latter minban (private)-type 
independent colleges. And I further divide them into four different partnership models, 
as showed in the following typography.  
1. Partnership model for public-type independent colleges 
Public HEI 
Public HEI + other public forces  
2. Partnership model for minban (private)-type independent colleges 
Public HEI + private enterprise 
Public HEI + local government + private enterprise  
 
 The public-type are the ones initially founded solely by a public university or by 
a public university and a public partner. The public partner can be a local government 
or a public-owned enterprise with local government backgrounds. For example, 
Zhejiang University City College was founded mainly by Zhejiang University and 
Hangzhou municipal government with another local public-owned telecom enterprise 
being the third partner. Although it has three partners, the Hangzhou government and 
the local telecom enterprise are both local public partners. For the full public 
university ownership model, Keyi College of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University was 
initially founded by the sponsoring public university. Because the 2008 regulation 
requires a non-state social organization as a partner, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University set 
up a non-operational education investment company fully owned by itself and signed 
the company as a non-state partner. Those independent colleges, first founded by only 
the public university itself before 2008, commonly used this method to fulfill the 
requirement indicated in the 2008 document. They are, de facto, fully owned by the 
sponsoring public HEIs.   
Also, before 2008 there were independent colleges founded by the partnership 
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between a public university and a local government. In this case, the local government 
provided land, facilities and even funding to attract the prestigious public university to 
set up a secondary college in the city. It was deemed a partnership between two strong 
public partners, beneficial for the long term development of the city. In another word, 
they are publicly owned institutions running under the minban mechanism (fee 
charging and cost-recovery). In Zhejiang, the two independent colleges affiliated with 
Zhejiang University are such examples. Nankai University Binghai College in Tianjin 
and Beijing Normal University Zhuhai in Guangdong are the examples in other parts 
of China. In order to fulfill the requirement in the 2008 document, some had the local 
government set up or ask a public-owned urban investment company to sign into the 
partnership and the initial partnership between the public HEI and the local 
government was protected in such a way.  
 The minban (private)-type are the ones joined by a private partner. In this kind of 
partnership model, the public HEI invests with invisible assets, such as academic and 
administrative management as well as social reputation. The private enterprise invests 
with visible assets, such as land, cash and facilities. Because of the participation of a 
private partner, the institution has a stronger drive to seek “reasonable returns.” The 
public university and the private enterprise could have disagreements about the 
distribution of educational income. There were instances in which the private 
enterprise expressed grievances about the 30 percent cut from the income as an annual 
fee for administrative cost. Almost all transformed former independent colleges 
belonged to this type. The private partner made the decision to break the partnership 
and transform into a traditional minban HEI with a full private ownership. Therefore, 
the minban-type independent colleges can be less stable. Their social reputation and 
future development can be undermined because of the disputes between partners and 
the excessive impulse for “returns.” After the 2008 document, these institutions have 
been experiencing some real difficulties. A few private enterprises sold their shares to 
the public university to withdraw and the institutions turned to be fully owned by the 
public university.  
Wenzhou University City College was transformed into Wenzhou Business 
65 
College, a traditional minban HEI, in 2016. The private partner, Wenzhou Wenbo 
Investment Company, stopped the partnership with Wenzhou University and applied 
for the transformation with the Ministry. This is the only transformed independent 
college in Zhejiang. In 2016, besides Wenzhou University City College, there were 
eight other independent colleges ratified to transform into traditional minban HEIs. 
There were three from Hubei and three from Henan (Ministry of Education, 2016).  
The partnership model with the joining of both local government and a private 
enterprise is not common, since this might cause bigger difficulty for coordination 
and agreement among the three partners. In Zhejiang, Tongji University Zhejiang 
College is the only one founded by Tongji University, Jiaxing municipal government 
and Hongda Group Co. in 2008. So far, there is no sign of any change with the current 
partnership structure.  
In the following, I will narrow down our focus on the independent colleges in 
Zhejiang Province. Zhejiang model, which falls into the first category—the public 
type independent colleges, is considered as the one receiving more positive nodding 
and enjoying better stability among all the independent colleges in China. Therefore, 
it is likely the future of independent colleges can be found in the study of those in 
Zhejiang.  
 
 Independent Colleges in Zhejiang 
Regional Background and Rise of Independent Colleges in Zhejiang 
 Zhejiang Province is located in the East Coast of China and is a key province in 
the Shanghai-centered economic circle of the Yangtze River Delta, which is believed 
to be the most developed region in China and has the most active private economy. In 
2015 Zhejiang’s GDP grew about 8 percent to 4.28 trillion RMB (approximately 625 
billion USD), ranked fourth nationally after Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong. In 
terms of per capita income, Zhejiang stood at 38,529 RMB (approximately 5,600 
USD) in 2016, ranked only after Shanghai and Beijing (National Bureau of Statistics, 
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2016; Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Therefore, people in Zhejiang 
are relatively more receptive to non-state social and economic innovations and they 
are more likely to afford the high tuition charged by minban institutions 
(approximately between 18,000 and 24,000 RMB/year).  
 In addition, Zhejiang, similar to provinces, such as Jiangsu and Hubei, has limited 
higher education resources. There is only one nationally prestigious public university, 
included in the national 985 and 211 project. Before 1999 there were only about 30 
Bachelor level HEIs, which were providing college opportunities for a province with 
a population of over 40 million (Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2000). 
Therefore, the economic, social and educational conditions in Zhejiang provided the 
soil for the rise of independent colleges in Zhejiang.  
 Between 1999 and 2003 there were 18 independent colleges established in 
Zhejiang. And the average institutional enrollment grew from a few hundred at the 
first year to about 10 thousand within one decade. In 2015, independent colleges in 
Zhejiang admitted 43 thousand students, making up 28% of the total admission of 
Bachelor level HEIs in Zhejiang. The number of total enrolled students in 
independent colleges reached 173 thousand, making up 29% of the total enrolled 
students among Bachelor level HEIs in Zhejiang. Also, independent colleges 
constituted 90% of the minban Bachelor level HEIs in Zhejiang, while majority of the 
minban HEIs still operate at the vocational college level, offering two-three years 
college learning experiences (Zhejiang Bureau of Education, 2015). Therefore, 
independent colleges have not only contributed greatly to the massification experience, 
but constituted a significant force in four year Bachelor level education in Zhejiang 
Province. Many ordinary students and their families have been able to realize their 
college dreams because of these independent colleges, though the tuition cost is about 
three times as much as that of public universities.  
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Table 3.2   2015 Minban HEIs Data in Zhejiang Province  
 No. of 
Institutions 
No. of 
Graduating 
Students 
No. of 
Enrolled 
Students 
No. of 
Faculty and 
Staff 
Independent Colleges 22 41285 173,557 11,207 
Total Minban Bachelor level HEIs  
(including Independent Colleges) 
 
25 57238 248,036 16,056 
 
Total Regular Bachelor Degree HEIs 58 140,318 608,378 64,372 
Total HEIs (including vocational colleges) 108263,981991,14988,744 
Retrieved from Zhejiang Bureau of Education  http://www.zjedu.gov.cn/type/394.html 
 
Zhejiang Model  
 Zhejiang’s independent colleges and their total number grew quickly from 1999 
to 2003 and remained relatively stable since 2008, though the impact of the 2008 
document has forced many colleges to undergo changes to meet the requirements. 
Wenzhou University City College is the only one transformed into traditional minban 
HEI. Therefore, the “Zhejiang model” has been considered a successful one, which 
can be studied and copied in other provinces.  
 They key character of the Zhejiang model is being publicly owned and privately 
run. They fall into the public-type independent colleges. Among the 22 independent 
colleges, 16 were initially founded solely by the public HEIs, which allowed the 
colleges to use the same campuses and got paid for using the facilities. With the 2003 
and 2008 documents, they have started to look for other public partner possibilities 
(local government preferably in Zhejiang’s case) or set up an education investment 
company under the public HEI to meet the requirement. Fundamentally, these 
colleges are still public owned and key decisions are made by the public HEIs. One 
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proof is that the independent college president is usually selected by the public 
university and affiliated with the personnel structure of the public university, though 
the appointment must also be approved by the board (Wang, 2012; Xu, 2011; Zhang, 
2009).    
 There are several advantages with the Zhejiang model. One is to ensure that the 
college serves the public good and profit-making is not the priority. Especially after 
2008, the fiscal independence and independent campus are required. The public 
university has stopped charging fees for using the facilities on campus, when the 
independent colleges gradually moved out of the public university campus. Therefore, 
almost all the tuition income can be used for the educational development of the 
college. However, in the minban (private)-type independent colleges, disputes over 
distribution of income can become a problem hindering the long term sustainable 
development of the institution.  
Secondly, the educational quality can be better safeguarded when the public HEIs 
are the main decision makers in how to run the college. Without a private partner 
trying to insert its own agendas, the independent colleges benefit more directly from 
sharing the educational resources (faculty, research capacity, administrative 
experience, etc.) of the public HEIs. In Zhejiang, the two independent colleges under 
Zhejiang University and the one under Zhejiang University of Technology have long 
kept themselves among the top 5 of the 300 or so independent colleges. In addition, 
15 out of the 22 independent colleges in Zhejiang are listed among the top 100 
independent colleges in China (Zhejiang Provincial Education Department, 2016). 
The overall academic performances of independent colleges in Zhejiang surpass the 
others.  
Zhejiang model also has its demerits. One is the controversy over the public 
ownership. There are voices in public questioning the public ownership for a minban 
HEI. Is the public HEI trying to earn extra income through independent colleges 
running under the minban mechanism? Does it mean unfair competition for other 
minban HEIs? The 2008 document seems to require the participation of a non-state 
social organization to count independent colleges as minban HEIs. However, it is hard 
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to make changes to the ownership structure and many find ways to circumvent the 
requirement. The other barriers include over-reliance on the public HEI and lack of 
ability to develop an educational path with its own characters. The over-reliance can 
lead to the problem of fake independence, which is contrary to the purpose of the 
2003 and 2008 documents. Currently, many independent colleges still rely on the 
academic and administrative resources of the public HEIs to set up or upgrade 
academic programs and to design administrative rules. In the long run it is restraining 
the independent colleges from taking innovative steps and finding a path suitable for 
themselves.  
All in all, the Zhejiang model, being publicly owned and privately run, is a 
relatively successful approach to establishing and running independent colleges. The 
public type independent colleges are becoming the main force among the 266 
independent colleges in China, when the private type ones are taking the path of 
transforming into traditional minban HEIs with a full private ownership. This trend, to 
some extent, establishes the dominant role of public ownership among independent 
colleges. In the following, I will talk about the relocation movement, which seems to 
solidify the public ownership through partnering up with different lower-level local 
governments. 
  
Moving Out of Hangzhou  
 This campus relocation movement was also triggered by the 2008 document, in 
which a hard requirement asks all independent colleges to meet the campus size 
requirement of 500 mu. In 2008, most of these colleges shared campuses with the 
sponsoring public HEIs. To survive as an independent college, they must find new 
space. Considering the limited land resources in the provincial capital of Hangzhou, 
neighboring towns or counties have become the possible places to find new campuses 
in order to pass the document requirement hurdle.   
 Since 2008, there are 6 independent colleges having planned or already moved 
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into the new campuses. Keyi College of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University is such an 
example. It received the land support from Shangyu District Government of Shaoxing 
City in 2015 and embarked on a new development journey on the brand new campus 
in 2017. The new campus is located in a local new economic development zone and is 
about one hour drive from Hangzhou. Many of these relocation plans have to fit into 
the local zoning or development plan for a university town or a new economic 
development zone. They also fit well into the provincial plan of optimizing the 
distribution of higher education resources in the province, which is purported to 
extend the HE resources into local economic zones to both achieve the fairer 
distribution and strengthen the HE’s support to local economic development(Zhejiang 
Provincial Education Department, 2016). Therefore, this relocation movement is 
desirable for both the independent colleges and local governments.  
 It is important to note that one result of this relocation movement is the 
strengthening of the public ownership. In 1999 Zhejiang University established two 
independent colleges through partnering with Hangzhou and Ningbo governments. 
Recently, it seems history is repeating itself. The moving-out independent colleges 
have established partnership, one way or another, with different levels of local 
governments. These independent colleges have received support in policy, land and 
facilities. In the future, this partnership is only going to grow stronger, since one 
original purpose for the relocation is to connect with local governments and benefit 
the lower-level local economic development. Another possibility is the growing 
independence. With the new campus and new partnership with local governments, 
these independent colleges might have opportunities to think of academic and 
administrative improvements to better fit into their new roles. Therefore, finding a 
path suitable for its own is a possible outcome.  
 The moving out is a sign that independent colleges are turning “independent” and 
the transformation process is going to be a continuous one. To February of 2016 there 
are already 12 independent colleges in process of moving out to meet the requirement. 
Three have completed the relocation; eight new campuses are under construction and 
one has just reached the campus moving agreement (Zhejiang Education Daily, 2016). 
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Although in the 2008 document there are eight aspects of independence specified and 
there is a five year time limit to reach the goal of independence, finding an 
appropriate new campus and undergoing partnership changes are surly not that easy. 
Until 2016 nationally only 43 realized the independence requirements in the 2008 
document and passed the regulation check. Majority are still in the process of 
adjustment. In Zhejiang, Opinions on Supporting Development of Independent 
Colleges in Zhejiang was passed in May, 2016 to push the regulation process based on 
the 2008 national document and offer policy and funding support on the basis of 
minban HEI standards to independent colleges passing the regulation check. On the 
one hand, the provincial document asks all the independent colleges to speed up the 
“independence” process by following the eight aspects of independence; on the other 
hand, it offers encouraging policy support for those successfully passing the check, 
including 1) fiscal subsidies; 2) tax deduction and 3) greater flexibility in setting 
tuition and fee charging standards. So far there are only four colleges in Zhejiang that 
have passed the check, including 1) Zhejiang University City College, 2) Ningbo 
Institute of Technology, Zhejiang University, 3) Zhijiang College, Zhejiang University 
of Technology and 4) Jiyang Collage of Zhejiang A&F University (Zhejiang 
Provincial Education Department, 2016).  
 Therefore, eight years after the 2008 document, the moving out process starting 
after 2008 is still ongoing, which demonstrates the painful and overdue process of 
achieving independence. More independent colleges are seeking government support 
or even partnership to complete the process, since relying on itself and the sponsoring 
public HEI is almost impossible to achieve the goal of expanding campus size and 
improving education facilities. Through this process, independent colleges begin to 
reduce their reliance on the mother public HEIs. However, the separation in visible 
aspects is much easier than the separation in invisible aspects, which can take a much 
longer time and much more adjustments than moving to a new campus, if not 
impossible. As will be discussed in the following two chapters, especially the chapter 
on the faculty’s perception on independent colleges, the implicit ties between 
independent colleges and their parent public HEIs are more influential in the soft 
72 
areas, such as personnel structure, program setup or running, administrative details 
and so on.  
Table 3.3  Independent Colleges Establishing School-Building Cooperative 
Partnership Ties with Local Governments in Zhejiang 
 Name of Independent Colleges ( IC) School-Building Cooperative Partners 
(In Addition to the Sponsoring Mother 
Institution) 
1 Zhejiang University City College Hangzhou Municipal Government (1999) 
2 Ningbo Institute  of Technology, Zhejiang 
University 
Ningbo Municipal Government (1999) 
3 
 
College of Science & Technology, Ningbo 
University 
Cixi Municipal Government (2016) 
4 
 
Bingjiang College of Zhejiang Chinese 
Medical University 
Fuyang District Government (2009) 
5 China JiliangUniversity, College of Modern 
Science and Technology 
Tonglu County Government (2016) 
6 Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 
College of Commerce 
Tonglu County Government (2012) 
7 Zhijiang College, Zhejiang University of 
Technology 
ShaoxingKeqiao District Government 
(2012) 
8 Keyi College of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University ShaoxingShangyu District Government 
(2015) 
9 Shanghai University of Finance & Economics, 
Zhejiang College 
Zhezhong Education Investment CO. (a 
Jinhua municipal government owned 
corporation) (2009) 
10 QiuZhen School of Huzhou Teachers College Huzhou City Construction Investment 
Group Co. (a Huzhou municipal 
government owned corporation) (2011) 
11 TongjiUniversity, Zhejiang College Jiangxing Municipal Government; Hongda 
Stockholding Group Co. (2008) 
12 Wenzhou University, City College transferred 
into Wenzhou Business College in 2016, 
divesting from Wenzhou University. 
Zhejiang Wenbo Investment Development 
Co. (1999) 
 
Note: According to the 2008 regulation, independent colleges must have a non-public “social 
force” partner to qualify as a minban institution. The above colleges usually signed the partnership 
agreement with the state-owned corporation under the local government, which meets the 
requirement in paper and gains favorable policy/land support from the local government. The local 
government benefits by having a HEI supporting local economic and cultural development.  
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Summary  
  As showed above, independent colleges are a key product of China’s higher 
education massification. Emerging at the beginning year (1999) of the college 
admission jump-rise, they experienced a golden age of development from 1999 to 
2008, accompanied by under-regulation and social controversies. Their growth slowed 
down when the state intervened to set up stricter requirements in order to guide them 
onto a path of “independence.” Since then, independent colleges have been adjusting 
and restructuring to ensure their continuous survival and development.  
 The contribution of these colleges to China’s quick massification at a time of 
limited public resources should not be understated. The combination of the active role 
of public HEIs, in some cases with the participation of local governments, and the 
market-oriented fee charging mechanism not only proves to be a practical model but 
also tells a lot about the privatization experience with Chinese characteristics.  
 Today, they have become an important part of China’s higher education that 
cannot be ignored. In less than 20 years, they have consisted of over half of the 
minban Bachelor level HEIs. With an advantageous birth background, they stay in the 
middle of China’s higher education hierarchy with the traditional minban HEIs at the 
bottom and the key public universities on the top. Most of them have been trying to 
find a way to develop a path of their own by focusing on 
practical-application-oriented teaching and grounding their programs to meet the 
social and economic needs. A path of their own can also set their programs apart from 
the research-oriented programs offered at the key public HEIs.  
 Zhejiang, being a province with a strong private economy, has witnessed a 
relatively successful development of independent colleges since 1999. The public 
ownership model, though having its demerits and controversies, has proved to be a 
practical and stable endeavor. It is very likely that the remaining independent colleges 
will probably turn to be more public if the public HEIs continue to own and de facto 
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run these colleges. In the next chapter, I will look into the physical aspects of an 
independent college in Zhejiang to offer a close-up study of its institutional nature and 
some salient aspects of the institutional operation. The reason to choose this 
institution is mainly its representativeness in explaining the “Zhejiang model” -- the 
public type independent college model.   
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Chapter 4 Independent Colleges in Zhejiang: The Portrait of 
Zhejiang University City College (ZUCC) 
 
Vignette: Building Zhejiang Polytechnic Institute (Polytechnic Institute of 
Zhejiang University）on the Campus of ZUCC 
 
 This was the spring of 2017. The northern campus of ZUCC was undergoing 
some construction project. A section of the undeveloped woods was bulldozed for a 
new parking area and a make-shift construction command center. The BeiXiu (North 
Elegance) Building, which had been used as a restaurant capable of holding events, 
such as graduation banquets, for ten years, was currently under renovation to be ready 
to serve as the main teaching and administration building for the Zhejiang Polytechnic 
Institute & the Polytechnic Institute of Zhejiang University in the coming September. 
Also, at the gate of a Mercedes-Benz dealer’s building, which was right next to the 
future-to-be teaching building, a sign was put up to inform the customers about the 
relocation. Obviously, this section of the land, owned by ZUCC and leased to the 
Benz dealer, was about to be taken back to also get ready for the use of the planned 
polytechnic institute under Zhejiang University.  
 There was no public announcement on the campus to explain the bustling 
construction at the very north end. Many faculty and students continued to do what 
they were supposed to do in this college without taking much notice of the often-seen 
construction here and there. After all, construction seems to be a rather normal and 
daily thing in China, especially for a college with a history of less than 20 years. 
However, there were some private discussions among faculty and staff about what the 
construction was for and what the planned polytechnic institute actually was going to 
be.  
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 During these discussions, there were several things which were clear and some 
concerns which were unsolved. The clear part included that 1) this was an important 
higher education project co-sponsored by Zhejiang University and Zhejiang 
provincial government; 2) as a project backed by the provincial government, the 
planned institute enjoyed a higher affiliation status in comparison to ZUCC, which 
has a municipal level affiliation; 3) it was certain that the new polytechnic institute 
would recruit its first group of students in September, 2017. The concerns included 1) 
how the two institutions would share the same campus; 2) how to understand the 
triangle relationship between ZUCC, Zhejiang University and the polytechnic institute; 
and 3) what all this was going to mean for ZUCC. Nobody could truly answer these 
concerns, but it was certain that ZUCC should cooperate in the possible ways it could 
since this new institute was a huge initiative backed by Zhejiang University and the 
provincial government. And it might even be of much bigger significance in the 
industrial transformation and manufacturing upgrading of the country.  
 In May of 2015, the state council of China published the Made in China 2025 
guidance paper to turn China into a manufacturing power through upgrading and 
innovating the manufacturing industry. Innovation, quality, green development, 
structural optimization and talents were the five key guiding principles in this paper. 
Smart manufacturing and industry 4.0 became the catchwords for media with Premier 
Li Keqiang’s third visit to Europe in July, 2015. In March, 2016, Guang Ming Daily, a 
major national government newspaper, published a piece advocating that in order to 
push for the upgrading of “Made in China” China must accelerate the education of 
high-end engineering talents. Therefore, in this critical moment of China’s 
manufacturing upgrading, it seemed very logical to follow the guidance from the top 
leadership to build engineering institutions to educate the badly-needed top-notch 
technical & engineering talents. Actually, it became very timely and politically 
keen-minded to build the Zhejiang Polytechnic Institute. The selection of a site and 
seeking the cooperation from ZUCC became only secondary to the successful 
establishment of an institutional project approved and sponsored by the provincial 
government and the ministerial level Zhejiang University, both of which have the 
77 
keen knowledge about the national strategic plan for the next ten or even twenty 
years.  
------------ 
 
 
 In this section, building on Schein’s organizational culture framework, I will 
explain the “physical” dimension of Zhejiang University City College (ZUCC). As the 
above vignette reveals, the public forces, such as the local government, Zhejiang 
University and the state policy, play a paramount role in shaping the “physical” 
features of the institution. The political authority hierarchy dictates the power of voice 
and determines the power structure. In this small story, ZUCC and the faculty 
working in it are very much under the influence of the powerful public forces from 
outside. It probably reminds us that the privatization or marketization in China is less 
the one kind with decentralization and devolution of power than the one kind with the 
guidance or leadership from the state.   
Specifically, I will look into ZUCC’s physical location, sponsoring institution, 
major configuration, tuition structure, personnel system and other featured 
characteristics. These salient aspects of the institution are the tangible “artifacts” 
embodying the institutional environment and they are also the manifestation of the 
“espoused value” of the institution (Schein, 1992). They appear in the recruiting 
brochure, on the website pages and in the institutional summary for the 15th 
anniversary. On the open campus day, these physical artifacts are also visible to send a 
strong public message about the cultural identity of the institution. These artifacts tell 
how the institution portrays itself and establishes the key shared cultural assumption 
to convey to the prospective students and visitors in order to form an institutional 
cultural impression on them (Spradley, 1980; Tierney, 1988, Clark, 1987). In the 
following, I will try to present the shared institutional portrait by exploring the 
“physical” characteristics in six areas, including institutional origin, geographical 
location, linkage to Zhejiang U, academic programs, tuition and personnel system. It 
is hoped that through this narrative portrait, the nature of ZUCC, or even the nature of 
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the public type independent colleges can be better understood for the audience.  
 
 
Institutional Origin 
 Zhejiang University City College (ZUCC) was first established in July, 1999. The 
year of 1999, probably, is the demarcation line for China’s massification of HE. In 
1997, the number of China’s higher education entering students reached 1 million, 
after over ten years’ accumulating growth under this 1 million line. This number shot 
from 1.08 million in 1998 to 1.6 million in 1999. This was about a 60% percent 
increase in the number of college-entering students, which was unprecedented and is 
still the highest annual increase in terms of higher education expansion rate. ZUCC, 
as one of the first independent colleges in China, was called a secondary college 
before 2003, implying its subsidiary affiliation to the sponsoring Zhejiang University. 
And its establishment met the historical task of HE expansion and offered HE 
opportunities to the numerous college-aspiring families, who were more than willing 
to pay the full tuition in order to realize the college dream.  
 Another key background information is the merging of the four national key 
universities in Hangzhou in 1998 – Zhejiang University, Hangzhou University, 
Zhejiang Agricultural University and Zhejiang Medical University, so as to form the 
more academically comprehensive and competitive Zhejiang University. With China’s 
211 project starting in 1995 and 985 project in 1998, many top universities were keen 
to reform themselves and improve their academic quality to meet the national goal of 
“building the first class universities with international competitiveness” (Rhoads, 
2014). The new Zhejiang University was one of the most prominent cases of 
university merging at the time. Although the merging almost immediately brought 
Zhejiang University to a much higher ranking among all the Chinese universities, the 
side effects included the disappearance of three key universities in Hangzhou and the 
redundancy of faculty in the new university.    
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 To both improve the size of higher education provision for the Zhejiang Province 
and to divert the excessive number of faculty, Zhejiang University City College was 
founded under the auspices of Zhejiang University and Hangzhou Municipal 
Government. Zhejiang Telecomm Industry CO., as the social force (basically it was 
also a state-owned enterprise), co-sponsored the founding with some initial land and 
building assets. Therefore, Zhejiang University City College has a clear public 
ownership with no private individuals or enterprises sitting on the board of the school. 
This ownership nature explains many of the influences from and connections with the 
public forces. However, despite the public ownership, the college has been running as 
a minban HEI charging a much higher tuition than normal public universities. This is 
called the cost-recovery model, or the publicly owned and privately run (Gong You 
Min Ban) model by many experts in China (Liu, 2003; Liu, 2014; Wen, 2005). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this is purported to mobilize the family funding and 
achieve the HE expansion with lower state funding. Zhejiang University, in this case, 
serves as the academic quality guardian and ensures the market attraction. In a 
significant way, it backs up the charging of high tuition. To no surprise, this hybrid 
model is considered innovative by some and unfathomably strange by others. 
Learning about its nature and its many manifestations will help us understand the 
privatization of HE with Chinese characteristics.  
 Growing in the massification period of China’s HE, ZUCC has turned into a 
college covering 165 acres (1000 mu) of land and educating about thirteen thousand 
degree-earning students with nine academic schools ranging from computer science to 
media and law. From 2008 on, ZUCC has started to award bachelor degrees bearing 
its full college name, instead of the ones with the name of Zhejiang University, which 
has been part of the transformation to become increasingly independent under the 
2008 Regulation Document (Ministry of Education, 2008).  
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Located in a Famed City– Geographic Advantage  
 As a college chiefly designed and established by the Hangzhou municipal 
government and the national key Zhejiang University, ZUCC has been proud of its 
both connections and used them in publicity materials to show the backing from both 
the local government and the well-known Zhejiang University. As a matter of fact, it 
has become an important development strategy to strengthen the ties with the two 
major founders so as to improve the institutional image among the public and gain 
teaching/research resources. In Chinese, it is called the strategy of Ming Chen, Ming 
Xiao, namely famed city, famed university. This policy emphasis has not only brought 
public recognition, but contributed to the fast growth in its campus size and academic 
programs in a short time.  
 The city of Hangzhou, being the capital of Zhejiang Province, has traditionally 
been known for its strength in tourism and cultural heritage. In recent years, high-tech 
or Internet industry has become a major advantage with companies, such as Alibaba, 
emerging and growing fast. With a population of 9 million, its GDP has surpassed one 
trillion RMB in 2015, ranked the 10th among all the cities in China (Hangzhou 
Statistical Data). Therefore, it is one of the major industrial cities in the Yangtze River 
Delta region, and it has a strong drawing power for talents from the region to study 
and live. Understandably, located in Hangzhou, ZUCC enjoys a geographical 
advantage in recruiting students residing in Zhejiang Province and drawing high 
quality talents into its faculty and staff team. This geographical advantage logic also 
works for other major cities in China, which are usually the homes of many key 
universities. Beijing and Shanghai are the cities with the most 985 and 211 
universities, which help to push the economic development of these cities. On the 
other hand, the economic and cultural status of these cities also provides the favorable 
growth environment for these key universities. In one word, geographic location 
matters.  
 In the case of ZUCC, Hangzhou government, being one of its founders, has 
offered a great deal of support for ZUCC in terms of its education/research resources. 
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Since 2003, thirteen programs at ZUCC have gradually been designated as the 
Hangzhou municipal key programs and received funding annually. Also, twelve 
science research labs have been named the municipal level key labs and two social 
science research centers have become the municipal key research bases, most of 
which happened after 2008. Considering there are altogether about forty degree 
programs and nineteen research centers at ZUCC, the support from the Hangzhou 
government is substantial.  
One more thing to note here is that these municipal supported programs and 
research centers also serve to help the urban economic and cultural development. For 
example, the Regional Economic Development and Evolution Simulation Lab was set 
up in 2013 as a key lab to help with the economic and city planning of the region. The 
Tourism Development and Law Research Center was set up in 2011 to provide policy 
suggestions for this traditional tourism city. In many different occasions, ZUCC has 
announced its goal as educating the application and innovation oriented talents, who 
can match the local social needs and contribute to the regional economic development. 
Therefore, this support between the college and the local government goes both ways.  
  
Supported by a Famed University – Link to Zhejiang University 
 Zhejiang University is the other major founder and the chief planner for the 
college. This salient connection is not only visible in the college name and symbol, 
but also observable in student academic affairs, programs, and faculty constitution.  
 The “pathway” policy, targeting at the entering students, offers the opportunity to 
transfer to Zhejiang University in the second year. The first year students have to 
participate in two subjects tests at the end of the each semester for the first year (math 
and English for humanities majors; math and physics for science majors). Also their 
GPA must rank above the top 10%. After an interview process, only 1% of the 
entering students are allowed to transfer and register with Zhejiang University. And 
there is a probation process when they successfully transfer, during which the selected 
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students will be returned to ZUCC if there is any problem in academic performance.  
Therefore, it is a very strictly designed transfer policy with only about a dozen 
students who can make the pathway. However, with China’s highly pressured Gaokao 
culture and great aspirations for a prestigious university degree, many students are 
drawn to ZUCC in order to try again to enter the prestigious Zhejiang University, 
even though the chance is very slim. In many recruiting materials and sessions, the 
“pathway” policy is publicized and explained to curious students hoping to have a 
second chance. In fact, every year quite a few high-scoring students, whose scores 
allow them to go to the first tier universities charging public tuitions, still choose to 
enter ZUCC with the determination that if given a second chance they can earn 
themselves a seat in the top university.  
 In terms of academic programs, there are nine schools and forty degree programs 
at ZUCC and some of them draw teaching and faculty resources from Zhejiang 
University. The medical school is a very typical example. It has been very much 
reliant on the teaching resources from Zhejiang U, because medical programs are 
usually costly to set up and Zhejiang U has the most expansive medical teaching 
resources in the whole province. Established around 2008, the medical school has 
three degree programs and enrolls over 1400 students. The current dean, graduated 
and having worked at Zhejiang University for many years, is also a graduate advisor 
for PhD students at Zhejiang University. The school frequently invites professors and 
doctors from ZJU and the three ZJU affiliated hospitals to offer academic and 
practical courses. Due to the high cost of building medical labs, the school sets up 
cooperative teaching programs with the medical labs at ZJU’s campus to send the 
senior students to have lab experiences there. These students study in the same lab 
with ZJU students. Also, every semester the nursing program openly selects students 
to work as interns at ZJU affiliated hospitals, which may result in formal employment 
at graduation.  
 The other schools and programs have their respective cooperation with ZJU at 
different degrees. If it is not as direct as students going to ZJU to use a lab there, it 
could be faculty attending academic forum or conferences at ZJU or inviting ZJU 
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faculty to do an academic lecture at ZUCC. After all, both institutions are located at 
Hangzhou and the physical vicinity brings the convenience for exchange and 
cooperation.  
 Another notable cooperation in academic programs is the joint programs for 
master students. ZUCC, as a four year undergraduate institution, does not have the 
authorization to accept master students. With the support from ZJU, some qualified 
ZUCC faculty can apply for being a tutor for master degree students at ZJU. If 
granted tutorship, they are allowed to take master students from ZJU through the joint 
programs or they can sit on the dissertation board for master students at ZJU. This 
broadens the academic development path for ZUCC faculty and upgrades the 
academic quality for ZUCC programs. In 2015, ZUCC faculty participated in the joint 
programs to help tutoring 90 students from ZJU. In the long run, this kind of 
cooperation prepares for ZUCC to develop its own master programs if the 
authorization policy allows in the future.  
 Faculty and staff constitution is another aspect to see the connection. A vague 
expression of “drawing upon the ZJU faculty resources” is often seen in different 
publicized documents to summarize the connection in faculty resources. On the top 
administrative leadership level, the three principals of ZUCC since 1999 have all 
previously worked at ZJU and transferred to ZUCC for a new job assignment. In 
many ways, they shall answer to the administrative leaders at ZJU. For any 
institutionally significant decisions, they must report to ZJU and seek approval. The 
current principal of ZUCC, Wu Jian, was a chemist and served as the Dean for Zhu 
Ke Zhen College of ZJU before she was asked to take the position at ZUCC in 2008.  
 At the faculty level, there are about 700 teaching faculty at ZUCC, about one 
third of which have some kind of background associated with ZJU. The senior faculty 
members are mostly transferred from ZJU during and after the merging to form the 
new ZJU. For various reasons they chose to leave their former positions at ZJU or 
other merged institutions to work at this new college. In addition, some faculty 
graduated from ZJU and joined ZUCC to teach and research afterwards. In some 
cases, they still work under their PhD tutor, who holds positions at both ZJU and 
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ZUCC. But one important thing to notice is that at the early stage of ZUCC, those 
faculty members who transferred from ZJU played an important role in jump-starting 
academic programs and teaching courses. They used to be the major force in faculty 
constitution. With stabilization of faculty structure after the merging and restructuring 
at ZJU, fewer faculty at ZJU chose to transfer to ZUCC. And ZUCC has been 
increasing its recruiting efforts for young teaching faculty in order to build its own 
energetic teaching force. Therefore, the size of those senior faculty members with 
ZJU background is shrinking. But still in the administrative level, the ZJU affiliated 
faculty members dominate the leadership and are responsible for major institutional 
decisions.  
  
First-Tier Programs in a Third-Tier College 
 Before talking about these first-tier programs at ZUCC, it is necessary to 
understand China’s tiered or hierarchical HE system and the related admission 
policies.  
 Because of the Gaokao mechanism and the centralized education policy, the HEIs 
in China do not enjoy the freedom of designing their own admission standards in a 
market-based HE system, such as the U.S. In each province, all the HEIs and the 
majors they offer are ranked into several tiers according to the evaluation from the 
provincial or national academic evaluation office. The tiered ranking strictly limits the 
lower tier universities to have access to high-scoring students. This is argued by some 
to be a rigid and unfair hierarchical system, which benefits the high-ranking public 
HEIs and creates barrier for the low-ranking minban HEIs to compete openly and 
fairly on the same level in recruiting students.  
 For example, ZUCC, just like the rest 21 independent colleges in Zhejiang 
Province, is currently categorized as a HEI to start the recruiting process after the first 
tier public universities complete the process. In Zhejiang Province, starting from 2013, 
the previously four tier recruiting system, in which ZUCC was a third tier college in 
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the recruiting process, has been changed to three tier system, in which ZUCC became 
a second tier college. According to the Zhejiang reform plan, in 2017 there would be 
no such distinction and all undergraduate level universities could recruit students from 
the same pool of students at the same time (Zhejiang Provincial Department of 
Education, 2014). However, this has not been put into practice at the moment of this 
writing. Nonetheless, the direction of reform across China is to gradually remove the 
unequal recruiting system and provide a level ground for both public institutions and 
minban ones to compete for good students. Also it is a way to gradually eradicate the 
deeply rooted prejudiced concept about different tiers of colleges and universities, in 
which minban ones are often stereotyped as having poor education quality and 
low-achieving students (Ministry of Education, 2015).  
However, it is important to note the tiered system has been existing in China 
since the restoration of Gaokao in 1978. The concepts of “first tier”, “second tier” and 
“third tier” have become so embedded in mind that people in the system habitually 
use them to tell the quality differences among all the HEIs. The common 
understanding is that first tier universities are all national key universities charging 
public tuition, which are obviously most desirable and therefore the most competitive 
ones. The second tier ones are also public universities, which are less prestigious and 
usually more regionally known. The third tier ones are those charging high minban 
tuition and having poor public images. These are the stereotyped images of the three 
tiers of HEIs, which serve as the reputation guide for students and their parents and 
create the rigid higher education recruiting system in China. This system and the 
stereotyping have a lasting influence on students and faculty in the “third tier” minban 
HEIs.  
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Table 4.1   Some Exemplary Major Programs Offered at ZUCC and Their Tuitions 
Some Major Programs Tuition 
asset evaluation (1st tier) 5300 
computer science(1st tier) 6000 
civil engineering(1st tier) 6000 
Statistics (3rd tier) 17000 
Information management (3rd tier) 17000 
Architecture (3rd tier) 25000 
Finance (3rd tier) 23000 
International business (3rd tier) 23000 
Note: Information derives from the 2016 ZUCC Student Recruiting Prospectus 
 
Therefore, despite the current policy reform efforts and the institutional 
background, ZUCC, like many other independent colleges charging high minban 
tuition, is stereotyped as a “third tier” college by the general public. To a great extent, 
it seems to confine the institution in a certain level of competition and create a glass 
ceiling for many minban institutions. This is probably why the administrative leaders 
of ZUCC try the best to distinguish itself from other third tier independent college and 
seek any opportunity that can give the institution a level-breaking pull.  
Thus, the establishment of some first-tier programs allows ZUCC to recruit 
students in the first batch together with other national key universities and charge the 
same subsidized public tuition. It has become its rational choice to find its way out of 
the third tier and break into the higher tier where it can have access to more talented 
students and enjoy a refined public image. In a way, the independent colleges offering 
first tier programs are, to a great extent, leaning towards the public HEIs, because 
these programs charge public university tuitions, which is less than one third of 
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minban tuition, and they can recruit high scoring students in the first tier batch.10 In 
another word, these are attempts to shorten the gap between the public and minban 
HEIs and break the stereotype for “third tier” colleges.  
In ZUCC’s case, there were three first-tier programs being established in 2016. 
They were asset evaluation, civil engineering and computer science, which altogether 
recruited 180 students in 2016. This is a number much smaller than the annual student 
recruiting figure of about 3400. But the college makes great efforts to climb up the 
hierarchical ladder in order to attract high scoring students and change the 
stereotypical image. These programs have a symbolic significance in raising the 
public image of ZUCC and breaking the glass ceiling for “third tier” independent 
colleges. In 2018, the first-tier programs at ZUCC have expanded to about twenty 
suddenly after passing the program evaluation of the provincial educational 
department. It means these programs can all start charging public tuitions and they 
can recruit students in the first tier batch. This exciting news has given the 
development path example for other independent colleges. Though the future is 
uncertain, it is likely more of these colleges in Zhejiang will seek strong public 
support and break away from the poor image of minban HEIs as third tier colleges.  
 
Cost-based Tuition Charging  
  
 Tuition is often used to tell the difference between a public and a minban HEI. 
ZUCC, like many other independent colleges in China, charges a much higher tuition 
than the one by a public institution. It is argued that this high tuition creates a barrier 
for many college-aspiring students to receive higher education and creates the 
problem for equality (Zha, 2012; Liu, 2012). It is certainly true for many low income 
families if we take a quick look at the tuition at ZUCC (See Table 4.1).  
                                                             
10Currently, among the 22 independent colleges in Zhejiang Province there are three having first-tier programs, 
two of which are the independent colleges affiliated to Zhejiang University. This shows the importance of having a 
strong public university as the sponsoring institution for independent colleges. The academic and faculty resource 
support from Zhejiang University is clearly stated in recruiting materials and provides the foundation for the 
first-tier programs in the two ZJU-affiliated independent colleges.   
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 As mentioned above, there are three first-tier programs at ZUCC, which charge a 
tuition from 5300 RMB to 6000 RMB. This is currently the standard tuition for many 
public universities. According to People’s Daily, the average government allocation 
support for each college student is about 12000 RMB (2016). Therefore, if admitted 
into public tuition programs, students take up one third of the cost for education and 
the public funding covers the rest. For the first tier programs at ZUCC, students can 
enjoy the much lower tuition cost with the government allocation funding. However, 
in 2016 considering the small number of 160 students these programs recruited, this 
government funding only amounted to less than 2 million RMB annually.  
 So for majority of the programs at ZUCC, it charges the minban tuition, which is 
between 17000 RMB and 23000 RMB. If we do the math, it can be found that this 
tuition is almost equal to the combined figure of the public tuition (5000RMB) and 
government allocation support (12000RMB). This probably means the students and 
their family have to pay up more to cover the average cost for educating a college 
student. And this number is about three times more than the tuition in a public 
institution. This is clearly the most salient way to see how a minban college is 
different from a public one. In my many interviews, students point this out as the most 
important reason to categorize ZUCC as a minban college. It is through the same 
tuition lens that the general public identify the difference between public and minban 
institutions.  
 Let’s take a more macro perspective to explore the tuition question. From 2014 to 
2016, ZUCC publicized its revenue and spending (See Table 4.2). The first thing to 
note is that the tuition has made up a big part of its revenue, which is about 80 percent. 
This corresponds to the minban character of this college that it mainly draws upon its 
own funding source to run the school. So in terms of the financial structure, it does 
run on a minban model and depends mainly on non-public funding.  
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Table 4.2  Revenue Sources for ZUCC 
                                               Unit: million RMB 
Year 2014 2015 2016 
Public Funding 45 51 56 
Tuition    274 269 274 
Total 319 320 330 
 
Source: Zhejiang University City College Annual Budget & Spending 
http://www.zucc.edu.cn/uploadfile/2016/0315/20160315050323484.pdf  
  
However, one more thing to note here is that ZUCC does receive some funding from 
the local government. In 2016, this figure has reached 13% of its total revenue. This is 
greatly a result of its cooperative relationship with the Hangzhou municipal 
government. Designed as a regional college to serve the regional economic 
development, ZUCC has developed a close partnership with the local government. 
From the very beginning, it received the land allocation for its campus site. Now, its 
public funding enjoys an annual growth since 2013. All this can be attributed to the 
local Hangzhou government being a sponsoring party. The publicly owned and 
privately run model explains a certain level of government preference and the annual 
growth in public funding.  
 During the interviews, the term of “cost-based tuition charging” or “cost-recovery 
model” came up quite frequently. It is often used by the interviewees to explain the 
core feature of the publicly owned and privately run model of ZUCC. Charging the 
minban tuition to cover the cost is considered a key feature for ZUCC-- the privately 
run mechanism. It provides the important funding support to the daily operation of the 
institution. This model, widely adopted in quite many independent colleges, greatly 
mobilizes the family financial sources and saves the government billions in higher 
education provision. On the one hand, it does create barrier and pressure for 
individual families in achieving the college-going dream. On the other hand, it also 
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allows China’s higher education system to upgrade the HE participation rate from 19% 
in 2004 to 40% in 2015 in one decade or so. Part of this China speed in massification 
of HE can be attributed to the rise of these independent colleges and the full tuition 
charging mechanism.  
  One last thing worth noting is that the full minban tuition has remained at one 
level since the founding of independent colleges. For ZUCC, the tuition has remained 
the same since 1999. Considering the inflation and economic growth since 1999, 
20000 RMB—the full tuition for most programs, would mean a big fortune in 1999, 
when the GDP per capita was only about 7,000 RMB. However, in 2016 China’s GDP 
per capita has reached 50,000 RMB. Therefore, it is important to see that the actual 
tuition adjusted by inflation is decreasing. More and more families are able to pay for 
this tuition with the economic growth and the increase in family income. And this 
tuition freezing may be partially a result of the centralized system and the cautious 
policy making in social welfare aspects so as not to stir up public discontent. 
Education has been a social welfare field attracting an increasing amount of attention 
in recent years. Keeping the tuition at a stable level may have some important 
stabilizing effect for the whole social and economic development.   
 
BianZhi—Public Affiliated Personnel System   
 In this section, I will discuss the BianZhi concept and the related personnel 
system at ZUCC. This personnel system has a lot to do with China’s past history of 
public ownership and socialist collective system (Perry and Lu, 1997). To some extent, 
it is the heritage of the socialist collective period and its reform has been going on for 
over two decades.  
 BianZhi (编制) is a term that has been repeatedly mentioned in the interviews 
with faculty and administrators at ZUCC. In Chinese, literally it means organizing 
institution. In the context of work units, it is a personnel affiliation with the institution 
a person works in. As a cultural heritage of the collective ownership period or the 
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pre-reform and opening era, BianZhi still exerts an important impact on individuals 
making career choices and institutions recruiting the needed talents, because an 
affiliation with certain work unit, especially the public one, means stability and 
security, often deemed desirable for many individuals.  
 In the case of ZUCC, it has three kinds of BianZhi in terms of its affiliation with 
the public sector. They are in a hierarchical order. The first and best one is the 
BianZhi affiliated with the Hangzhou public sector personnel system. Employees in 
this category are most close to civil servants under the Hangzhou government 
personnel system. They enjoy high job security and may transfer among positions in 
the Hangzhou government personnel system. It means the faculty or administrators of 
ZUCC can also transfer to the different departments under the Hangzhou municipal 
government, though it can be rare. These employees are fundamentally similar to the 
ones working in public HEIs. So far, there are about 700 employees in this personnel 
category, most of which are faculty and key administrators. In addition, similar to this 
BianZhi is the one under Zhejiang University personnel system. This affiliation is a 
result of the transfer of many faculty and administrators from ZJU to ZUCC after the 
merging of four institutions to establish the new ZJU in 1998. They were promised 
that their affiliation with the giant ZJU would be always protected and their social 
welfare would go along with the ZJU personnel system when they transferred to 
ZUCC. This settled the worry about benefit reduction after transferring from a public 
HEI to a minban one. Basically they have been guaranteed with the social welfare 
package under the previous public institution. In a nutshell, in this first and most 
desirable category of Bianzhi, the strong public affiliation is a key factor; and there 
are two sub categories, depending on the personnel affiliation with Hangzhou 
government or ZJU. And today majority of the faculty and administrators belong to 
this category.  
 The second category is the employees under the so-called personnel agent system. 
These people are affiliated neither under the Hangzhou public personnel system nor 
with the ZJU personnel system. They are employed by ZUCC and have signed a 
contract with ZUCC. They enjoy the similar benefit standards as the ones employed 
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under the Hangzhou public personnel system, but in registration they do not count as 
one affiliated with the Hangzhou public system. Basically, they are purely employees 
of ZUCC and do not enjoy the security and transferability within the Hangzhou public 
personnel system. Due to the current public sector personnel system reform and the 
public personnel quota limit, almost all the recently recruited administrative level 
personnel belong to the personnel agent system. In fact, the reason to set up this 
category is to narrow the benefit gap between the public personnel system and the non 
public personnel system at the best. So there can be less complaint from employees 
and less inequality resulted from the personnel affiliation difference.  
 The last category is usually the least desirable, since it is under the enterprise 
personnel system, which is similar to the system of many private enterprises. This 
system not only has less job security, but offers reduced social benefits. Simply, these 
employees make far less than the others with public personnel system affiliation, even 
though they often work as much. With the consideration of personnel quota and cost 
control, an increasing number of lower administrative level personnel are under this 
category. But overall they still occupy a small section of all the personnel at ZUCC. 
They belong to the rather marginalized group of employees in the institution. There is 
some mobility opportunities in this group and some might find an opportunity to 
upgrade into the second group.   
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Figure 4.1   Personnel Organizing Institution and Its Categorization  
 
  
Although being officially categorized as a minban institution according to the 
Ministry of Education, ZUCC, like many other independent colleges, displays some 
characters that are quite public. The personnel system shows many of the faculty and 
administrators are actually public sector employees, though a small number are the 
enterprise Bianzhi and some are between the public and the enterprise BianZhi. This 
provides an advantage in talent recruiting, since many job seekers still value the 
public personnel affiliation, especially the one with good security. For other 
independent colleges in Zhejiang Province, some have recently relocated to the 
neighboring small towns mainly due to the campus size requirement set up by the 
Ministry in 2008 (the 2008 Regulation). From another perspective, this strategy is also 
attempted to build up the tie with the local government force, because the strong 
government tie can lead to the public personnel affiliation quota and other potential 
public funding benefits. This is usually considered beneficial for the long term 
survival and development of these independent colleges with a short history. In a HE 
system with a strong existence of the state, the gravitational pull of the government 
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institutions and the direction they are heading to.  
Therefore, this public affiliated personnel system, or Bianzhi, is an important 
character for many independent colleges, especially the ones in Zhejiang Province. To 
some extent, it has helped these institutions to earn its credibility among the public, 
especially for those who value stability and security. After all, the employees in the 
institution are public employees who should answer to the regulations of the local 
government and put the public interest as their top priority.  
    
Summary 
 In this chapter, specific attention has been given to the physical location, 
sponsoring institution, degree program configuration, tuition structure, BianZhi 
personnel system of ZUCC. ZUCC, founded by ZJU and Hangzhou government, is an 
independent college partially designed to serve the regional social and economic 
development. It shows quite a few characteristics that point to its public ownership. 
Its affiliation with two public founders seems to draw this institution closer to the 
public side. Backed by the strong public institution and supported by the local 
government, ZUCC now enjoys three first tier programs charging public tuition and is 
likely to expand these public tuition charging first tier programs in the near future. Its 
personnel system reveals its HR affiliation with both ZJU and Hangzhou municipal 
government. Obviously, ZUCC takes full advantage of its affiliation with the two 
public forces, which works in its favor when attracting high quality faculty. The 
minban side is more or less explained in terms of the tuition structure and its revenue 
structure. And it tells about its pragmatic consideration when it comes to fund raising. 
The minban mechanism is a good way to mobilize financial resources from the 
society to achieve a bigger public goal.     
 Just as the anecdote in the beginning of the chapter tries to reveal, the institution 
is probably more public than minban/private in making key decisions with long term 
institutional impacts, largely due to its affiliation with both Zhejiang University and 
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the local government. Clearly, its fast growth in the past two decades should be 
largely attributed to the support from these two public forces. However, in interviews 
some faculty and administrators also point to the downside for the strong public 
affiliation. Somehow, it also compromises its independence and the ability to innovate. 
The public support can be a great advantage in running a college in China’s public 
dominant HE system, on the one hand; on the other hand, it can also restrain the 
institutional innovation it can take. Isomorphism, or the so called iron cage, as 
explained by the neo-institutionalism perspective, will turn these originally innovative 
institutions to be more similar to the old ones (DiMaggio, 1983; Pedersen & Dobbin, 
2006). In this case, they started on an innovative path and gradually turned to be like 
the shrunken version of public universities.  
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Chapter 5  Students’ Perception of ZUCC 
 
Vignette  
Zhen was a fourth year female student majoring in English, which is not one of 
those majors at ZUCC receiving a great deal of academic support from ZJU, the 
mother institution.11 Her long braided hair and radiating smile were the most 
characteristic of her personality. She was the running chairman for the Toastmaster 
Club (TMC) at ZUCC when she was in her third year. She invited me to participate in 
the club activities a couple of times and that’s how I started to learn more about her.  
Being genuinely interested in practicing her English, she attended almost all the 
TMC events on the campus and reached out to other TMC activities in other parts of 
the city. At this moment of writing, she had become the district assistant director for 
the TMC-Hangzhou District and was pretty active in updating her personal weibo and 
wechat accounts with her weekly participation at different TMC locations in 
Hangzhou. She told me in several occasions that she was interested in pursuing a 
further education abroad, preferably U.S., because that was more challenging. While 
discussing what she might want to study abroad, she mentioned she was interested in 
becoming a teacher and the different educational experiments, particularly the fun and 
humanistic approach, attract her attention most. She believed she might discover a 
less pains-taking study approach for her future students.  
In one of our conversations, she told me that one of the reasons for her to prepare 
herself for further study was to prove she could be better with a diploma from a better 
institution. Coming from the well-known small commodity exporting town, Yiwu of 
Zhejiang Province, she left me the impression of a confident and out-going college 
student with a strong interest in learning from others. TMC was not the only place 
where she could learn things outside the classroom. She also had internship 
                                                             
11 Being an institution associated with Zhejiang University, Zhejiang University City College enjoys various kinds 
of support from the mother institution. These supports are mainly academic and faculty wise. However, science 
programs, particularly the medical program (undergraduate level), receive a lot of teaching resource support, since 
it is expensive to start a medical program from scratch and sharing the lab facilities and faculty from Zhejiang 
University can not only cut down the cost but raise the whole standard of the program at ZJU City College.  
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experiences at several children’s English teaching centers and currently she was 
working as a teaching assistant for an IELTS teaching center, which according to her 
paid her better and helped her learn how to prepare for studying abroad. Despite her 
impressive social practice resume, she, just like most of her fellow students, suffered 
from a kind of “independent college syndrome”, which could be characterized as a 
sense of inferiority or self-humbling perception when compared to some top tier 
universities, mainly the 985 or 211 universities. In China, independent colleges are 
often unofficially referred to as “San-Ben” institutions, which means third tier 
colleges. Charging three to four folds of the public college tuition, having a college 
name with the mother institution brand name and an add-on part become the most 
visible features for the “San-Ben” institutions. The mother institution brand name may 
give the students some pride, but it can also cause confusion and even become a 
permanent reminder of their inferiority. After all, they are different and believed to be 
hardly able to match the ability of those favored ones entering the true top tier 
universities.  
When first entering ZUCC, Zhen, like many other high-aspiring freshmen, tried 
her luck at the cross-collegiate pathway test, which allows the ZUCC students to 
compete for a very small number of seats at the mother institution—ZJU. The 
graduate study, for her, is yet another opportunity to prove herself and relieve herself 
from the “independent college syndrome”. As a matter of a fact, about 20 percent of 
the ZUCC students seek opportunities for further education either in China or abroad. 
Most students who enter the job market upon graduation face the fierce employment 
competition and bear the brunt of being a “San-Ben” student.  
Zhen told me her participation in TMC not only helped her improve English but 
broadened her social connection and experience, which could come handy when the 
time came for her to look for job opportunities. Actually, she had used her TMC 
connection to help one of her friends obtain an interview opportunity at a big 
transnational enterprise. For a 21 year old college student, that was quite resourceful 
and strategic. Surly she understood the importance of both academic ability and social 
skills.  
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If Zhen’s active participation in TMC is rare among the students, her passion to 
prove herself and resourcefulness may not be unique to herself. As a student group 
often associated with the “San-Ben” institution but longing for a better one, they share 
some common characters and experiences when they study at ZUCC and enter the 
society with that label after graduation. 
 In the following section, I will try to portray the implications of studying at 
ZUCC and how students perceive their experiences in the institution. Hence, it will 
give us some clue about the nature of independent colleges from students’ 
perspective.   
  
---------------- 
 
Students are an important part of the school community. When 
Gaztambide-Fernandez did his cultural study on American elite boarding schools, he 
chose to focus on the student group through uncovering the entering, living, studying 
and graduating experiences so as to expose the formation of a grueling elite culture in 
school (2009). His interesting study shows how students’ experiences and their views 
are an indispensable part of what the institution is. When prospective students choose 
to enter certain schools, they and their family weigh the pros and cons of an institution 
and ponder over its social and academic value. Hence, they come to some sense about 
what they may expect when entering the institution, though that expectation or 
perception changes with their growing experience in the institution. When students 
join the school community, they shape and are shaped by the culture of the school. 
That interaction between the student group and the institution reveals not only the 
diversified student experiences but also certain characters about the institution. When 
they graduate and enter the society, students compete for jobs with the brand mark of 
the institution and they come to see what the institution has brought to them and how 
these characters they inherit from the institution are received by the wider society.  
Therefore, it is argued that a study of students’ perception of the institution can 
help to reveal the cultural and social identity of the institution. Their understanding of 
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the institution can be different from the official image of the institution and is 
believed to represent a kind of more grassroots-based perspective. According to 
Schein’s (1992) organizational culture framework, students’ perception offers the 
knowledge on the participants’ assumption about the reality in the organization, which 
can come into conflict with the “espoused image” or the officially portrayed version. 
The study is intended to give a more complex and multi-faceted portrait of 
independent colleges so as to come as close as possible to their true nature.  
 One problem with representing the student body is the issue of representation. In 
the case of ZUCC, there is a body of over 10 thousand students associated with nine 
different schools. It is certainly impossible to interview all the students. However, the 
difficulty in accounting for the quantity is compensated by digging in depth and 
careful selection in the interview population. As an insider, who can engage with 
students in various occasions, I had the advantage to observe and question when I felt 
necessary. During the one and a half years’ period doing the study, I have contacts 
with all kinds of students under various occasions. I have ever been to the freshmen’s 
counseling meetings, internship advising programs, opening and commencement 
ceremonies, on-campus job fairs and students’ extracurricular clubs. My participation 
as a faculty advisor in the EDPC (English Debating and Public Speaking Center) 
turned out to be particularly helpful, because I got to reach those students with an 
interest in sharing their opinions and speaking openly and they come from different 
backgrounds. And their continued involvement in the EDPC also offers me the 
opportunity to learn more about these students and how they think about the 
institution. Furthermore, in selecting the interviewees, I made the attempt to cover 
almost all the nine schools and particularly focused on the fourth year students, who 
had gone through most of their academic studies at ZUCC and were in the process of 
seeking employment. From my fieldwork experience, I found the fourth year students 
were at a critical moment of their time at the institution – the conclusion of a college 
experience and the beginning of a career path. This is the time when they feel most 
comfortable to reflect upon their college experiences and evaluate what their identity 
as graduates of ZUCC means in the society. Therefore, they provide a very realistic 
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and ground-based perspective about the nature of ZUCC, including its relationship 
with ZJU, the complex identity of ZUCC and the social stereotyping of the institution. 
In a word, I argue the in-depth fieldwork and selective interviews help to provide a 
human experience oriented portrait and lay an important foundation for my qualitative 
study. A quantitative research may provide a general survey of the student body and 
their views, but it cannot reveal their frustrations, social prejudices and values.  
  
 
Public or Private? 
 During the various interviews and communications with students, many point out 
that this institution has characteristics of both private and public institutions. And it is 
hard for them to give a certain answer about the ownership nature. However, there are 
two main observations that can be identified here. One is that the high tuition comes 
out to be the main reason to consider ZUCC as a private or minban HEI for students. 
The other is the tendency to see ZUCC as one leaning toward a public HEI. Students 
tell their understandings from the setup of curriculum, faculty quality, academic 
atmosphere and other educational factors. It is interesting to note that majority of 
students share this internalized idea that public HEIs are usually more superior to 
private ones in academic quality and social recognition, which is in line with China’s 
public dominated HE system (Jiang, 2011). Minban HEIs occupy a quite peripheral 
position in the whole system and therefore, have a relatively lower recognition in the 
society. Students tend to link minban HEIs with poor teaching quality, high tuition, 
management problems and instability. In this case, students at ZUCC tend to identify 
the institution as a private one when it comes to tuition and as an increasingly public 
one when it comes to other educational aspects.  
 High tuition and lack of other government subsidies for students become the most 
obvious reason to see ZUCC as a private one. A student from the engineering school 
mentions: 
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For me tuition is the way to distinguish the different colleges. 
The first tier and second tier colleges are all public ones because 
they charge lower tuitions. ZUCC charges a third tier private 
college tuition just like many other private HEIs. It is much more 
than the tuition charged by public colleges. I think many people 
share this understanding and therefore, usually agree on the private 
nature of ZUCC. (Student Interview No.3) 
 
 Similar to this student citing the high tuition, another student from the business 
school makes a comparison between her experience at ZUCC and her friends at other 
public colleges,  
 I have some high school classmates now studying at public 
colleges. They not only enjoy a much lower tuition, but receive 
some tuition returns, which is about several hundred Yuan per 
semester. Also I know their dinning services are much cheaper and 
provide more varieties. As far as I know, they got some kind of 
food subsidies from the government. This is why their dining hall 
provides better food at a lower price. There are some other 
differences. Obviously, we have to pay more and may not get the 
same kind of quality experiences as my friends at public colleges. 
(Student Interview No.5) 
  
 Most students I interviewed agree that ZUCC does not enjoy the kind of 
resources or subsidies other public colleges might have. The public colleges receive 
funding based on the number of students they enroll annually and some have better 
chances to receive national or provincial level funding support. Therefore, despite the 
government efforts to open state-supported scholarships to both public and private 
institution students with the overall policy for equal treatment, private HEIs lag still 
far behind in terms of receiving financial supports from the government. ZUCC, like 
many other independent colleges, still largely rely on the tuition for the running cost 
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every year. This is also why some students, particularly the science students, complain 
about the limited lab resources or library electronic data services. As one interviewee 
mentions,  
 It is really not very convenient to do our research at the library. 
The electronic journal we need cannot be found in the library data 
services and many of my classmates have to go and purchase the 
access ourselves. Also many of our current electronic journal 
services are provided by or linked to Zhejiang University. It is not 
very stable. One time I was researching for the final paper, the 
service was out of its capacity limit and was down for a whole 
night. And this kind of temporary breakdown is not rare. So I really 
wish the school can put more money into upgrading our library 
electronic data services. (Student Interview No.9) 
 The heavy reliance on student tuition makes it difficult to distribute the limited 
resources in an all-considerate manner. ZUCC has mainly spent the budget expanding 
teaching facilities and constructing the campus in its first 15 years. It should be 
mentioned that ZUCC, like many other independent colleges, spent only about 15 
years expanding from a couple of hundred students to over thirteen thousand. Many of 
the budgets went into developing the teaching capacity so as to satisfy the basic 
educational needs for this increasingly large student body. Dinning services and 
library electronic data services are the ones that are likely to be given less priorities in 
comparison to hiring more teachers and building more lecture rooms.  
 Besides the high tuition and limited resources, there seems to be no further reason 
for the students to identify ZUCC as a private one. On the other hand, many consider 
it to be more public-like when talking of the relatively better teaching quality, faculty 
quality, administrative style and institutional background. In the eyes of these students, 
the public HEIs in China usually have better academic quality and more educational 
resources than the private ones.  
 When discussing the faculty quality, one student from the computer science 
department presents her view that,  
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I think our teachers are better than the ones in some private 
colleges. Our department hires some teachers from some good 
research institutions and some from Zhejiang University. They have 
great experience and teach us something really useful. Also they 
put a lot of efforts into helping us. (Student Interview No.11) 
Another student from the business school shares this observation by saying,  
Our courses are strictly organized and we have to follow a set of 
standards to earn enough credits in order to graduate. For example, 
our school requires every student to attend at least 10 open lectures 
to earn the ‘secondary class’ credits. Also we have to fulfill the 
volunteer hours to meet the graduation requirement. Our teachers 
are quite strict and serious about these standards. I don’t think it is 
easy to just cheat on it. I feel some of these requirements are like 
the ones at Zhejiang University and this is why it is a college more 
like a public one. Some private colleges have loose rules and 
teachers are not that strict on academic standards. (Student 
Interview No.2) 
In a public dominated HE system, it is understandable for people to form the 
stereotype of “good public” and “bad private” colleges. Although ZUCC charges a 
“private” tuition, the academic and faculty quality seem to distinguish itself from the 
other private colleges and make students feel it is in reality more like public colleges.  
 During the interview process, there are also some students who are better aware 
of the history of the college and point out the two major founding partners: Zhejiang 
University and Hangzhou Municipal Government. One is a public institution under 
the National Department of Education and the other is a local government. One 
student from the business school interestingly compares ZUCC to state-owned 
enterprises: 
We have two strong mountain-like supporters on our back. This 
is just like some state-owned enterprises, which can enjoy some 
favorable policies from the government and win a competitive edge 
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in market competition. ZUCC often models itself on ZJU and 
receives some kind of support from the Hangzhou government. The 
private part is just for more flexibility in market competition. 
Fundamentally, we are an institution with the public forces playing 
a leading role. If anything happens, the government is going to 
intervene and provide help. Therefore, ZUCC, unlike some private 
schools, does not have to worry about school shutting down. This is 
like state-owned enterprises, which usually do not worry about 
going bankrupt. (Student Interview No.8) 
This student’s observation on the connection between ZUCC and other public 
forces is actually repeated by many other interviewees. And this is an important 
character for almost all the independent colleges, which emerged as some kind of 
secondary colleges of the public HEIs. Some had a local government or state-owned 
enterprise partner; other had private enterprise partners from outside. This is probably 
the main reason many students give more credibility to these institutions with good 
support from public forces. They are confident that their needs can be better served 
and their rights can be better protected with the potential government force 
underpinning the institution.  
In addition, there are a few students pointing out the increasing bureaucratization 
of ZUCC as a sign for its public identity. Since the administrative structure at ZUCC 
follows the main frame of ZJU, this newly-emerged institution gradually develops the 
problem of a burdensome bureaucratic system. This has caused some students to 
complain the centralized management style without giving enough attention to 
individual needs. Therefore, it is likely that ZUCC, with its increasing size, is slowly 
losing its flexibility in management style and turning into a more public-like 
institution burdened with an increasing number of rules and standards. This is a point 
I will come back to in the part on the faculty’s perception of ZUCC.  
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Relationship with ZJU 
 Zhejiang University, as one of the key founders for ZUCC, exerts its influences 
on the institution in many different ways. From the most apparent name of the 
institution to the faculty composition, ZJU plays a key role for the rise and 
development of ZUCC as one of the earliest independent colleges in China. During 
the interviews and interactions, many students point to this “mother” institution as one 
of the big drawing reasons to choose ZUCC. The reputation and social recognition 
enjoyed by ZJU are passed on to ZUCC in some way and become one of the main 
reasons for students to swarm into such a newly established college.  
It is found in the interviews that there are more benefits resulting from this 
relationship, although some students have expressed some concerns in faculty quality 
and students in different majors seem to benefit at different extents.  
1）Social Reputation 
Social reputation is one key standard when students and their parents choose 
where to go for college education. “Brand name” is a key concept that came out quite 
often when the interviewees were asked about the benefits from association with 
Zhejiang University. Students feel this brand name gives some promises about the 
teaching quality, employment/internship opportunities and recognition.  
One interviewee mentions: 
When I tell interviewers or working partners in the society that I 
come from City College, most people don’t have the clear clue 
where it is. Then, I add its full name is Zhejiang University City 
College. Suddenly, they come to see what I am talking about and 
they repeat the first part, Zhejiang University, with an 
understanding nod. At that moment, I know they are making a 
misunderstanding, but I usually don’t correct them because I feel 
they have accepted me. This is a good sign for me. (Student 
Interview No.1) 
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Another student puts it in a more straightforward manner,  
I probably wouldn’t have chosen this college if its name did not 
have Zhejiang University on it. Think about it. Hangzhou City 
College is obviously not as attractive as Zhejiang University City 
College. Its association with Zhejiang University means a privilege 
or power, which can make some things easy for students when we 
go to compete in the society. (Student Interview No.9) 
There is another student planning to study abroad, who reminds the interviewer of 
the international importance of this social reputation.  
I feel lucky to be in this college. I got a few high school 
classmates who were admitted into one tier-two public college, 
called Zhoushan Maritime College. Our academic ability is quite 
on the same level. But when they applied for overseas education, 
they got more rejections than acceptances. I feel our college has a 
great advantage when it comes to applying for study-abroad. 
Zhejiang University is much more well-known than many other 
universities or colleges in Zhejiang. I think some foreign 
universities might just think we are also Zhejiang University 
students. (Student Interview No.5) 
 
 Putting aside the actual benefits from this association with ZJU, the intangible 
social benefit is already enormous and it is especially true in the early stage of ZUCC, 
since this social reputation helps it recruit students and win the trust from the students 
and their families. It is also easy for the graduates of ZUCC to win the recognition 
and thereafter opportunities when applying for jobs or further education.  
 Considering the immense difficulty in founding a brand new university in today’s 
world, leaning on the established reputation of a well-known university is surly a 
smart way to boost the construction and development of a new college. The 
importance of reputation should not be underestimated at any time for any university, 
considering the popularity of reputation ranking among the top universities in the 
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world. The ranking system has become an important guide for prospective students to 
choose where they want to go for education. Here with the social benefits they can 
gain, the ZUCC students are no exception in this reputation-oriented university status 
system.  
 2) Faculty and Academic Resources  
 As a flagship university, ZJU has the rich academic and learning resources that 
can be exploited by ZUCC. And students at ZUCC obviously expect to enjoy some 
and quite a few students point to the different kinds of resources resulting from the 
association, though it is more so for students majoring in science, engineering and 
medicine.  
 Quite a few students point out the faculty advantage. Since at ZUCC there are 
quite many faculty who either worked previously at ZJU or recently graduated from 
ZJU, the faculty quality is often cited as an advantage. One student from computer 
science tells,  
I feel it is good to have ZJU teachers here to help us. I have been 
in a group led by a ZJU graduated teacher since my second year. 
He graduated from ZJU with one master degree in information 
science and another in management about ten years ago. He is the 
leading teacher for our lab and many ZJU graduate students even 
come to work in the lab with us. We can apply to participate in the 
lab work and enjoy the resources in this cooperative lab. It is a 
great learning experience to work with faculty and students from 
ZJU. (Student Interview No.2) 
Another student from pharmacy shares the same observation,  
Our program has almost one third of the faculty borrowed from 
ZJU. Many of them are quite experienced and they have great 
knowledge background in our field. Also, we can go to ZJU to do 
some lab research in one semester and use the equipment there. 
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And because of the connection with ZJU and the ZJU affiliated 
hospitals, our program can send us to do internship in these key 
hospitals. This is a big advantage in comparison with similar 
programs in other schools. (Student Interview No.7) 
The school of medicine at ZUCC is probably the one that benefits the most from 
the association, since ZJU has one of the top medical facilities and faculty in China. 
Sharing some of the resources not only improves the quality of the programs in the 
school of medicine but saves a large sum of money for establishing and maintaining 
the medicine-related programs.  
In addition, those students who have an interest in pursuing graduate education in 
China seem to agree that they might have some advantages over other 
non-ZJU-related schools if they decide to go for graduate programs at ZJU.  
I got some advice from my teacher, whose PhD advisor is at ZJU, 
about how to prepare for the ZJU graduate program entrance exam. 
This is helpful. I was referred to this ZJU teacher by my teacher 
here. If I can pass the entrance exam, this can be important for me 
to prepare for the interview. (Student Interview No.13) 
Because of the interconnected relations, many teachers at ZUCC either worked or 
graduated from ZJU, which becomes an advantage for some ZUCC students when it 
comes to academic exchange or resources sharing. ZUCC teachers with ZJU 
backgrounds are more likely to recommend their students to better academic 
programs at ZJU and these students stand a better chance to be accepted.  
Zhejiang University, being one of the founding institutions for ZUCC, provided 
important faculty resources, managerial experience and social reputation to the 
fledgling college at its beginning stage. However, it is also noted that the connection 
with ZJU does not always bring positive things. While the brand name of ZJU boosts 
the credibility and social reputation, which successfully attract many prospective 
students, this father-son type of relationship plants the seed for an unequal 
relationship, which students at ZUCC sometimes feel in daily academic life. While it 
is acknowledged that the connection with ZJU comes with some high-end academic 
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resources, particularly from the faculty side, the faculty quality and diversity may not 
be always guaranteed because of the cost-consideration and possible inbreeding. 
The medical student mentioned before revealed the unequal treatment they 
experienced at the ZJU campus when they did their one semester lab work there. It is 
an example to see the unequal relationship.  
In the second semester of our third year, we went to study at 
Huajiachi (one of the four campuses of ZJU in Hangzhou). But we 
are not allowed to use many of the facilities there. We cannot 
access the library service there and our meal card has to be remade. 
I feel good to use the lab there, but we are constantly reminded of 
our true identity (not a ZJU student) with all the restraints. I don’t 
like the feeling. (Student Interview No.8) 
A number of students recalled their unpleasant classroom experience when some 
ZJU professors came to teach at ZUCC. One says,  
We had one ZJU teacher teaching us hydromechanics. He only 
came to call the roster and deliver the contents. After that, he’d 
leave without any communication with us. Sometimes, he just read 
from the PPT. There was no communication and he didn’t care 
about us. I feel he might have some bias against us. You know, we 
are only ZUCC students, not as good as those at ZJU. (Student 
Interview No.9) 
A few students also point to the fact that some of the ZJU current graduate 
students come to teach at ZUCC and their lack of teaching experience can cause some 
problem for the teaching effectiveness.  
In general, many students at ZUCC benefit from the association with ZJU, 
tangibly or intangibly. The pathway program between ZUCC and ZJU offers the 
ZUCC students a second chance to compete for a very limited number of slots to enter 
ZJU, which many students I interviewed mention as one of the reasons to consider 
ZUCC when filling out the gaokao zhiyuan (the programs they apply and expect to be 
admitted into after the entrance exam). Also the faculty and other academic resources 
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resulting from this association are mainly considered positive by the students. Some 
programs, such as computer science and medicine, benefit greatly from sharing the 
academic resources with ZJU, because these are the traditionally strong and nationally 
top-ranked programs of ZJU. On the other hand, some see the unequal side of this 
relationship, which makes some students feel frustrated or unfairly treated. 
Considering the “father-son” type of relationship and the huge gap in academic 
capacity, maintaining an equal exchange for ZJU and ZUCC is unlikely. When this 
relationship is embodied in student experiences, it tends to create an emotional gap 
and a hierarchical top-down separation. Therefore, students at ZUCC might suffer a 
kind of lower-status psychological deficit, which I call “San Ben Qing Jie” or “third 
tier complex”.  
In the following section, I will move on to explain further about this third tier 
complex, which touches on the frustration and inferiority felt by many studying at 
ZUCC. While the first part of the institution name (Zhejiang University) brings 
mostly benefits, the second part (City College) creates a huge invisible shadow to 
distinguish the students at ZUCC from the ones at ZJU and puts on them a label they 
feel difficult to get rid of.  
 
A Stereotyped Image of ZUCC as a San Ben Institution (Third-Tier College)  
 Since China reestablished its higher education admission system in the reform 
and opening era, the admission policy has always been in the hands of the education 
authority departments at the state or provincial level. The stratification of HEIs is a 
key element in the after-Gaokao recruiting and admission. This has caused the 
problem of unequal access to high scoring students among the top tier and the lower 
tier universities/colleges, since the system allows the first tier institutions to undergo 
the recruiting and admission process in the first round and the ones designated into the 
lower tiers are mostly barred from reaching the higher-scoring students.  
One side effect of this policy is the social stereotyping on different tiers of HEIs 
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in the society. Students and their parents look to the tiered categories to decide what 
universities are more reputed and better in quality; and the recruiting companies also 
sometimes refer to this stratification system to help them find the preferred job 
candidates. As a matter of fact, in recent years there are already social outcries and 
slow reforms to change the tiered system (Bie, 2016; Xiong, 2016). Some provinces 
or municipal cities, such as Shanghai, have simplified the tiered system and organized 
the recruiting& admission process in two batches, reducing the number of the once 
highly hierarchical system into two tiers. Though universities in the first tier are still 
well-protected and compete only in their small circle, majority of the ordinary HEIs 
can play on a relatively level field and access the same pool of students during 
recruiting and admission. Many lower tier private colleges and vocational colleges 
now can have access to some high scoring students and compete with the 
non-first-tier public colleges in the same recruiting process. However, the change of 
public opinion and this culture of university stratification prove to be far more 
difficult than the policy reform. Many students in lower tier colleges are subject to the 
popularized label of “San Ben colleges” (third-tier colleges), and they feel and 
experience the social biases resulting from this stereotyped image of San Ben. 
Although ZUCC is in a relatively more advantaged position among the so-called San 
Ben colleges with its well-regulated teaching management and association with ZJU, 
many students there still share the frustration and prejudice when seeking 
employment or further education. Some of these stereotyped images are so deep that 
the prejudice may even come from faculty teaching at ZUCC.  
During the interviews and casual conversations with students, the prejudice is 
most strongly felt in the fourth year, when many of them either enter the job market or 
compete in the graduate school entrance exams. Numerous fourth year students share 
this same experience of being excluded from competing for job positions because of 
the San Ben (third tier) nature of the institution they are graduating from.  
One student shares,  
I have been to some job fairs recently, but many companies put 
it clear in the job requirements that they only receive resumes from 
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985/211 universities. Some recruiting personnel told me that they 
didn’t consider applicants from independent colleges. I don’t feel 
good about this. The hierarchical classification is out there to 
remind you who you are and what you can do. (Student Interview 
No.6) 
Another student points to the importance of that piece of paper (diploma paper),  
The paper we hold may be ok in Hangzhou or Zhejiang, but its 
recognition is usually limited in Zhejiang. One of my classmates 
comes from Sichuan. He now wants to find a job in Hangzhou, 
because it appears the diploma paper is not well-accepted in his 
home province. It will not be easy for him to find a good job back 
at home. For people outside Zhejiang, we are just a regional third 
tier college. Or if you are lucky, people mistake you for a graduate 
from Zhejiang University. But it doesn’t always work. (Student 
Interview No.4) 
The piece of paper they hold when entering the job market determines what 
opportunities can be open to them. The social perception of a third tier college forms a 
tacit understanding about the students from this type of colleges, which works like a 
glass ceiling in a job market. Some other students mention the same kind of prejudice 
during their internship applications. And it seems the barrier is especially strong 
among the big private companies or state owned enterprises, which are relatively 
popular and more selective in seeking employees. Associating with Zhejiang 
University provides some kind of cushion for seeking employment in Zhejiang, since 
the brand name of ZJU provides some assurance for the quality of education. 
However, the social perception of an independent college is still relatively negative 
and the students entering these colleges are often considered lower-scoring and less 
qualified. The appended part (City College) provides no added value but reveals the 
tier level of this institution and “predicts” the qualification of students there.  
The invisible barrier is not only felt by students in the job market, but in pursuing 
further education. Several students I interviewed attended the graduate school 
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entrance exams and reported the similar bias against the San Ben students, especially 
during the interview process.  
During the interview, some teachers tend to view us from a 
different lens. My score got me into the interview stage for a 
graduate school in Shanghai. But the first question I was asked of 
was whether my graduating college is a San Ben college. I think 
outside Zhejiang there is some prejudice against us. This is like an 
iron mark for who you are. Later, I didn’t get into this school and 
was adjusted to enter another one. The interview process makes up 
40% of the total performance, so it really affects me. (Student 
Interview No.3) 
What’s worth noting is this inferiority complex, as a result of education system, 
social policy and social stereotyping, has shaped students’ perception of this 
institution and to some extent what is possible for them after graduation. One student 
gives his understanding of ZUCC with a focus on the hierarchical order: 
ZUCC is in fact a San Ben (third tier) institution because it is 
minban and charges minban tuition. But its admission scores are 
high, even higher than some second tier public institutions. And 
this is an application oriented institution, not that much of an 
academic-oriented one. So it cannot rank with other first tier key 
public institutions. I guess this is who we are. (Student Interview 
No.9) 
It is a little sad to see how students self impose these public images or social 
stereotyping resulting from the gao kao admission policy. This obviously limits what 
they think they can do. But from the realistic point of view, it is what they faced when 
they experienced the process of filling up the gao kao college admission choices. And 
these images are strengthened or solidified when they go out to compete for job 
positions in job affairs or to apply for further education in China. This probably shows 
us what an institutionalized bias can do to individuals and the choices available to 
individuals.  
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However, there is also a bright side to what these students may think and act on 
their own. The diploma and public image of San Ben may leave them in a 
disadvantaged position. Working hard to show their capability and improve their 
qualifications is the answer many students have chosen to give to the adversity they 
all have to deal with. Just like Zhen in the beginning story, some choose to prove what 
they can do by seeking further education opportunities abroad or in China. Some 
choose other ways to dig into their potentials to show what they can truly achieve.  
 
Prove by Developing Ability 
While realizing the social bias on the diploma, some students point to the upside 
for themselves. It is a positive attitude and a belief in what they can do to change the 
unfavorable condition and prove what they can do through developing potentials.  
Our advantage is flexibility; disadvantage is diploma. In China, 
the society tends to pay too much attention to diploma. It is kind of 
diploma-ism. If I hold a Zhejiang University diploma, I am 
considered excellent or top-notch. If I have a City College diploma, 
I am considered non-comparable to the top-notch. I think our 
advantage is we can develop our abilities to settle this question. So 
if our fellow students can be determined to pursue our goals, our 
potentials are no less than anyone. I believe we can even exert 
greater flexibility and potential. (Student Interview No.10) 
This is an example to show how these lovely students give themselves 
encouragement when facing the diploma barrier. It is like a pep talk they give to 
themselves so that they can work harder and seek opportunities to improve their 
qualifications. Of course, this is for those students who choose a positive attitude in 
dealing with the San Ben stereotyping.  
Some relate this psychological deficit to confidence and they believe there are 
different ways they can do to improve their confidence.  
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Many friends around me feel the diploma is not that ideal. So 
they look for ways to grow their competiveness. I think this is why 
City College has many students who plan to study abroad. Because 
furthering education abroad can help them win a better diploma. 
With that golden glaze, they develop their confidence. When they 
return to China, they can use that diploma to apply for better jobs. 
So maybe it is about confidence. (Student Interview No.3) 
Studying abroad is one of the popular choices some students I interviewed have 
chosen for their development path. But this is only for less than 10% of the graduating 
students at ZUCC who can afford the top expenses to study abroad. There are others 
who choose to prepare for China’s graduate school entrance exam, which is no less 
competitive than the well-known Gao Kao (college entrance exam). Majority of the 
students there will still enter the job market after graduation and the way they choose 
to develop ability is to go through various certificate tests to collect skill certificates. 
For example, for many English majors I know, they start considering all kinds of 
certificates tests since the junior year. The list of certificates on their calendar may 
include Interpreter Certificate, CATTI Certificate (Translation Proficiency level), 
Teacher (Primary & Secondary Education) Certificate, Foreign Trade Documentation 
Specialist Certificate, BEC Certificate (Business English), TESOL Certificate 
(Teaching of English), TEM 8 Certificate (Language Certificate for English Majors) 
and etc. It is just amazing to see how hard some of these students work in order to 
gain as many certificates as possible. So it may allow them to compete at an equal 
platform. And most importantly, it might ease their anxiety and lack of confidence 
because of their inferior diploma. Of course, this is only for some students who are 
particularly motivated and ambitious, and willing to prove themselves again. Many 
may naturally fall into this San Ben stereotyping, believing they are fundamentally 
less intelligent than those earning Zhejiang University degrees only because they 
can’t score higher in Gao Kao.  
Besides developing the academic ability to improve competitiveness, some point 
out the advantage in communication ability. This may put ZUCC students in an 
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advantaged position in the long run, especially when they join the company.  
I feel our students are more flexible than those nerdy high 
scoring students. My friends around me are all talkative and good 
at communication. And we have many club or social activities for 
us to develop communication skills. This can be an advantage when 
you go to an interview. I have been to several interviews and I feel 
good about what I did. And they all had some good impressions 
about me, because I got job offers right away. (Student Interview 
No.12) 
It is interesting to note that in China usually the top scoring students are 
stereotyped as wearing glasses with a stiff smile and hard to have a non-technical 
conversation with. Some students at ZUCC are particularly outgoing and interested in 
meeting new people and attending social events. They may spend less time on 
academic learning, but they try to break out of the academically inferior image by 
developing an alternative ability—social skills. ZUCC is somehow well-known for 
the number of students who experimented on opening their own small businesses. On 
the campus, there is a small street with an established sign, which says “College 
Student Entrepreneurship Street”. This street is lined with some stores selling cell 
phone cases, textile products and interior ornaments. Recently, because of the rise of 
social media tools, some entrepreneurial students opened WeChat shops selling all 
kinds of products, ranging from hometown specialties to second-hand luxury bags. 
They surly know how to take advantage of their social connections (friend circle) to 
target the right customers.  
Therefore, there is another layer to the San Ben students. Beyond the negative 
stereotype derived from the institution of Gao Kao and Diploma, there are some 
positive reactions to turn around the adverse tide. Zhen, the student in the vignette, is 
just one of the thirteen thousand students at ZUCC, but the psychological burden she 
has to shoulder is common among those enrolled at ZUCC. The San Ben stereotyping 
is not easy to get over, since it is socially established and internalized among students 
and teachers. Even before they enter college, at the moment the Gao Kao scores are 
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rated and the rankings for those who participated in the exam are determined, students 
come to form this view of themselves and set themselves on a ranking chart, which 
can implicitly determine many aspects of their future lives, from academic experience 
to job seeking. Zhen is probably one of the optimistic ones who devotes her passion 
into an English speech organization—TMC, to resist that negative stereotyping and 
find confidence.  
 
Summary 
In this section, I have portrayed ZUCC students’ perception on the institutional 
nature of ZUCC and their experiences as ZUCC students living under the burden of 
San Ben. The former is revealed through looking into the public or private identity of 
the institution and its connected but separate relationship with ZJU, the mother 
institution. The later is discussed by focusing on the San Ben stereotyping burden and 
the resistances from the students. The portrait is based on the students’ testimonies 
and the observations of students’ experiences. In general, it seems students build up 
their perception by comparing ZUCC to a standard they hold internally, which is 
minban/private implying lower academic level and poor quality and public meaning 
the opposite. This is a standard fitting with the public image of the two types of HEIs 
in the public-dominated HE system—minban HEIs and public HEIs. While the ZJU 
connection and the relatively good quality academic level give students the 
impression of a public institution, some daily experiences remind students of the 
minban/private aspect of the institution. Therefore, the students offer an ambiguous 
understanding on the nature of the institution. In addition, they are more sensitive to 
the disadvantages that come with the title or diploma of ZUCC. Despite the 
reputational heritage they may enjoy from the association with ZJU, the San Ben 
stereotyping is an institutionalized hurdle difficult to jump over.   
Since ZUCC’s model of public ownership and private running mechanism is a 
prevalent one in Zhejiang, Jiangsu and some other provinces, the portrait of students’ 
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perception and their experiences may also provide insights into the understanding of 
similar independent colleges across China. Especially the San Ben stereotyping, this 
is an institutionalized bias among several million lower tier students. The 
psychological deficit they have to go through is a common phenomenon.    
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Chapter 6  Faculty Perception of ZUCC 
 
Vignette  
Gu is a veteran at ZUCC. He came to this college first as a student in 2000, when 
in his words “there were only two buildings and no sports facility on campus.” After 
graduation, he stayed to work in the student affairs office. This was a job that required 
him to be a head teacher for an entering class and provide counseling in academic, 
career and even emotional affairs. Most of the time, he has a good smile and is willing 
to listen, that helps him win the reputation as a nice teacher among students.  
Gu shares with two other colleagues in the student affairs office for the 
engineering college. In China, the students affairs office is in charge of many aspects 
of students’ life on campus, such as dorm life, student organizations, campus theme 
activities, student employment information, freshman college adaptation, sophomore 
military training, class attendance monitoring, student psychological status monitoring, 
alumni information, class head teacher management and student CPC party member 
organization. There could be other work I fail to include here. And three of them have 
to oversee over 800 students in this college. As the most experienced student affairs 
worker in the office, Gu often stays after working hours to sort out the convoluted 
student-related matters. The biggest concern he and his colleagues share is the safety 
of students, including personal life safety and possession safety. In recent years, the 
psychological stability of students comes up on top. I often feel sympathetic for Gu 
and his colleagues to have to provide care for so many students, which is probably 
common among student affairs workers in many colleges. Gu sometimes jokes to say 
he is a babysitter, because he has to take care of so many aspects of students’ life on 
campus.  
  It is no doubt that the main reason for Gu to take up this hard job is his ability to 
identify with students, with the help of his four year study experience at ZUCC. 
Another reason for his career choice has something to do with the government and 
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ZJU backing of ZUCC--the same reason for him to choose ZUCC, a one year old 
school at the time, for his undergraduate study. When getting the job, Gu was able to 
be included in the Hangzhou Public Personnel System, which is close to a government 
position job with stability and public welfare, because around 2004 when Gu joined 
workforce ZUCC was under rapid expansion and the school needed a lot of new 
teachers and student affairs workers. Of course, graduates like Gu were ideal for 
handling student affairs.   
 One thing I later learned from Gu about personnel affiliation in his office is that 
one of his two colleagues in the office has an enterprise personnel affiliation, that 
means less pay for same work and risk of being laid off first. Gu told me that was a bit 
unfair for her, but she was waiting for an opening in the public personnel system. 
With her working experience, she would be the first one to be considered, if there 
could be an extra place. But what I learned from other sources was public personnel 
affiliation would be only available for newly recruited teaching faculty.  
 As a young worker at ZUCC, Gu has been looking for opportunities to upgrade 
himself. He has been taking classes from ZJU and participated in some student affairs 
training programs organized at ZJU. Recently he enrolled in the part-time MPA 
program at ZJU after passing the entrance exams. That program is not only suitable 
for his background, but will provide a boost for his future career at ZUCC.  
 As a student affairs officer, he has a good knowledge of students at ZUCC. What 
he has trained himself to do better is to listen and connect, though it is increasingly 
difficult for him because of the generation gap he started to feel between him and 
incoming students. But certainly he knows what it means to study and work at ZUCC 
and what advantage and bias this title of ZUCC can bring to him and his students. 
Because of his study experience at ZUCC, he knows better about being a ZUCCer, 
that gives him a great advantage in helping his students find a path through the 
college years and maybe even for the future life.  
 
---------------- 
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Faculty and staff make up a key part of the institution. By studying the faculty 
perceptions, we can peek into not only the internal workings of an institution, but also 
the nature of that institution. Because they are the ones passing 
knowledge/understanding about the institution to the students every day and able to 
stay in it long enough to be fully aware of the pros and cons about the internal 
workings.  
Poole’s ethnographic case on Japanese professors in a private university in urban 
Tokyo reveals how Japanese professors perceive and face the conflict between the 
traditions and the neoliberal western style reforms in a time of Japan’s HE structural 
changes (Poole, 2010). This ethnography on faculty group in a private university in 
Japan provides insights about how to conduct a participant observation research with 
a focus on revealing the understanding of faculty on its institution as well as the 
institutional change. Building the research in the context of Japan’s higher education 
and the structural reform, Poole connects the faculty group cultural dynamics to the 
big picture of HE reform.  
In this study, faculty’s experiences and their perceptions on ZUCC and its internal 
working provide key knowledge about the development path, institutional nature and 
barriers of ZUCC. Through the case of ZUCC, the nature and experience of similar 
institutions can also be learned. Therefore, the study of ZUCC’s faculty gives us a 
good glimpse into the independent colleges belonging to the public ownership type, 
which are particularly representative in Zhejiang and Jiangsu. In order to conduct this 
ethnographic case study, I interviewed 20 teachers, 15 college faculty/administrators 
from ZUCC and 5 teachers working in 4 other independent colleges in Zhejiang. 
These interviews help me establish a good understanding of institutional history, 
internal structure, relationship with government, relationship with mother public HEI, 
and its position within the HE system. The interviews with teachers from other ICs in 
Zhejiang help me confirm the structural similarities and status differences, due to 
differences in their mother institutions, between ZUCC and other independent 
colleges (ICs) in Zhejiang.   
Moreover, the faculty/staff based interviews give another important facet of the 
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narrative on ICs, since these carefully chosen faculty and staff have all worked in the 
institution for at least 5 years and they know more about the daily functioning of the 
school. Their genuine experiences tell us more on the true nature and challenges of 
ICs, possibly even the future destiny of time-produced ICs in China.  
In the following, I will explore six major areas which are the repeatedly discussed 
topics in the interviews with faculty/staff at ZUCC. The knowledge revealed in these 
areas contributes to the improved understanding of what type of HEI ZUCC is, what 
the Zhejiang model of ICs looks like and how the public-leaning ICs run.  
 
A Necessary Birth at the Age of Economic Boom and HE Massification 
ZUCC, as one of the earliest ICs in China, is an important creation under several 
different forces, including expanding of HE, economic boom, restructuring of top 
universities and privatization of HE in China. However, the particularly strong public 
support or ownership at the beginning is what distinguishes ZUCC from other ICs 
founded around the 2000.  
MinCheng MinXiao BanXue or running school under the partnership of a famous 
city and a famous university is a key feature mentioned in most interviews. This 
special partnership has laid the foundation for this public ownership and formed a big 
draw for recruiting both students and faculty.   
ZJU is a big brandname; ZUCC is a new thing I have never heard 
of. When I interviewed for the job, they told me they can offer me a 
Hangzhou Bianzhi (public personnel institution). This is the main 
reason for me to come ZUCC. I thought even if it was new, the 
founding institutions were big and trustworthy. (Faculty Interview No. 
18) 
This is a representative answer from various faculty members I interviewed when 
asked why they have chosen to join ZUCC. In the interview with one of the senior 
administrative official at ZUCC, MinCheng MinXiao was explained as a kind of 
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strategy to raise the institutional starting bar and set a good beginning for its future 
development.  
MinCheng MinXiao is a good label for us. Hangzhou City 
provides policies and lands; ZJU offers faculty and 
teaching/administrative resources. This is a very high starting point for 
us. This is why we are confident about the quality and development of 
our school. (Faculty Interview No. 5) 
In this strong partnership, one is the provincial capital of an economically 
powerful province at the Yangtze River Delta region and the other is a 985/211 project 
top university in China. Both are public forces and well-recognized brands, which 
provide strong credibility for the new-born college. It partially explains why it can 
develop so fast. Within 6-7 years, ZUCC has reached the size of a ten thousand 
student campus.  
One interesting story told by one interviewee captures how the new school started 
as a shabby one and transformed into a decent-sized college in only 6-7 years.  
When I entered ZUCC in 2000, there was no library and no sports 
field. We had to go to the sports field in the neighboring school for PE 
classes. It was just not like a college at all. You had to walk through a 
small alley to find the school gate. There were only two teaching 
buildings, which belonged to the Zhejiang Postal School (ZUCC was 
built on the physical location of the former Zhejiang Postal School). 
The Science & Technology Building (a 15-floor building, tallest on 
campus) was still under construction. Back then, if we wanted to do 
experiments or search for some academic information, we would have 
to take buses to go to the ZJU campus, which was very inconvenient. 
Two years later, a small library was set up in the second floor of the 
Science & Technology Building. This library was relocated to the 
northern campus library site (a 4-floor building) in 2006. (Faculty 
Interview No. 5) 
Lack of normal educational facilities at the beginning and developing at almost a 
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light speed are the key aspects for ZUCC’s early days. This may tell how urgent it was 
to establish such a school to meet the fast-increasing family demands for HE and the 
demands for well-educated talents in the wider society. Even the facilities are not fully 
ready, but the school has already started recruiting.  
  The birth of ZUCC was also a necessity at the right time. 5 of the interviewees 
actually worked at ZJU before they moved to ZUCC as teaching faculty. All of them 
first taught part-time at ZUCC and later transferred to ZUCC out of some careful 
calculations. The strong public ownership and the transfer of ZJU senior 
administrators to support the start of ZUCC provide them some confidence in this 
new school.  
Quite a number of the ZJU-transferred faculty asked for the 
transfer as I did. Back then, the merging of four high-quality HEIs in 
Hangzhou to make the new comprehensive ZJU caused some frictions 
in management as well as redundancy in faculty and staff. The 
economics department I worked at was just one of many. Moreover, 
ZUCC’s pay and benefits were better. I was told that if I transferred to 
ZUCC, the overall development prospect was no worse than that of 
staying at ZJU. And I was better at teaching than at researching. So I 
came. (Faculty Interview No. 12) 
The merging of four campuses mentioned here is an important HE reform 
movement in the late 1990s, when the state sets up a series of projects to build 
China’s world-class universities, including the well-known 211 project and 985 
project. The short path is to merge several local universities into one big 
comprehensive and competitive one with high volumes of research output and large 
numbers of students/faculty. In Zhejiang province, old ZJU, Zhejiang College of 
Medicine, Zhejiang University of Agriculture and Hangzhou University merged 
together to form a new ZJU with a huge new campus built at Zijingang and old 
campuses serving as branch campuses. This has resulted in four campuses of ZJU in 
one city and further restructuring was needed to deal with the redundancy in human 
resources. During the interviews, it is found that in the early days many part-time 
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teachers at ZUCC came from different campuses of ZJU and these teachers could 
fulfill their teaching load requirement by teaching to a certain load at ZUCC, although 
they were still in the personnel system of ZJU. This was believed to be a way to 
encourage ZJU faculty to participate in educational duties at ZUCC, which helped to 
provide important faculty resources for the expanding new college, control the 
running cost and divert the redundancy of ZJU. So it was considered not only 
necessary, but smart creative mechanism to achieve several benefits in terms of 
management.  
 The eagerness for good-quality higher education was also one important aspect 
for the birth of ZUCC. This was also one of the reasons for China’s expanding HE 
since 1998. Education was widely believed to be the way to change a person and a 
family’s fate. With the one Child policy, many families were willing to put most of the 
financial resources on the education of their children.  
This is the influence of Chinese traditional thought. All the 
Chinese families, no matter how hard their life is, hope to send their 
children to college. Even for a janitor, he or she will work hard to save 
money to pay for the child’s college education. So there are not enough 
colleges available. (Faculty Interview No. 7) 
That traditional thinking, combined with the economic opportunities at the new 
age, provides a lot of impulses for HE. Satisfying the social demands for better 
education and serving the economic development are mutually supportive and 
dependent. With the economic boom, especially in the east coast provinces such as 
Zhejiang, more parents are capable of affording high tuition and are more than 
willing to pay for it. Therefore, it became a timely policy move to allow 
already-established public HEIs to find necessary resources or partnerships to open 
new institutions for those who could pay but whose scores were not competitive 
enough to get them into well-established public HEIs.  
 Just as ZUCC’s shabby and poorly-equipped campus shows, the early stages of 
ICs were quite imperfect. In the interviews with faculty/staff from other ICs in 
Zhejiang, the early days were usually depicted as chaotic or abnormal.  
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The independent college of Zhejiang University of Technology 
was on the same campus of ZUT. Both institutions shared educational 
resources, including buildings, classrooms, libraries and etc. Students at 
the Independent College were basically enjoying everything students at 
ZUT had, only they paying more tuition. And even when they graduated 
they received the same diploma. Xiao Zhong Xiao (school within a 
school) was the common running model for many ICs in the early days. 
(Faculty Interview No. 15) 
By doing this, the ICs saved the founding institution a lot of running costs and 
the high tuition brings income to stimulate those established public institutions to 
push the size expansion. In the case of ZUCC, Xiao Zhong Xiao model was not 
adopted because the Hangzhou government, as a founding partner, provided the 
precious land, which many other ICs in Zhejiang did not enjoy. However, ZUCC did 
enjoy the sharing of faculty and administrative resources from ZJU, which not only 
lowered the running costs but maintained a good educational quality and reputation 
for a new-born school. Similarly, all the ICs in the early days awarded the founding 
public HEIs’ diploma, which was criticized as a sign for the chaotic and unfair 
situation then.  
As discussed in previous chapters, the birth and fast-track development of ZUCC 
coincided with the stories of many other ICs in China. It is commonly understood 
that China’s HE massification era happened around 2000 (Mok, 2008) and the state 
adopted some “privatization” policies to draw financial resources from families so as 
to afford the more than 15 percent increase of HE admission every year between 
1999 and 2008. ZUCC, born in an economically developed province, was supported 
by both the provincial capital government and the top university, which are powerful 
and significant public forces with big reputation, and followed a flexible mechanism 
to quickly start the running of a new school. Even though the early days were 
characterized as “unstandardized” and “chaotic”, its appearance met the demands and 
needs from various sides, including the government, the public and the top public 
universities. Therefore, it can be deemed a necessary result of the time.  
127 
 
A Product of Public Forces to Meet the Demands 
What is IC and whether ZUCC is an exemplary IC are important questions 
frequently raised in interviews. Many interviewees at ZUCC have no problem 
explaining the original shareholding structure of the school. ZUCC was often referred 
to as a result of the partnership between the local government and the key public 
university or Min Cheng Min Xiao. Although generally ZUCC was considered by the 
faculty and staff to be a standard model, enjoying quite a big amount of 
“independence”, some senior administrators were reluctant to categorize ZUCC in the 
group of ICs due to the bad reputation ICs have had in the media. Therefore, the goal 
is to break away from this socially-controversial group of colleges and get on a track 
to create a new type of HEI with good quality and high reputation.  
The origin shareholding structure was mentioned whenever the issue of public 
ownership was raised.  
ZUCC was financial sponsored by Zhejiang Telecom Industry Co. 
with land appropriated by the city government. It was originally the site 
for the Zhejiang Postal School. This was a source of government 
support, since the land costed about tens of thousands RMB per mu. 
The other funding from the government was limited, only 15 million 
RMB in 3 years. We were mostly dependent on the tuition fees, 
18000-20000 per student. Later, it was found that the school was in 
heavy debt because of the campus construction, so the city government 
helped to exempt us from paying the loan interests. So we have been 
paying back the 800 million bank loan debt with no interest... ZJU 
provided the personnel (administration), government gave policy 
support and the telecom industry Co. gave money. The partnership of 
these three sides worked to found ZUCC. Of course, now the 
supporting efforts from the government are increasing. (Faculty 
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Interview No. 9) 
Here, Zhejiang Telecom was a state-owned enterprise, which probably 
participated in this partnership under the government suggestion. Therefore, the 
original and today’s shareholding structure of ZUCC is heavily public. The fate of 
this school has been the concern of the local government since its beginning and its 
development is assured under the cooperation of several public forces.  
ZJU belongs to the state; Hangzhou city is the government and 
Telecom Industry is state-owned. These public ownership institutions 
founded ZUCC, but its running mechanism is people-run (minban), 
self-dependent revenue and expenditure. This is our model of public 
ownership and people-run mechanism… The joined work of ZJU and 
Hangzhou government made this school to reach a high level in a short 
period of time. What’s more, the public forces improved the social 
recognition of ZUCC. This is the characteristic of Chinese society. If 
you run education, you need the participation of a public force. The 
government backed forces are always more trustworthy, and therefore, 
more attractive for the society. (Faculty Interview No. 6)  
Told by a senior administrator, this is the basic definition of the so-called hybrid 
model. If ZUCC were a child, she was born into a good family. That good birth gave 
it an important advantage over other minban institutions. The trust it enjoys due to 
the strong public mother and father makes it possible for its quick growth.  
The Zhejiang model, occasionally mentioned in the interviews, refers to the type 
of ICs founded mostly by public forces. Public HEI plus local government is key to 
their success. Some ICs in Zhejiang actually started with the total control and 
ownership of the mother public HEIs. Their beginning years were less independent 
because they shared campus, teachers and department settings with the mother HEIs. 
But that independency has been increasing because of the No. 26 Decree from the 
Ministry of Education, which requires all ICs to improve their independency in 7 
areas, including campus facilities, teaching organization and administration, 
recruitment, diploma, fiscal budgeting, legal status and civil responsibilities. (No. 26 
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Decree of Chinese Ministry of Education) 
Presently, the ICs in Zhejiang still maintain their original 
institutional structure and are turning more standardized. Diploma, 
campus and finance are increasingly independent. Starting from 2013, 
many ICs in Hangzhou, which shared the campuses of the mother 
universities, have been on a process to relocate out of Hangzhou to set 
up their independent campuses. In this respect, ZUCC has been a 
standard since beginning. (Faculty Interview No. 9) 
As a matter of fact, the Zhejiang model has been leaning more towards the 
public side since 2013. Many ICs, when moving out of Hangzhou and choosing a 
new campus site, seek the support and cooperation with the local governments, 
mostly county-level ones. The county-level governments offered lands, policies and 
even loans to permanently settle in the area, since this could be a boost for the local 
economy and beneficial for the long-term development of the area. For example, 
Zhejiang University of Technology Zhijiang College moved to Shaoxing in 2017 and 
is now helping Shaoxing government devise industrial & economic development 
plans. In return, ZUT Zhejiang College could get financial and policy supports, such 
as public personnel institution quota and land appropriation. The public HEI plus 
local government model, exemplified by ZUCC, is actually becoming more prevalent 
in Zhejiang. It seems that in order to successfully establish and run a HEI in a 
state-dominant country like China, the support from the public forces is of great 
importance. That natural gravitation is, explicitly or implicitly, turning all the ICs in 
Zhejiang to the side of public ownership, rather than a minban mechanism trying to 
disrupt the public-dominant HE system.  
However, there is also another legitimate reason for these ICs to lean towards its 
public side. The social reputation of ICs, especially the public media coverage, is 
often associated with a negative image. In a public-dominant HE system, minban 
often means low quality and high fees. And in early days, many ICs awarded the 
mother HEIs’ diplomas, which were even touted as a student-recruiting 
advertisement. The participation of some private real-estate companies was portrayed 
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as a way to occupy public lands and turn them into profit-making real-estate projects. 
In reality, many private partners did have a bigger concern for the short-term 
investment returns. Thus, the public view these newly-born HEIs with a dubious eye. 
The public or direct government force participation can give more credibility to these 
ICs. This partially explains why many ICs, in Zhejiang at least, have been trying to 
seek local government partners.  
The unfavorable public media image is a concern for some of the senior 
administrators interviewed at ZUCC. They are aware of the problems associated with 
some ICs in China, though they consider the ones in Zhejiang are generally more 
standard and contributing to the right cause of education. The negative image of ICs 
has caused them to break away from the stereotyping of IC and call ZUCC “new 
model HEI”.  
From the beginning we hold high standard and quality in running 
the school. We’ve been independent since the beginning. We had an 
independent campus, while other ICs carved a piece from the mother 
institution’s campus and started recruiting students with only one or two 
teaching builds. They did not have independent financial power and the 
power to decide on some important affairs. We’ve had independent 
property rights, personnel system independence and campus 
independence since beginning. So we think our standard is higher and 
our leadership group doesn’t think we are just like other ICs. 
Particularly, we are very different from the ICs in Hubei, which are 
more chaotic and profit-oriented. We belong to the top group in China 
with very standardized school administration and independent campus, 
such as Beijing Normal University Zhuhai College, ZJU-Ningbo 
College of Technology. To be Honest, the schools with high running 
standards are not willing to be called ICs and call themselves 
‘new-model HEIs’. This is trying to distinguish from other ICs. (Faculty 
Interview No. 12)  
Here the ICs in Hubei mentioned by this interviewee are mostly started with the 
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participation of some private entrepreneurs who invested financially to form a 
partnership with the public HEI. Because these private investors considered more for 
return or fiscal balance, they were more eager to expand the student body, sometimes 
even that expansion exceeding the capacity of school facilities, which could cause 
many complaints and negative feedbacks from students and their parents.12 In recent 
years, some of these ICs with private partners were turning themselves into full 
minban HEIs so they could raise their tuition to make up for the deficiency in 
school-operation funding.13   
Social reputation is a huge concern for all the ICs, because they are all young 
colleges with no historical fame to rely upon. How they are perceived by the society 
heavily influence the number and quality of students applying for these colleges. And 
their public image can also affect the employment prospects of their graduates. For 
faculty, the social reputation can subtly affect the grant or project application success. 
Therefore, it is understandable to see some ICs try to keep them away from the 
unfavorable media image of ICs, though fundamentally these schools are similar in 
terms of historical background and growth process.  
In another interview, the administrator interestingly categorized the ICs in China 
into three levels.   
The first top level is the ICs with pure public force participation. 
They have independent campuses and independent fiscal power. These 
schools do not ask for return and the public founders keep investing in 
the aim to improve school quality and development. Their quality is no 
worse than some second-tier public HEIs. ZUCC is one of these. The 
second level is the ICS with also the participation of mainly public 
forces and they also run on minban mechanism.  Most ICs in Zhejiang 
belong to this group. Their independence level is not as high as ours. 
                                                             
12 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-09-18/1001773742s.shtml. This is a piece of news from Xinhua News Agency 
about the sub-standard quality problems with ICs in Hubei and three ICs were banned from recruiting students.  
13 http://wh.bendibao.com/news/2014530/56755.shtm. This is a piece of local news from Hubei on 7 ICs turning 
into traditional minban HEIs and raising their tuitions. It is mentioned if they kept their IC status, it is difficult or 
more complicated to raise tuitions because of the participation of public HEIs. Turning into full minban gives them 
the freedom to decide on tuition issues more freely. And the operational cost gap is a serious fiscal problem driving 
these ICs to turn full minban.  
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Some do not have independent campuses and rely more upon the 
educational resources from the mother HEIs. Although their 
independence is not that high, their investment is continuous with no 
requirement for profit or return. The last batch is mostly the private 
individual invested and formed under the partnership between public 
HEIs and private investors. Therefore, these bosses pay more attention 
to investment returns, which cause all kinds of problems. (Faculty 
Interview No. 14) 
The criterion in this categorization theory is based upon the level of public 
participation and return-demands. The more public forces participate in school 
operation, the less likely they demand for returns, and the higher education standards 
they can maintain. This may give us some idea why the society actually favors the 
ones with strong public backings more. 
As a matter of fact, many ICs in China are undergoing some kind of 
transformation to find a suitable path for development according to their respective 
realities. In Zhejiang, there were 22 ICs before 2016. Wenzhou University City 
College transfigured into a traditional minban college in 2016 and called itself 
Wenzhou Business College, cutting its ties with the mother public HEI, Wenzhou 
University.14 The rest 21 ICs have been working to improve their independence with 
12 of them relocating to a new site for an independent and new campus, which was 
usually carefully coordinated under the support of some local governments. This is a 
sign to show the “Zhejiang Model” is turning increasingly public, since these 
relocating colleges are increasingly dependent upon the policy and land support from 
the local governments. And they hold their ties with the mother public HEIs tightly, 
evidenced by them keeping the title. Therefore, for many ICs in Zhejiang, the 
example set by ZUCC is actually what they all hope to follow. With the strong public 
force support, the benefits are evident in the context of a public-dominant HEI 
system.  
                                                             
14 http://news.66wz.com/system/2016/05/10/104823073.shtml. This is a piece of news on Wenzhou Net about 
the transformation of Wenzhou University City College into a traditional minban college in 2016.  
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Running under Minban Mechanism--Unorthodox but Flexible 
Besides the public ownership, running under a minban mechanism is also a 
distinct feature of ICs. How does the minban mechanism manifest itself? How is it 
perceived by the people working under such a mechanism? Generally speaking, the 
minban mechanism is not a characteristic as outstanding as its public ownership 
among the ICs in Zhejiang, which this research mainly focuses upon. In all of the 
interviews, at the end I gave a question to ask the interviewees to give a score on the 
rating of how much minban (private) the institution is. On the spectrum of 1 to 10, 1 
means full minban; 10 means full public. Majority will give the score of 6, meaning 
it is more public-leaning. This is a result reflecting the public leaning feature of the 
Zhejiang model with no private investors joining the school board. Even when there 
is a requirement for the joining of a non-government social force, many ICs in 
Zhejiang have their fully-owned educational enterprises to sit in the board as a 
dummy so as to fulfill the legal requirement. However, there are some salient aspects 
repeatedly occurring in interviews that help to show how the minban mechanism 
works and what minban is understood by the Chinese administrators and faculty.  
There is one important element mentioned by every interviewee to demonstrate 
ZUCC is actually running under a minban mechanism--the high tuition it charges.  
In 1999, ZUCC’s tuition was 15 to 16 thousand RMB. Back 
around 2000, you have to understand how much 16 thousand is. Most 
people in Hangzhou made about 2000 RMB per month. The housing 
price was Hangzhou is about 3000 per square meter. Four years tuition 
could almost allow you to buy a small apartment in the city. So only 
those whose family economic conditions were really good could afford 
a four year college at ZUCC. Back then, some of our students were sons 
and daughters of business owners. Today (2017) our tuition is still 
around 18 thousand. The change is not big and now many family in the 
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city can afford this price.” (Faculty Interview No.15) 
The issue of tuition is a complicated story here. As it was set in the founding 
days, tuition played a key role in building and operating the institution. As was 
mentioned by another interviewee, “self-dependent revenue and expenditure” is a 
key feature for the minban mechanism. From the perspective of economic 
development level, 16 thousand was quite intimidating for many families in 2000. 
The self-dependent element was evident. ICs needed the tuition very much to start 
building and running the schools. Today, many ICs still charge around 18 thousand 
per year, three times higher than most public universities. That can be understood as 
a key feature of the minban mechanism. But the dissatisfaction about the inability to 
increase tuition at a reasonable level among faculty and administrators I interviewed 
shows the constraints many ICs running under the minban mechanism faces.  
ICs like ZUCC faces a big difficulty, that is the administrative 
constraint. For example, tuition. In many countries, the universities 
adjust tuition according to CPI changes. We are not doing this. For one, 
the bureau of education keeps a close eye on the tuition hikes. Any 
adjustment in tuition must go through some censorship for approval. 
They are very careful about the cost rise in people-livelihood related 
aspects, such as education. For another, the school is also reluctant to do 
so, because this might affect our student recruitment. The ICs in 
Zhejiang all maintain the same level of tuition. But if we could adjust it 
accordingly, it might help to improve our quality and standards. If our 
faculty recruited at a higher level, this could improve our 
competitiveness. Many universities abroad can attract top talents 
because they can afford high salaries for faculty. (Faculty Interview No. 
8)  
So the tuition, on the hand, sets ZUCC in a different category from public 
colleges. The almost freezing tuition for 18 years, on the other hand, shows the 
                                                             
15 The price of housing in Hangzhou today is around 20,000 RMB per square meter in average; however, in 2000 
it is only around 3000 RMB per square meter. The inflation is substantial, but the tuition of ICs has not been 
adjusted on the inflation rate. Therefore, more family can afford this tuition today.  
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complex story behind the minban mechanism. It is running under a minban 
mechanism, but that is one under the censorship of a local educational bureau. The 
increase of tuition could be deemed a potential cause for social dissatisfaction. To 
maintain higher education at a reasonable price is a key concern for the government. 
One side story on adjusting the tuition for a China-Australian (ZUCC-USQ) joint 
degree program at ZUCC offers some insight in the inflexibility of tuition. The 
Australian university has been demanding on the increase of tuition for quite a few 
years. It is said that the frustration the Australian side had with the rising cost and 
stagnant tuition has become one of the main reasons to end the joint program.  
In addition to tuition, another feature indicative of the minban mechanism is the 
shareholding board system of the school. This is the second most referred to explicit 
character when I asked the interviewees about the minban mechanism. The board 
system in China usually exists among companies, especially the market-listed ones. 
It is often viewed as a modern system to bring enterprises or organizations closer to 
the influence of the market force. Therefore, in the reform and opening era of China, 
it has become a standard reform to inject dynamic forces into a rigid system.  
The board system was a great innovative attempt when ZUCC was 
founded. It formed a more dynamic structure for decision-making. 
From the stockholding perspective, ZJU and Hangzhou government 
have been main holders, who collectively make all the big decisions. In 
the past 15 years or so I haven’t seen any really innovative new changes 
to the current HE models. From the perspective of commercial 
enterprises, the board is vital and decides on the directional changes of 
the organization. However, in our case, it seems very difficult to make 
real new changes, since the individuals sitting in the board are only 
representatives and their personal interests are not involved. Behind 
them are state-owned organizations. (Faculty Interview No. 5) 
The introduction of the board system, from the start, seems to learn from the 
market force, hoping the modern enterprise system can bring vitality to the education 
experiment. However, as explained by this teacher from the business school, the IC 
136 
model has faced the challenge of running an innovative mechanism. How to charter 
the unknown water during development is even more difficult than starting a new 
school. In the case of ICs, many have been gravitated towards the public force during 
their development path. ZUCC has been heavily influenced by ZJU in terms of 
organizational structure and rules-setting. The faculty evaluation criteria are modeled 
on the ones from ZJU and student manuals also learn from ZJU. After all, it is much 
safer and easier to copy and adapt. Drawing upon the existing resources is a quick 
way to set up an institution in a short time. The board system allows multiple 
valuable contributors to join forces and share burdens. If it is not innovative enough, 
it is absolutely practical and useful.  
Besides the tangible aspects for minban mechanism, there are some intangible 
ones showing its minban characteristics. They generally have something to do with a 
cultural perception. Some of the interviewees have been working at ZUCC since its 
very early days and they have witnessed the passion common among start-up 
businesses and the flexibility of the administrative office for benefiting students in 
early years. And they lamented the loss of these vitality elements associated with a 
minban experiment and the return of a menacingly cold old-day bureaucratic system.  
The ZUCC leaders in early days were more accessible, close to us. 
There were more communication channels between teachers and leaders. 
Leaders cared more about the needs of teachers. The atmosphere was 
very good. Principal Lu Shijie often came among us to learn our voices 
and listen to students’ needs. I give you one example. In 2004, One of 
my students were doing an intern in Gansu and had to stay there for one 
more month, which caused a conflict with some of the important classes. 
I referred this student to Principal Lu for special case consideration. He 
took on this matter and sincerely helped to coordinate. In the end, the 
system didn’t allow this and it didn’t work out for the student. But the 
direct involvement of Principal Lu made us see he really cared the 
growth of our students. The spiritual support was touching. In these 
days, Principal Lu and other important leaders (Shu Ji, meaning party 
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secretaries) always left their doors open. You could call them on their 
cell phones to frankly open a conversation. Now, if you want to see a 
leader, you have to go through a secretary. I can’t even figure out which 
leader works in which office. So the message is clear. There is a line of 
separation. (Faculty Interview No. 1) 
The early passion and flexibility in a start-up college and the increasing 
bureaucratization are a repeatedly mentioned topic among quite a few veteran 
teachers at ZUCC. When they entered ZUCC, a new college built on a minban 
mechanism, they had expectations for something new and dynamic. Some of these 
teachers were actually transferred from the old ZJU campuses, where things always 
followed a old development path. It was at ZUCC that they saw the passion and 
devotion only seen in a start-up business. They felt this was a minban experiment and 
they were creating something new from scratch. Such a thought excited them and 
they had a lot of motivation to push for its success. This is what I see as the implicit 
aspects for a minban mechanism. In China, minying (people-run) enterprises are 
often seen as more highly motivated, passionate and quick responsive to change than 
state-owned enterprises. That helps with the competitiveness of these minying 
enterprises in the market. For them, it is a game of either developing or dying. Not 
like the state-owned enterprises, they can’t enjoy any preferential policies or 
subsidies in hard times. It is the same for minban HEIs, such as ICs. In the interviews, 
many teachers mentioned the importance of teaching quality and students’ 
satisfaction. ZUCC once made teaching as the primary task for teachers and teaching 
quality as the life line of the school. Because as a HEI dependent upon the student 
tuition, the satisfaction rate of these customers and its reputation among parents are 
of paramount importance. Just like a company, the products shall bring customers 
what they need so as to attract more customers. ZUCC finds itself in a similar 
position, as good teaching quality can bring more students to join ZUCC.  
However, in recent years, the key focus of ZUCC has gradually shifted to many 
other tasks. Research has been increasingly stressed as it is a key factor in building a 
high-rating college and it brings prestige in a way different from teaching quality. 
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Internationalization and entrepreneurship are also frequent buzzwords appearing in 
documents, as they are part of the social trends brought onto agenda by many 
colleges. The cultural value of a minban institution is fading. People started to refer 
to the negative stereotype associated minban in China, which is high tuition and poor 
quality. Gradually, the path is turning to look more like a standardized public 
institution, which ZUCC has a lot to learn from ZJU. If not learning everything, the 
rich institutional and academic resources at ZJU should help ZUCC find a suitable 
path agreed by both of the two key public shareholders in the board. (Path 
dependence, student-suitable ) 
Backing from Local Government 
As a public owned IC, ZUCC’s relationship with government is clear from its 
beginning. The Hangzhou government provided numerous supports to ensure its good 
start, including land appropriation, bank loan arrangement, public personnel policy 
support and shareholding structure participation. Almost all the interviewees refer to 
the participation of a government as a benign sign beneficial to the educational cause 
in the long run. They see the more ZUCC can win the support from government, the 
better it can develop and prosper.  
Firstly, the participation of government is demonstrated in the shareholding 
structure, legal person choice and key leadership appointment.  
Strictly speaking, from the shareholding structure perspective, 
almost all the HEIs in China are government-owned. Colleges, like us, 
are similar to reformed state-owned enterprises, to some extent. Our 
educational products charge fees based on the market value, but our 
management is fully state-owned enterprise style. From shareholding to 
key personnel appointment, it is all following the model of state-owned 
enterprises. Our principal is never publicly recruited, approved by the 
board. He or she is appointed from the government force above and the 
management officials have administrative titles equal to that of deputy 
139 
provincial department level officials. They report to the higher level 
officials and are subject to the supervision. And ZUCC’s legal person is 
the vice mayor of Hangzhou. (Faculty Interview No. 5) 
This is a frank statement about the high level management structure of ZUCC. To 
a great extent, the management administrators are treated as government officials, in 
terms of evaluation and welfare benefits. Therefore, the development path of such 
colleges will answer to the needs of local governments, rather than to some individual 
who is intent on undergoing some educational experiment or creating some new 
model of education. Interestingly, the market mechanism is partially utilized to 
achieve a public goal under the approval and guidance of local government forces. 
This is actually one major reason I argue that neoliberalism argument for the 
“privatization” of China’s HE is problematic. On the surface it is charging fee and 
shifting the burden of cost to families and students; fundamentally, the public force is 
always in control and decides the extent and scale of that “privatization” (Mok, 
Harvey). This is only a practical solution to solve an urgent problem under certain 
historical period and should not be considered a fundamental institutional 
restructuring, as it happened in the educational system of U.K. and U.S.  
Secondly, in terms of the whole personnel system, ZUCC has won the strong 
policy support from the Hangzhou government since beginning, which makes it easier 
to attract top talents and gives ZUCC a big advantage over traditional minban HEIs.  
When I first entered ZUCC, I knew I was in the Hangzhou public 
personnel system. There was a certain number of public personnel quota 
appropriated to ZUCC as both a policy support and a way to attract 
good talents. I am not sure about the exact number, maybe about 1000 
quota. This explains a lot about our public ownership. It is because of 
the participation of Hangzhou government that we can enjoy such a 
public personnel policy. Among all the ICs at that time, it was rare. 
Only schools like ZUCC, or ZJU-Ningbo College of Technology, were 
so strongly supported by the government force. The other ICs in 
Zhejiang (which are also mostly public owned with the mother 
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institution holding majority or full of its ownership), also tried to refer 
our case to the local government, asking for policy support and 
acquiring some public personnel quota. This personnel quota is very 
helpful for recruiting talents. (Faculty Interview No. 10) 
The public personnel system among public universities is a key characteristic 
showing the strong connection between public universities and government 
institutions. Despite the recent attempts to reform the administrative structure and 
de-administrate (Qu Xing Zhen Hua) HEIs, many universities and colleges in China 
are actually public affair units, which mean they are more dependent on government 
support in finance, personnel system and administration. This is something seldom 
noticed by the scholars in the West. The high level leaders of these universities are 
basically equal to the government officials at relative levels. The teachers are, to some 
extent, equal to the civil workers in terms of the welfare benefits they can enjoy and 
retirement plans. And it is commonly believed that the positions within the public 
personnel system are more stable and beneficial in the long-run. Therefore, it becomes 
a big attraction for many job applicants.  
In the case of ZUCC, the job advertisement usually shows the personnel 
affiliation. An ad showing the Hangzhou public personnel affiliation(Hangzhou Shi 
Ye Bian Zhi杭州事业编) can attract more potential applicants then one showing 
company personnel affiliation (Gong Si Qi Ye Bian Zhi 公司企业编制), which 
provides only half of the benefits and does not guarantee a long term employment 
position. At ZUCC there is a third category of personnel affiliation, between public 
and company. That is called personnel agent (Ren Shi Dai Li 人事代理), meaning the 
employee can enjoy the benefits equal to that of Hangzhou public personnel but not in 
actuality a Hangzhou personnel affiliation. The welfare gap here is covered by 
self-raised funding of ZUCC. Basically, it is the best possible solution if the employee 
can’t make it into the public personnel system. Because there is a certain quota with 
the public system, when the personnel quota is full personnel agent is a smart way to 
keep the competitiveness in personnel recruitment and bypass the quota issue. Of 
course, the school has to come up with that funding to equalize the benefits.  
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We had an agreement with Hangzhou government when ZUCC 
was founded. They offered us a certain number of public personnel 
quota, which was about 700 (there is some discrepancy between the 
interviewees about the actual number). At the beginning, there were 
quite many empty seats; but with the time passing, these seats were 
quickly filled up. Now the public personnel affiliation is quite limited 
and we have to be careful to reserve these seats for teaching and 
researching faculty. There are already none available for administrative 
staff. (Faculty Interview No. 17) 
The value of these personnel quota is obvious from the words of both 
interviewees and it has been considered as a policy boon advantageous for ICs, such 
as ZUCC. In my interviews with faculty from other ICs in Zhejiang, the Bian Zhi 
(personnel affiliation) also turned up frequently. In other cases, they provide the 
public personnel affiliation under the mother HEIs as a recruiting gold card. For 
example, Zhejiang University of Technology-Zhijiang College recruits faculty by 
promising to offer ZUT’s personnel affiliation, which is the public university 
affiliation. Therefore, in these ICs with public ownership, most faculty and staff, 
especially the core teaching and research faculty have some kind of public personnel 
affiliation, similar to those of civil workers. Put it simply, ownership structure 
determines the personnel structure.  
With the recent relocation movement of many ICs in Zhejiang, these ICs have 
been actively seeking stronger partnership with local governments. The Hangzhou 
neighboring areas, such as Shaoxing (绍兴), Shangyu(上虞), Fuyang (富阳) and 
Jiande (建德), have all become the new homes for these relocated ICs and the policy 
support from the local governments is shown in providing public personnel quota.  
Personnel system, as a key aspect of an organization, tells a lot about what this 
organization is and who it serves. Obviously, for these ICs, university autonomy they 
can enjoy is limited by its ownership structure and personnel system. Ultimately, it is 
closer to an extension of government bureaucracy than an independent institution 
capable of setting its own development course.  
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Thirdly, from the perspective of student recruitment, we can also discover the 
increasingly strong connection with the public force. Some background knowledge 
should first be introduced to make sense of this aspect. In China the application and 
recruitment of prospective college students is a semi-planned process. Each HEI has 
their degree programs assigned into different tiers for student recruitment after these 
programs and the overall academic capacity of a college are evaluated and approved 
by either the Ministry of Education or the local bureau of education, depending on the 
supervision affiliation of these colleges. In addition, the number of students for each 
degree program is reported up to the Ministry or local bureaus and approved there. 
Every a few years, the degree program’s academic capacity and student recruitment 
number are evaluated, so the program can continue. In this semi-planned system, to 
which tier a college is categorized into or in what batch of student admission process 
a degree program can start recruiting after Gaokao is key to what kind of students the 
college or the program can have access to. According to the post-Gaokao recruitment 
condition in 2018, there were about 200 first tier HEIs in China, including 112 Project 
211 HEIs and 39 Project 985 HEIs.16 These are the top tier HEIs in China, all public 
ones, and their programs can start recruiting in the first batch of admission process, 
which means the high-scoring students usually go to these programs and the lower tier 
HEIs have to wait for the turn in the admission process. Of course, many of these top 
tier HEIs have high academic reputation and proud history. Even if they are not given 
the advantageous position in admission process, they are probably going to be favored 
by many. However, the admission process means there is no pressure at all from the 
bottom to challenge their positions and they always enjoy picking the best batch of 
students into their baskets. Therefore, it is always the goal for the lower tier HEIs to 
enter the first tier and start recruiting in the first batch. Because admitting the best 
students makes it more likely to produce the best graduates.  
So in the case of ZUCC, since its beginning, as an IC it has to recruit students in 
                                                             
16 Project 985 and Project 211 are gradually phasing out and now replaced by a new and more fluid list of “Double 
First Class” (Shuang Yi Liu 双一流) HEIs according to the Ministry of Education. However, among parents and 
students, they are still used to the former way of rating HEIs. They still refer to these two projects to decide 
whether the HEI they want to be admitted into is top class.  
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the third batch together with all the high fee charging minban HEIs. That means in 
order to charge high tuition, it can only have access to the “left-over” students after all 
the good one have admitted the relatively high scoring students. For a long period of 
time, at ZUCC how to adjust the educational methods to suit the needs of these lower 
scoring students with less motivation for learning is a problem causing headache and 
debates. Therefore, it is believed even with the good educational resources ZUCC can 
provide, if it can have no access to high scoring talents the educational turnout can be 
less fruitful. When the time comes, seeking the opportunity to upgrade the college 
into the first tier and admitting students in the first batch is a strategically significant 
move.  
Under this backdrop, in 2015 there were three degree programs first starting 
admitting in the first batch, and the recruiting quota is 180, which is a small number in 
comparison to the total recruiting quota of over 3000. So this was the first time to test 
the water to find out how the students and parents react. In the following years, the 
recruiting quota is steadily increasing and the degree programs admitting in the first 
batch are also expanding. In 2017 there were five degree programs recruiting in the 
first batch and charging public tuition, which is only a third or even less of that 
charged by most other programs on that same year. These are important early signs to 
show ZUCC is gradually upgrading or leaning towards a public HEI. The most 
sensational news came in 2018 that ZUCC started to open almost all the programs for 
recruiting in the first batch on the public HEI tuition standard, except for several 
newly established majors. That means it can now have access to the high scoring 
students in the first round of recruitment, just like other top public HEIs, and the 
tuitions it charges are fully public, from 3000 to 6000, with the rest of the tuition cost 
paid by the government.  
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Table 6.1  Student Recruiting Data for ZUCC 
Recruiting 
programs 
Recruiting number 
of students 
Tuition 
(RMB) 
Remarks 
Computer 
Science 
87 6000 Recruiting on the public HEI 
tuition standards 
Civil 
Engineering 
58 6000 
Finance 80 5300 
Asset Appraisal  67 5300 
Clinical 
Medicine 
120 6000 
Source: 2017 Recruiting Plan for Zhejiang University City College.  
http://www.gx211.com/news/20170711/n14997644824992.html 
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Table 6.2 Provincial Recruiting Plan for ZUCC 
Province Recruiting 
Number 
Recruiting Batch Remarks 
Zhejiang 2016 First Batch These are all degree 
programs charging on the 
public HEI tuition standards. 
Liaoning, Jiangsu and 
Guangdong are the 
provinces adopting a 
reformed admission process 
with three batches, including 
special advanced batch, 
bachelor degree batch and 
associate degree batch. Here 
the bachelor degree batch is 
a combination of the first 
and second batch recruiting, 
which means all the bachelor 
degree awarding HEIs can 
have access to all the 
students at the same time 
and compete at the same 
level.  
Hebei 45 Second Batch 
Liaoning 19 Bachelor Degree Batch 
Jiangsu 80 Bachelor Degree Batch 
Anhui 50 Second Batch 
Fujian 50 Second Batch 
Shandong 50 Second Batch 
Henan 100 First Batch 
Hubei 20 Second Batch 
Guangdong 45 Bachelor Degree Batch 
Guangxi 20 Second Batch 
Sichuan 50 Second Batch 
Guizhou 20 Second Batch 
Yunnan 10 Second Batch 
Xinjiang 10 Second Batch 
Total  2723   
Source: 2018 Recruiting Plan for Zhejiang University City College.  
http://zs.zucc.edu.cn/baokao_1_show.aspx?id=1044  
 
It is right that ZUCC is turning public with the increasing public subsidies; 
however, it is still an independent college, or called by many as “one of the first ICs to 
recruit in the first batch”. Probably this is pointing a possible development path for 
the many ICs with public ownership. And all the upgrading is most considered as the 
result of both its excellent educational quality and the strong tie with the Hangzhou 
government.  
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It is important to have government support if you really want to 
run a school well. At ZUCC, the situation is becoming better and the 
support from the government is also increasing. In 2015 we had three 
degree programs recruiting in the first batch. These majors charged 
public tuition. The tuition is about 5000, and the government subsidy is 
about 10 million. Not every IC can enjoy such a subsidy. These first 
batch programs are important for our development. In the future, 
hopefully there could be more. (Faculty Interview No. 11) 
 
Here great importance is attached to the government support. The first three 
programs recruiting in the first batch and charging public tuitions are a proud thing for 
many working at ZUCC, showing the affirmative acknowledge to the educational 
progress of ZUCC and a good sign for its future upgrading.  
Another interviewee gives the explanation for the upgrading. 
It depends on the popularity of ZUCC among students for each 
year’s admission process. It means whether students think of us 
positively or not is key. So we chose our best programs with the best 
faculty force and high social popularity to be the first group of 
programs to recruit in the first batch. The recruitment qualification in 
the first batch is first examined by Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of 
Education. Then, after approved, it is up to the society to see whether 
you are truly recognized. If parents and students disagree, the 
qualification is meaningless. So now we can upgrade some programs to 
the first batch recruitment successfully, meaning the wide social 
recognition to our school. This is a good sign to tell us our quality has 
improved to a good level…Because of our brand name and the good 
birth background, we have done it in 15 years. Our graduates are 
suitable for the economic development demands of Zhejiang as well as 
the Yangtze River Delta Region. So the local government is willing to 
give you more support. (Faculty Interview No. 13) 
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He was very proud of the progress made so far and pointed to the support from 
the government as an important factor in the progress. The tie to the public force plays 
an indispensible role in the quick development of ZUCC.  
Another interviewee summarizes the advantages the ICs with public ownership 
have over the ICs with more private capital involvement.  
In comparison to those with private investment, we have relatively 
big advantages. One is no profit-making requirements. The public 
partners care very little about this and usually have more long term 
plans. In those ICs with strong profit-seeking intentions, they have more 
strict rules on faculty spending, such as cost for attending academic 
activities. And a certain percentage of tuition revenue is carved out as 
investment returns. The other advantage is the faculty personnel 
affiliation. That personnel affiliation is also related to professional rank 
promotion. The ICs with no government support or less public 
participation have difficulties attracting young talents because these 
schools cannot offer secure public personnel affiliation and the related 
benefits with that affiliation. (Faculty Interview No. 4) 
 
Basically, minban HEIs generally face more challenges for development, in not 
only seeking talented faculty but also recruiting high-scoring students. Mostly, they 
are limited by the lack of continuous fund injection and the public-favoring policy 
system. Simply put, the better welfare promises in public ownership ICs draw more 
attention from job-seeking young talents; the lower public tuition attracts more 
students and family. The intangible benefits, such as bank loan and subsidized 
program projects, are also giving some edge to the ones with public support. So in the 
long run, the ICs with public ownership are sure to outrun the ones without.  
However, there is also another side to the public participation, which is 
mentioned by several interviewees as a hindrance to the development of schools, such 
as ZUCC. It has something to do with stifling bureaucratization and excessive 
administrative force.  
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Our principle and the party secretary of our school are all 
government officials with administrative titles. They report to the 
government bureaus and it is their duty to align the school policies to 
the higher ones from the education bureau. Therefore, there is this issue 
of autonomy or liberty degree. Even though we are considered a minban 
by many parents and students, I feel we are leaning toward public HEIs. 
It is highly likely for us to be reorganized. If our leaders were not 
appointed, there might be other possibilities. But now ZUCC is just 
more like another administrative organization in the system. (Faculty 
Interview No. 15) 
  
China’s HE system is one with a long history of state control and planning. In 
recent years, with the economic liberalization the government has opened the policy 
window for schools run by non-government forces. However, the HE is still far from 
enjoying autonomy. Any careful look into the inner structure of university 
organization or the curriculum plan can show the influence of the state (Pan, 2009). 
On the one hand, the state force gives credibility and boost-start to these schools. On 
the other hand, it limits the rise of alternative educational models. As told by a faculty 
teaching in the Sino-Australian joint program at ZUCC, the conflict between the 
program-relevant core courses and the compulsory Marxist thought courses is a big 
headache for them. For them, the only solution seems to have students take 11-12 
courses a semester in order to fulfill the requirements from both sides. This leaves 
little time and space for faculty and students to experiment anything new. Despite the 
big call for creativity and innovation in society, the current stagnant curriculum 
system does not allow the true spirit for creativity to take root in colleges.  
 
Inextricable Ties to ZJU—Good and Bad 
The inextricable ties to ZJU are discernible in many aspects of ZUCC since its 
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beginning days, including leadership group, faculty, program and curriculum design, 
academic standards     and bureaucratic setup. And these ties seem contradictory to 
the name—Independent Colleges as well as to the government decree issued in 2008 
to standardize the “Independence” of ICs. However, from another perspective, again 
this is just another practical move to solve educational challenges in reality. After all, 
it is the quickest possible way to model on what has been established and draw upon 
the available existing resources if the goal is to massively expand the size of HE in a 
short span of time.  
In terms of leadership group, key figures, such as principal and party secretary, 
are always appointed by ZJU and approved by the board. So far, all the key leadership 
positions have been held by ZJU personnel transferred to the key position at ZUCC, 
who usually held mid-level leadership positions when at ZJU, such as dean positions 
at relevant colleges.  
The ZUCC school-level leaders are all sent from ZJU. They 
belong to the personnel system at ZJU and are evaluated at ZJU 
annually or quadrennially. ZUCC’s first principal was Lu Shijie, who 
used to be the provost of ZJU (Vice President rank of ZJU). Wu Jian, 
the current principal, used to be Dean of Zhu Ke Zhen College (a key 
college attracting top-scoring students), ZJU. Basically, ZJU has a 
strong control over the future of ZUCC. Of course, the support is 
equally significant. (Faculty Interview No. 10) 
 
These high-level leaders are veterans in the field of HE and have a lot of 
experiences working in the public-dominated system. Therefore, they are usually 
good at winning resources for the development of ZUCC. Today almost all the ICs in 
Zhejiang have their top leadership group appointed by the mother public HEIs. 
Fundamentally, these ICs are part of the big educational scheme of the public HEIs 
and they mean important contributions to the HE cause in Zhejiang, which can be 
turned into credits or bargaining chips for funds or policies in the future. Therefore, 
the ties are beneficial in both ways.  
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Faculty is another aspect to show the strong ties. However, the impact from ZJU 
faculty is decreasing in recent years with the increase of ZUCC self-recruited faculty 
and the retirement of old ZJU faculty.  
In the early days, the size of ZUCC was not big. Many courses 
were taught by faculty from ZJU, who came here to teach part-time or 
to fulfill their teaching hour requirements. Some of these early teachers 
were really good with their teaching experiences. Around 2003 or 2004, 
there is a big restructuring at ZJU. Suddenly, there was a big influx of 
faculty at ZUCC. Back then, about one third of the faculty force was 
former ZJU faculty. After that, the proportion has been decreasing with 
the entry of new faculty from the public recruitment efforts. (Faculty 
Interview No. 3) 
The support of ZJU faculty for teaching was a big attraction for applying students. 
“The first-tier faculty for the second-tier students” is a saying raised up by quite a few 
interviewees, referring to the experienced and highly qualified teaching faculty to give 
lectures to low-scoring students with some learning motivation problems. Consider, 
even though your score couldn’t get you into the top universities to enjoy the 
top-notch professors’ lectures at ZJU, ZUCC could still offer you a second chance to 
have access to the top educational resources with more tuition. Many students were 
attracted by this promise of first class teaching resources.  
Program design is another aspect to see the connection. In the programs, such as 
engineering, computer science and medicine, the reliance on ZJU resources is 
especially evident and strong.  
In early days, most of our faculty was part-time. And they came 
from ZJU, ZJU affiliated hospitals. Almost two third of the courses 
were taught by them…Today we still have quite a few ZJU teachers 
helping with teaching core courses, but we have more ZUCC teachers 
involving in the core course teaching. In clinical medicine, there are 
about 14 part-time teachers from ZJU or ZJU hospitals helping with the 
courses. In the senior year, students will go to ZJU-Hua Jia Chi Campus 
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and spend the whole year there with the ZJU faculty group for lab work 
and thesis. So for the three majors we have, clinical medicine is the one 
heavily dependent on the ZJU faculty force; pharmacy used to the same 
situation and now it is almost independent with only one or two ZJU 
faculty helping; nursing is the one with still many faculty from ZJU and 
ZJU hospitals and the core curriculum are taught by teachers from the 
ZJU system. (Faculty Interview No. 8) 
The interviewees from civil engineering and computer science also revealed 
similar situations. They could share labs at ZJU to allow some top ZUCC students to 
work there or have ZJU teachers or graduates from ZJU doctoral programs to teach 
some of the core courses. As a matter of fact, many newly recruited faculty at these 
two programs were graduated from ZJU, which made it easy for them to maintain the 
connection for research and lab work. It is not an exaggeration to say the ZUCC 
programs in civil engineering, computer science and medicine are kind of offspring 
from ZJU. This condition also exists in other programs at ZUCC, in varying extent.  
Before 2005, most academic quality insurance was done with the participation of 
ZJU. For example, final examination papers had to be sent to ZJU for approval and 
degree related core courses had to be approved by ZJU. When applying for 
government grants or key discipline points, it was usually ZJU professors leading the 
application team. These supports helped to keep the standards in check while 
experiencing quick growth. Therefore, they were widely considered beneficial to 
ZUCC’s development in the early booming days.  
In terms of bureaucratic management, the influence of ZJU is also evident, 
especially in early days. ZUCC has been modeling itself upon ZJU in organizational 
structure, management style, evaluation criteria and bureaucratic setup. In the words 
of some interviewees, it is the “old way style (Lao Tao Lu)” that ZUCC has been 
building itself upon. Just like any public HEIs in China, ZUCC has party secretary 
setup, in addition to the principal office. Also, in order to meet the same evaluation 
criteria for all the bachelor degree awarding HEIs, the management mechanism for 
evaluating faculty and department research/teaching responsibilities is basically the 
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same as the one used by ZJU, except for some adjustment to suit the current 
development level of ZUCC.  
So are there any drawbacks or worries with the strong connection? Some 
interviewees did mention some for consideration, such as issue of loyalty among 
school leaders, increasing inflexibility in bureaucratic organization and lack of 
diversity or characters unique for ZUCC.   
In bureaucratic inflexibility, the “old way style” was considered by some as 
“restraints”, which make ZUCC look more like a public university. 
When ICs were established, the management model, operational 
model and evaluation mechanism all followed the old models, which 
meant basically one same mechanism. Your faculty sources, teaching 
program setup, teaching style, library setup and other things were 
almost the same throughout China. This determines that if ZUCC wants 
to be flexible and creative in organizational change, there will be some 
serious restraints. Today, we can see it is turning to be more like the old 
public HEI school model. Maybe it has something to do with its origin 
as the secondary college of the public HEIs. One thing we shall agree is 
these ICs do not have their unique characteristics and they just follow 
the ‘old style way’. (Faculty Interview No. 11) 
Maybe it has never been its goal to build a new type of HE model. After all, to 
solve the realistic challenge of giving more Chinese students the opportunity to go to 
college is the task assigned to these colleges by the time. To use the educational 
resources of public HEIs and have these well-known institutions to establish new 
colleges is practically the fastest way to build colleges with relatively satisfying 
quality and considerable student capacity. And as mentioned above, the public HEIs 
have never been trying to let ICs develop in ways of their own choices. Therefore, 
flexibility and experimentation on HE are never the priority consideration for school 
leaders.  
Another worry also discussed in interviews is the loyalty of leaders. Since they 
are appointed by ZJU and report to ZJU in terms of annual work evaluation, it seems 
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reasonable to assume the ZUCC leaders may not put the interest of ZUCC first when 
it interest comes into conflict with that of ZJU. Though it is a rare situation ZUCC 
might come to, the issue of loyalty has got some faculty starting their career at ZUCC 
to question whether the ZJU appointed leaders will speak on their behalf. In 2018 
ZJU’s Zhejiang Engineering College started recruiting master degree students with the 
campus set up in the northern part of the ZUCC campus. Basically, ZJU, under the 
auspice of Zhejiang government, has decided to use the land and hardware facilities at 
ZUCC to open a new high-end graduate-level engineering college. This has caused 
some concerns among ZUCC faculty about the nature of this new college and the 
implications for the future of ZUCC. Some pointed to the loyalty of ZUCC leaders 
and showed dismay about what they or their leaders can do to protect the interests of 
ZUCC. Because this is a decision made by ZJU never formally announcing to let 
ZUCC faculty voice their opinions. And as leaders of ZUCC were appointed by ZJU, 
they also felt no responsibility to communicate this important decision to ZUCC 
faculty. Instead, answering to the requirements from the higher mother university is 
perhaps more important and sensible to do.  
So the inexplicable ties to ZJU are mostly considered an advantage, especially in 
China’s public dominant HE system. It has got ZUCC strong faculty resources, big 
brand name, government preference and institutional management experience, all of 
which prepare for the quick rise of a new type of HEI. However, these are out of 
practical considerations, rather than experimenting on some new HE model. 
Nowadays, the ties are turning increasingly intangible with the requirements from 
above to keep ICs “independent”. But people, or personnel structure, have made these 
ICs almost inseparable from the mother HEIs. “Old way style” is probably going to 
stay that way if it is the same group of “people” managing based on their managing 
experiences.  
Bias in a Hierarchical HE System 
The last aspect that can help us understand the position of ICs in the HE system 
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of China is related to bias and prejudice all the ICs have to face. This is also touched 
upon in the previous chapter on students’ perception of ZUCC. Here in the interviews 
of faculty and staff, this is an issue also frequently discussed. It is certain that in 
China’s hierarchical HE system, the lower tier HEIs face not only less policy support 
from the government but society-wide prejudice.   
In terms of unfavorable policy prejudice, some faculty shared their experiences in 
grant application to show the unfair treatment in the process.   
Just like our students being labeled IC students when applying for 
jobs, we teachers face the same labeling when applying for grants and 
project funding. Many grants favor the public HEIs. For example, the 
education reform project funding I tried to apply to. I found Hangzhou 
Normal University was able to apply to almost 20 grant supports. 
However, there were only 3 grant opportunities for the education reform 
projects from all the ICs in Zhejiang. Over twenty ICs competed for 
these 3 opportunities, while one public HEI can apply to more than 10. I 
wanted to apply, but the chance was too small. We were not on the same 
starting line as those public ones. So I really hope our school can enjoy 
a fairer social environment. After all we have made so much 
contribution to the talent cultivation in the past 15 years. We deserve 
better. (Faculty Interview No. 16) 
It is not difficult to understand the local government is usually more willing to 
give support to those HEIs directly under their authority. Since the healthy growth of 
these affiliated HEIs is part of the social progress contribution in the government 
work report, the development of these public HEIs is of political significance in 
addition to economic and cultural values. ICs are, therefore, considered secondary or 
even peripheral when it comes to funding decisions.  
The other interviewee’s remark on his observation of official documents from 
Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Education also confirms the peripheral position of ICs 
in policy consideration.  
ICs’ position is a bit tricky and the local bureau of education holds 
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a dubious attitude to these colleges. In the documents released by the 
bureau of education, the ranking of HEIs shows the hierarchical order in 
the eyes of the bureau. The key public universities always come first; 
then the public bachelor degree level institutions; then, the public 
associate degree level institutions; lastly, it is the independent colleges. 
My feeling is that ICs should at least be put in the category of bachelor 
degree institutions, since they are all awarding that degree. But in 
documents, ICs are listed behind public associate degree institutions. 
This shows the bureau holds some dubious attitude to ICs. What are 
they? Minban or public? (Faculty Interview No. 14) 
As a new comer in the HE system, ICs are considered something between minban 
and public. There is lacking of policy guide on how to support its development, 
except for the No. 26 Decree published by the Ministry in 2008, specifying the 
minban nature of these ICs and the requirements for becoming “independent” in 
campus, degree, finance and etc.17 At the provincial level, the priority often goes to 
the provincial level public HEIs. As mentioned before, some ICs have their faculty 
apply to funding in the name of the mother public HEIs, because applications from 
these public HEIs receive more preference in the grant allocation process. Using the 
words of an interviewee, “in the public dominated HE system, if a university wants to 
grow, finding some public backing can make it easy to gain access to all kinds of 
resources as well as social recognition.” (Faculty Interview No. 11) 
Another policy bias for ICs is in the student admission process. This bias is also 
relevant to other minban HEIs in China. In today’s admission process, HEIs are 
usually put into different batches while admitting students. In most provincial 
admission policies, there are two batches of admission. The first mainly consists of 
public HEIs, including 985/211 Project universities. The second includes the rest of 
the bachelor degree institutions. In Zhejiang, before 2015 there were three batches: 1) 
                                                             
17 The minban nature of ICs in the No. 26 Decree is mainly referring to the minban tuition these schools charge 
and the fact that these schools receive far less public fiscal support than the public HEIs. However, in reality the 
public universities being the key founders make their nature more ambiguous. Practically, how an education 
institution charges tuition is the basic way to determine the public or minban nature of an institution in China.  
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key public HEIs, 2) other public bachelor level HEIs, 3) minban bachelor level HEIs. 
Therefore, the hierarchical admission process is very apparent. The public HEIs 
always had priority in accessing the high scoring students. The minban HEIs were left 
to pick among the rest. However, in some provinces, such as Guangdong, the unfair 
admission process has been changed. Starting from 2018, all the bachelor degree HEIs 
in Guangdong have the same access to all the Gaokao students. That means minban 
HEIs and ICs can compete for good students with public HEIs. This is an important 
break to the public dominated HE system. But it still takes time to see how far the 
policy will go in terms of treating public and minban HEIs equally.  
 Despite the gradual reform, the psychological and social consequences of this 
hierarchical admission policy are indelible. Since the restoration of Gaokao in 1978, 
the admission process has been set up in several batches dividing the access order to 
good students. Parents and students have already formed this conception of ranking 
HEIs. In Zhejiang, even after the abolition of the third batch admission, many parents 
habitually refer to minban HEIs as San Ben (third tier Bachelor) HEIs, because before 
all the third Bachelor degree college were minban HEIs, including ZUCC. San Ben is 
like a social label to designate a positional status to all these minban HEIs. As 
explained by an interviewee, ICs all face this negative social stereotyping: 
Chinese society gives great emphasis to brand-name, ranking and 
hierarchy. Many companies only consider job applications from 
985/211 university graduates, not independent college graduates. 
Parents and their children also follow the same thinking model. Being 
admitted into some top university is considered important for many 
things impacting the students’ future. Therefore, in our society ICs 
normally receive social discriminations. ICs are considered low-notch 
and worse than the top universities in education quality. It is a difficult 
journey ahead of ICs. I often encourage my students to continue for a 
graduate education. This is a way to prove they are no less than 
anybody else. (Faculty Interview No. 10) 
The social stereotyping affects not only the status of these institutions but the 
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people in them. Students are barred from applying for positions in certain big 
corporations and faculty face limited opportunities in grant application. The simple 
division of HEIs into different tiers has a lasting effect on the development path of not 
only the institutions but also the students graduating from them. It is like the tracking 
of students in high schools. Once a student is put in the science track, he or she is 
destined to become an engineer in career. That labeling or tracking system oppresses 
the inner voice of students and ignores the variety of individuals. In the same logic, 
the simple division or categorization of HEIs can reduce the dynamics of HE and lead 
to the homogenization of HEIs, which is a serious issue China’s HE system faces.  
In response to such social stereotyping, some ICs with good public resources are 
making efforts to distinguish themselves from the other ICs. ZUCC is an example by 
calling itself “New Type” (Xin Xing 新型) in school introduction. During interviews, 
some senior officials also think ZUCC is developing on a path of its own, not willing 
to put it into the negatively imaged IC group.  
The social reputation of ICs is not very good. This image is hard to 
revert. Now we call ourselves ‘New Type’ HEI. Although we are not so 
sure what this ‘New Type’ actually includes, it is a gesture to show we 
want to find a way of our own. I feel the future is leaning towards 
public. The resources and reputation for public ones are important and 
advantageous. (Faculty Interview No. 5) 
In a public dominated system, picking the winning side is probably the right 
decision. The road for minban HEIs is going to be tough. In reality, it is true that 
minban HEIs usually have lower educational quality. But it is the result of a 
combination of factors, not just the inside problem with the school. The funding 
difficulty to attract good teachers, the policy hindrance to access good students and 
the social stereotyping of minban are all outside factors creating an unfavorable soil 
for their development. In the case of ZUCC, most of its degree programs are turning 
public after securing the full public support from the local government. The ICs with 
public ownership in Zhejiang are all seeking their ways to strengthen the ties with 
local governments so as to ensure the policy and funding support. What used to be a 
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new model of minban is gradually turning to some ordinary public HEIs. The 
innovation in institutional mechanism is losing its luster after they have fulfilled their 
historical purpose.  
Summary 
 In this section, faculty’s knowledge on the nature of ZUCC is depicted. Because 
of their long term immersive participation in the institution, their knowledge is more 
nuanced and insightful. Through their lenses, we learn how ZUCC was given birth 
and the practical reasons underlying the emergence of independent colleges. Also, it 
seems majority of the faculty point to the importance of the strong backing from the 
local government and the inextricable connections with the mother public HEI. And 
further nuanced knowledge about ZUCC’s relationship with the local government and 
the mother institution is provided to show both the obvious and the shady area of the 
whole story. Despite the quick establishment of social reputation with the 
participation of public forces in the building of ZUCC, concerns about 
bureaucratization, loss of innovation and flexibility, and lack of independence from 
ZJU are legitimate if the institution plans to find a path of its own. In the end, the 
issue of stratification in a tiered HE system is also recognized by the faculty group. 
And for many, finding a way to break away from the negatively portrayed image of 
minban institutions is a solution to the problem. Building strong ties to the public 
force and turning minban tuition programs into public tuition ones are some of the 
agreed practices.  
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Chapter 7  Conclusion 
 
Retired UCLA education faculty, Frederick Erickson argues that “ethnography 
should be considered a deliberate inquiry process guided by a point of view, rather 
than a reporting process guided by a standard technique or set of techniques, or a 
totally intuitive process that does not involve reflection”(1984, p. 51). Inspired by this 
ethnographic approach, I entered the field as an observing participant, working for the 
English department, and was determined to offer an insider’s perspective on 
recently-developed independent colleges in China. I grounded my fieldwork in the 
literature on China’s higher education system and its privatization reform in higher 
education. The key goal of this dissertation is to make sense of these independent 
colleges in the context of China’s higher education system. Particularly, I focused on 
the physical artifacts (programs, personnel system and admission ad) and the assumed 
perceptions (perceptions of students and faculty) to narrate the institutional story of 
ZUCC, in which the question about its identity as a private/minban HEI or a public 
one is interrogated.  
In this dissertation, chapter two takes a historical view at the development of 
China’s private higher education since its emergence in the 1910s. Great attention is 
paid to the Reform Era (1978 to today), because this is the period characterized by a 
post-socialist market reform and most relevant to the social context for the rise of 
independent colleges. A typology is given to make sense of the private higher 
education structure in current China.  
Chapter three looks into the status quo of independent colleges in China, 
attempting to answer questions, such as what are independent colleges and how they 
have developed. Through focusing on the regulatory government documents, the 
development path of these new HEIs is portrayed and the basic characters are 
depicted so as to offer a knowledge foundation on this new type of hybrid institutions 
with Chinese characteristics. At the end of chapter two, some background knowledge 
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about the independent colleges in the province of Zhejiang is introduced so as to both 
recognize the regional character of independent colleges and set the stage for the 
ethnographic study on Zhejiang University City College (ZUCC) in the following 
chapters.  
Chapter four to six provide the detailed research results on the ethnographic case 
study of ZUCC. Chapter four focuses on the physical aspects of the institutional story, 
including history, founding background, programs, tuition and personnel structure. 
Chapter five provides the interesting insights from the perspective of students. Their 
perceptions show the importance of social reputation of the founding public 
institution. And the stereotyped image of independent colleges—third tier colleges 
(San Ben)—limits the opportunities for these students, some of whom make efforts to 
climb up the internalized social ladder of higher education institutions. Chapter six 
reveals the knowledge of faculty working there for more than 6 years. Their 
understanding provides valuable insights into the birth story of ZUCC, its minban 
mechanism, the roles of the two founding partners (Hangzhou government and ZJU) 
and the bias against independent colleges in a tiered higher education system. It is 
important to note that students’ perception and faculty’s perception are quite different 
in terms of attention and stand, but their views are also mutually corroborating. The 
social capital that comes with the founding parties can have a significant impact on 
the resources and reputation enjoyed by an independent college, while the existing 
tiered system stigmatizes the institutional image of these new colleges, which in turn 
implicitly hurts the people studying and working there.  
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Understanding China’s Independent Colleges  
Figure 7.1 Types of Independent Colleges  
 
 Independent colleges in China are a new group of HEIs, established at a time of 
higher education expansion (massification era) and assuming the historical task of 
providing higher education opportunities without causing financial burden to the state. 
Because of the strong role the founding public universities play in the establishment 
and operation processes, these colleges have been shaped in a way suiting the 
requirements or plans of the founding public universities. As shown in the above 
chapters, despite the categorization as minban colleges, independent colleges have 
most been influenced by the founding public universities in academic programs 
setting, faculty composition, personnel structure, administration and campus culture.  
 In this research, the fieldwork is based upon the independent colleges in Zhejiang, 
where all but one independent college follow the model of public ownership and 
minban operation mechanism. And this public type of independent colleges is the 
dominant form in Zhejiang (21 ICs) and Jiangsu (24 ICs) provinces. With the 2008 
regulatory government document, many independent colleges are adjusting to meet 
the requirements on keeping themselves “independent” from the founding public 
universities. Quite a number of private type independent colleges—having both public 
and private founding partners—chose to transform into traditional minban HEIs, 
divesting from the founding public universities. The number of independent colleges 
declined from 322 in 2008 to 265 in 2017, which can be largely attributed to the 
Independent 
colleges
Public ownership(public 
type)
Public-private 
collaboration (private 
type)
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transformation. And also due to the 2008 document, many public type independent 
colleges, particularly the ones in Zhejiang according to the research, have looked for 
opportunities to partner up with lower-level governments so as to meet the 500 mu 
independent campus size requirement and secure long term government funding and 
BianZhi support. In Zhejiang, over a dozen independent colleges have been 
undergoing such campus moving plans.  
 Therefore, from a macro-level, independent colleges have experienced an 
expansion period before 2008, which coincides with China’s rapid massification since 
1999 and later entered a period of regulation and adjustment to deal with the social 
criticisms against some illegitimate behaviors, such as awarding public university 
degree paper and sharing campus facilities with the founding public university.  
 To understand the social context for the rise of independent colleges, it is 
important to discuss the influences of market and state forces. Before the 2008 
regulatory document, particularly before 2003, the public universities took the center 
stage in establishing and running the precursors of independent colleges with either 
other public partners or private investors. This was the period when the market 
mechanism was considered a useful tool to realize the goal for higher education 
provision expansion. In the high days for China’s post-socialist market reform, 
particularly after China’s entry into WTO in 2000, the large social trend was to carry 
out the market reform in all areas so as to both stimulate the economy and reform the 
backward social and economic organizations. The public universities took this 
historical opportunity and went ahead to take advantage of their academic capital to 
engineer a new type of HEIs. During this process, pragmatism plays a key role in 
deciding how to charge tuition, how to organize academic programs and where to set 
the campus. This is probably the reason that scholars focusing on China’s higher 
education refer to the rise of minban/private institutions in this period as the 
neoliberal movement in the China context (Mok, 2007, 2009; Yan, 2010).  
However, the social outcry pointing to the irregular behaviors in independent 
colleges began to catch the attention of the media and eventually the government. The 
state began to come back to take up its role to regulate and respond to the rising 
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discontent. The 2008 document is a good example of that regulation. Since then, 
independent colleges had to find ways to meet the requirements and turn to an 
adjustment path to ensure its survival and quality.  
In a socialist market system, the state’s role should never be underestimated. 
China’s public dominant system puts the public institutions in the core position and 
the minban institutions in the peripheral position (Altbach, 2005). All levels of the 
government have a natural trust for public universities, since they all serve the same 
purpose of economic development, political indoctrination and nation-building. The 
central and local governments are more likely to see the founding of independent 
colleges by public HEIs with more trust and as an important strategy for local social 
and economic development. Therefore, despite the pragmatic orientation and the 
intention to invite market force into higher education, the participation of public HEIs 
and the strong tie between the public HEIs and the local governments determine the 
public leaning nature of these independent colleges. The tuition charging is only a 
pragmatic tactic to mobilize funding from families. The freezing of tuition is a sign 
for the underlying influence of the government regulation and checking system to 
ensure the clam-down of the public discontent. So it is safe to say that the state has 
never disappeared from the picture and the market force has never truly penetrated the 
public dominant higher education system of China.  
From a micro-level perspective, the ethnographic case study on ZUCC provides 
further evidences about the public influences inside the institution. In the chapter on 
the physical aspects of the education at ZUCC, the two public founders—ZJU and 
Hangzhou government—underlie the founding story of ZUCC. The purpose is to meet 
the rising demands, serve the local talent needs for economic development and assist 
in the personnel restructuring of ZJU during its merging process. It is important to 
note that this dual public connection has greatly helped to win public credibility and 
reputation for this new born college. For both students and faculty, when they have to 
consider whether to choose this college for study or work, the public founders’ 
credibility and their strong academic/political influence serve to win their favor. It 
becomes one of the main reasons for the quick rise and expansion of ZUCC (less than 
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10 years to expand into a college with over ten thousand students). In addition, the 
programs offered at ZUCC and the supporting academic resources from ZJU show the 
underlying ubiquitous influences from the founding public university. The upgrading 
of some programs from the third tier minban tuition charging to the first tier public 
tuition charging implies the development path of this institution is more likely to turn 
increasingly public. And it is probably the will of the founders to formally transform 
ZUCC into a public one once the historical role it has played has been satisfactorily 
fulfilled.  
Bianzhi is one particular feature within the administrative system revealing the 
true nature of the institution from an insiders’ point of view. A large group of the 
faculty force enjoy the public personnel affiliation and are in fact employees of the 
Hangzhou government. The public personnel affiliation is favored by many 
employees of ZUCC, because it enjoys better job security and welfare. However, the 
other personnel affiliations, such as the enterprise affiliation, are considered inferior. 
And they create a hierarchical personnel affiliation inside the institution. Interestingly, 
similar to China’s higher education structure, the closer you are to the public force, 
the better security and credibility you can enjoy. Again, this can be attributed to 
China’s public dominant system, where the top-class educational resources are all in 
the hands of the public forces. The students and faculty are aware of this public 
dominant tendency and are naturally attracted to the institutions associated with 
public forces.  
When exploring the perceptions of students and faculty inside, two assumptions 
stand out to exert influences on the perceived image of ZUCC among them. One is the 
social reputation and credibility associated with the public founders. Both students 
and faculty identify it as an important factor to be attracted to the institution. This 
assumption makes a lot of sense, considering the public dominant system creates this 
more credible image of public HEIs.  
The other assumption may not be strongly associated with the public founders, 
but show an interesting stigmatization of independent colleges, because of its minban 
categorization and SanBen status. An invisible wall is built up between the public 
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HEIs, occupying mostly the first tier positions, and the minban HEIs, burdened with 
the negative stereotype of being inferior and high fee charging. This psychological 
barrier has impacted the self-image of students and many of them are trapped in this 
socially constructed image, despite efforts to break out and prove their worthiness. 
Though being more rational, faculty also face some of this similar bias due to the 
artificially designed hierarchical order of HEIs. For them, it has more to do with 
grants and funding opportunities. It is important to note that this bias is embedded in 
the long term domination of public forces in education. People grow used to the idea 
that public universities are more credible and longer lasting and minban ones are 
usually profit oriented and less trustworthy. Therefore, this public stereotyping 
contributes to the quick rise of these independent colleges backed by public 
universities and sometimes even local governments. To a great extent, I argue this 
actually provide evidence for the tremendous role public influences have in China’s 
higher education. And it is contrary to the argument that these so-called new colleges, 
formally categorized as minban institutions, show the evidence for the privatization or 
marketization of higher education in China. This research shows insiders’ 
investigation into the internal organs of independent colleges reveals a lot about the 
strong public influences, both physically and psychologically. This is what the official 
statistical information cannot reveal.  
 
Privatization with Chinese Characteristics  
Altbach argues that internationalization and diversification are the two major 
trends in the growth of private higher education worldwide (2005). 
Internationalization might be another story beyond this dissertation’s focus. 
Diversification can be used to explain China’s newly-emerged independent colleges. 
In a time of massification, new HEIs were created to meet the new demands. Usually 
these new HEIs have some private characters since their emergence is situated in the 
market reform background to meet the surging needs.  
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To China’s story of privatization in higher education, scholars debate with each 
other in terms of the nature. Yan and Lin (2010) refer to these independent colleges 
mainly as “commercial civil society.” On the one hand, these institutions serve as an 
important supplement to the public dominant higher education system and may have 
the potential to turn into non-government “civil society” in China. On the other hand, 
a careful investigation into its founders or partners reveals the shadow influence of 
real estate companies or profit-oriented businesses and their short-term plan for 
economic returns. This side of the debate points to the rampant influence of market or 
business interests in higher education, which distorts the education nature of 
private/minban institutions. On the other hand, some scholars try to remind us of the 
vital role of the state. Wang (2013), in his study on China’s privatization of higher 
education, argues the push for marketization is designed by the state as a pragmatic 
method to realize the massification with minimum cost and the state is the master 
mind behind its privatization movement. Therefore, for Wang, the marketization is 
never intended to stir up the structural or systematic change in higher education 
organization and it is never the true intent of the government to bring in market force 
into the higher education arena. As a matter of fact, the market force is always under 
the check of the state power.  
Mok (2007, 2009), as a long-term follower of China’s privatization and 
marketization, tries to apply the western concept of neoliberalism in the context of 
China, calling the increasingly private tendency of higher education in China (rising 
tuition and rise of minban institutions) as impacts of neoliberalism. Different from 
other scholars, Mok notices the role of the state was starting to return around 2012, 
when China’s massification has reached a point where social discontent began to rise 
(2012). Therefore, it seems China’s policy towards marketization vacillates between 
decentralization and centralization, depending on the social context and policy needs.  
As a socialist market society with a strong state presence, I disagree that the 
western originated concept of neoliberalism can easily fit into the China context. As 
this research has shown, China still has a very public-dominant higher education 
system and the influence of the public forces can be observed in daily practices and 
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people’s perceptions. The concepts such as choice and freedom, frequently raised in a 
market oriented system, are seldom discussed or noted by the participants in higher 
education system. So to understand China’s privatization, it is important to evaluate 
the negotiations among different forces.    
Burton Clark designed an analytical triangle to explain the complex interactions 
among three major forces, namely the state, the market and the academic oligarchy, 
when the neoliberal global force began to exert its influences in the 1980s and the 
universities underwent some structural changes in terms of funding and academic 
mission (1983). According to this cognitive model, the market’s influence continues 
to grow and erode the academic power of universities and colleges. The states in 
many regions, especially the U.S. and U.K., withdraw themselves from their role of 
public higher education provider (Torres, 2002). Only some top universities, called 
here as “academic oligarchies”, maintain the independence and capability to negotiate 
with the prevalent market force.  
 
Figure 7.2  Clark’s Triangle of Coordination (1983) 
 
Figure 7.3   Revised Triangle of Coordination  
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In the case of China and the rising independent colleges, I theorize on the basis of 
Clark’s triangle of analysis. With the anthropological ground research, family or 
public perspective is added to enrich the analytical model. In the case of China, 
market concept is an imported one, therefore it lacks the deep-rooted ideological 
belief in a market-regulated system. On the contrary, the state is widely considered as 
a more trustworthy provider for education. In the late 1990s, when the massification 
began, it was the state which introduced the hand of the market to help to solve the 
higher education provision problem. From the perspective of the state, the market 
force has been a useful tool to achieve certain goals and the state is always read to 
intervene when it sees necessary. In the case of independent colleges, the 2003 and 
2008 regulatory documents are important examples to show the checking power of the 
state. The market force can only develop according to the path designed from the top, 
though the state also welcomes the vitality and self-sustaining ability resulted from 
the market competition.  
 In terms of academic oligarchies, the major top universities in China are all 
public. Behind the numerous independent colleges, one can find the indispensable 
influences of the first tier public universities. And the state regulation clearly 
stipulates that only the public universities can establish independent colleges. In the 
founding process, the public universities often seek partnership or policy support from 
the local governments. This Chinese characteristic compromises the independence of 
academic oligarchies. To a great extent, public universities work together with the 
local governments to set up independent colleges so as to provide the necessary 
talents and educational resources for local economic, cultural and social development. 
The state trusts the public universities with founding new institutions and the public 
universities try to win local funding/policy support for provision of educational 
services to the public and expansion of academic influences. The case of Zhejiang’s 
independent colleges proves that the local government support is one of the key 
ingredients for their survival and development, considering the land requirements for 
new campuses and personnel affiliation system. Therefore, in the case of China, the 
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state and the academic oligarchies often coordinate with each other to serve the goal 
of higher education provision and expansion. But due to the control of key resources 
by the state, the public universities are more willing to seek partnership and their 
independence is usually considered secondary. For ZUCC, the partnership between 
Hangzhou government and ZJU not only provides a strong foundation for its quick 
rise but also wins the trust from the public. In general this kind of partnership is 
understandable and pragmatic in China’s public dominant higher education system. 
Neither independent civil society nor neoliberal transformation is within the 
consideration of local government officials and public university administrators when 
they set up the new HEIs.  
With regard to family, their needs and calculations should also be put into the 
picture, since it is their tuition paying and decision making that allows the quick 
expansion of independent colleges. To a great extent, the hybrid model of public 
ownership and private running is to suit the preference of these families. In China, 
many families dream of sending their children to the few top public universities, 
which is believed to bring glory and honor to the family line. Students interviewed all 
mention the brand name of ZJU is one of the key reasons for them to choose ZUCC. 
Therefore, it is their preference for top universities, behind which lies the long term 
tradition of passing the imperial examination to enter the elite class, that prepares the 
social and cultural context for the rise of independent colleges. They play an 
important role in shaping the privatization with Chinese characteristics. As mentioned 
by one of the interviewees, if ZUCC had another name, such as Hangzhou City 
College, the school would become less desirable. The attraction of being associated 
with the top university (elite class) is a driving force for many families to pay the 
triple tuition to enter the third tier (SanBen) college. Therefore, the participation of 
public universities is somehow a social necessity, because the families lend great 
credibility to these top elite universities. To some extent, the choices made by these 
ordinary families are turning the higher education system increasingly public. The 
trust is given to those with strong public backing, rather than the ones with only 
private founders. The bias against minban HEIs is embedded in the system, but it 
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results from the social attitude of the general public. Therefore, the family choices and 
preferences prepare the social and cultural foundation for the rise of independent 
colleges with public ownership but operating under minban mechanism.  
 
Future Research 
In the field of comparative education, China or Asian education is an important 
sub-field. However, a lot of researches are conducted from the outsiders’ perspective. 
Some of them are marvelous and provide very insightful analysis to the particularities 
of Chinese or Asian education (Marginson, 2011; Hayhoe, 2011; Hawkins, 2013). 
There is a lacking of insiders’ researches, a kind of researches that reveal the inner 
mechanism and insiders’ viewpoints. For the many universities and colleges in China, 
there are many different facets: the different tiers of HEIs, the considerations of 
families and students, the western and eastern regional differences, the minban HEIs, 
the Sino-foreign joint institutes and the globalization of education from the 
perspective of local colleges and universities. China is a vast country with hugely 
different circumstances when it comes to higher education. The forces of 
marketization, globalization and massification all reflect themselves in a different way 
when it meets the Chinese context. Therefore, a lot more researches can be done to 
explain the characteristics coming out of this interaction between international forces 
and local contexts. Insiders’ researches can surly help to enrich the knowledge on 
China’s education and broaden the analytical framework for understanding China.  
In terms of China’s private higher education, as discussed in the second chapter, 
there are three major types: traditional minban HEIs, independent colleges, 
Sino-foreign joint institutes. Further researches can be conducted about other two 
types of private higher education. Traditional minban HEIs suffer from the social bias 
and lie in the lower ladder of the hierarchical system. The social stereotyping and the 
cultural worshiping of top universities all contribute to the difficult circumstances 
they have to endure. The lived experiences of students and faculty in these institutions 
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and how they perceive their conditions can be interesting topics to explore. These are 
important experiences from the bottom, which are not often given a lot of academic 
attention.  
The Sino-foreign joint institutes are the results of marketization in the past two 
decades. Today there are quite a few globally prestigious universities already setting 
up campuses in China, including New York University in Shanghai, University of 
Nottingham in Ningbo, and Xi-an Jiaotong-Liverpool University in Suzhou. They 
form a small portion of China’s higher education, but their presence is a sign of 
China’s openness and the diversification of its higher education. These foreign 
universities try to maintain their original university mission and character while 
adapting to the local needs and meeting the local higher education requirements. How 
these joint institutes survive and develop in China is another interesting topic to 
explore. And how are they perceived by the local students and families? What are the 
experiences of studying in these institutions like? What conflicts or problems arise 
when the western educational models meet the Chinese educational practices? I am 
sure there must be many interesting stories within these Sino-foreign joint institutes.  
This dissertation makes some efforts to contribute to the knowledge on Chinese 
higher education, particularly its private or minban part, from the anthropological 
insiders’ lens. It is believed that more such in-depth insiders’ research can be 
conducted to reveal the inner mechanism and experiences of the minban HEIs in 
China. It is the goal of this dissertation to explore the story of rising independent 
colleges in China and reveal the inside experiences of these newly-established minban 
HEIs.  
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Appendix 1: Sample Interview Questions 
 
Interview Consent Form 
Information on the Study 
Thank you very much for considering participating in this research. The 
following is a detailed research guide for interviewees. Please read in detail to assist 
you in deciding to be a volunteer interviewee for the study.  
 
Research question: this study attempts to explore China’s “independent colleges” 
running under the publicly owned and privately run model 
 
Researcher: Xiaopeng Shen (UCLA doctoral candidate in education)  
 email: xpshen@gmail.com phone: 13805784164 
 
Faculty sponsor: Prof. Val Rust (School of Education, UCLA)      
email: rust@gseis.ucla.edu 
 
Research summary: The research plans to use Zhejiang University City College 
(ZUCC) as a case to reflect the characteristics of independent colleges. It hopes to 
interview the people who are associated with this college to understand how this new 
type of independent colleges is made sense of and how the publicly owned and 
privately run model is played out in reality. Through depicting the case of Zhejiang 
University City College, the research tends to explain the private colleges with 
Chinese characteristics.  
  
Interview questions 
Part 1 
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1. How much did you know about ZUCC and independent colleges before you came 
here? Why did you choose to come to ZUCC?  
2. What is your current impression of ZUCC? Is it different from your impression 
when you first came here?  
3. How do you see the development of ZUCC in these years? What are the big 
changes in your eyes? Do you see changes in physical campus, faculty, student 
body and school vision?  
4. Do you think ZUCC is an independent college? If so, what makes you include 
ZUCC as an independent college?  
5. How do you see the connection between ZUCC and Zhejiang University? What 
are the ties and how independent is ZUCC?  
6. What advantages and disadvantages does ZUCC have as an independent college 
associated with Zhejiang University?  
7. What kind of higher education institution do you think ZUCC belong to? Or how 
do you think ZUCC define itself? Among all the four year institutions in Zhejiang 
how do you think ZUCC is ranked?  
8. To what extent ZUCC is different or similar to public universities? To what extent 
ZUCC is different and similar to other independent colleges?  
9. How do you comment on ZUCC in terms of its teaching quality and student body?  
10. In your experience what do you think can best exemplify the characteristics of 
ZUCC? 
 
Part 2 
1. How much do you know about the publicly owned and privately run model? What 
are the pros and cons of this model? How did it emerge?  
2. How do you understand the publicly owned and privately run model with 
independent colleges? What are the areas this model can found to exert its 
influences on?  
3. What are the things in this college that can be explained as the influence of public 
ownership?  
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4. What are the things in this college that can be explained as the influence of private 
market mechanism?  
5. Have you found any controversies over Zhejiang University City College and 
independent colleges overall? How do you think of these controversies? What are 
the influences of these controversies?  
 
Part 3 
1. How would you rate the degree of being public? 10 is being fully public and 1 is 
being fully private? Why?  
2. How do you see the future of Zhejiang University City College and independent 
colleges overall?  
 
Be noted:  
 
a. You have the right to choose to participate in this study or not. And there will 
be no harmful consequences if you choose not to.  
b. You can also choose to stop the interview if you feel any part of the interview 
making you uncomfortable and you don’t feel like answering it.  
c. You have the right to choose to answer or not to answer any of the questions 
above.  
d. Your interview will be kept confidential. The interview data will be safely 
protected and kept.  
e. If you have any questions or concerns, you can contact me through the 
contact methods indicated above. I will try my best to answer them.  
f. No personal information will be not revealed in the research and in the 
writing of the dissertation.  
g. If you agree to participate in this research, you will be asked to conduct a 1 to 
1.5 hours interview based on the questions listed above.  
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Appendix 2: Sample Interview Questions for Students 
 
Interview Consent Form 
Information On the Study 
Thank you very much for considering to participate in this research. The 
following is a detailed research guide for interviewees. Please read in detail to assist 
you in deciding to be a volunteer interviewee for the study.  
 
Research question: this study attempts to explore China’s “independent colleges” 
running under the publicly owned and privately run model 
 
Researcher: Xiaopeng Shen (UCLA doctoral candidate in education)  
 email: xpshen@gmail.com phone: 13805784164 
 
Faculty sponsor: Prof. Val Rust (School of Education, UCLA)      
email: rust@gseis.ucla.edu 
 
Research summary: The research plans to use Zhejiang University City College 
(ZUCC) as a case to reflect the characteristics of independent colleges. It hopes to 
interview the people who are associated with this college to understand how this new 
type of independent colleges is made sense of and how the publicly owned and 
privately run model is played out in reality. Through depicting the case of Zhejiang 
University City College, the research tends to explain the private colleges with 
Chinese characteristics.  
  
Interview questions 
 
Part 1 Personal Questions 
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1. Where is your hometown? What major do you study? Is ZUCC the ideal school for 
you when you pass the college entrance exam?  
2. Could you talk about the situation when you filled in your application form? Why 
did you choose ZUCC? What are the considering factors when you select colleges? 
3. What did you know about ZUCC when you filled in your application form? What 
kind of college did you know ZUCC was?  
4. Could you describe your feelings or impressions when you first arrived at ZUCC?  
5. What are the pros and cons for choosing ZUCC? 
6. What level of college do you think ZUCC is today? What are the main characters of 
ZUCC in your eyes?   
 
Part 2 ZUCC impressions 
1. Could you talk about your program and your department? What are the major 
characters of your program and the department you study in? What is good and bad 
about the program?  
2. How do you think the connection between ZUCC and ZJU is manifested? How do 
you perceive the relationship between ZUCC and ZJU?  
3. How do you see the differences between ZUCC and traditional Minban colleges, 
such as Shuren university?  
4. How do you see the differences between ZUCC and regular public universities, 
such as Hangzhou Normal University?  
5. What is your knowledge about independent colleges? From what you have learned 
in and out of school, what is the common impression or evaluation for independent 
colleges? 
6. Do you feel independent colleges are closer to public HEIs or private/minban ones? 
To what extent do you see them similar to public HEIs? To what extent do you see 
them similar to private/minban ones?  
7. Do you feel what are the differences between us (ZUCC) and other independent 
colleges in Zhejiang?  
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Future 
1. As a graduate from an independent college, what do you think are your strengths 
and weaknesses? When you graduate and enter the society, how do you feel you are 
treated and looked at as a graduate from an independent college?  
2. How does the degree from ZUCC help or limit your personal development?  
3. If you have to give a score (10=full mark) to the overall experience at ZUCC, what 
is your score? Why? 
 
Be noted:  
 
a. You have the right to choose to participate in this study or not. And there will 
be no harmful consequences if you choose not to.  
b. You can also choose to stop the interview if you feel any part of the interview 
making you uncomfortable and you don’t feel like answering it.  
c. You have the right to choose to answer or not to answer any of the questions 
above.  
d. Your interview will be kept confidential. The interview data will be safely 
protected and kept.  
e. If you have any questions or concerns, you can contact me through the 
contact methods indicated above. I will try my best to answer them.  
f. No personal information will be not revealed in the research and in the 
writing of the dissertation.  
g. If you agree to participate in this research, you will be asked to conduct a 1 to 
1.5 hours interview based on the questions listed above.  
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